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STATEMENT  
OF  
GEN. FITZ JOHN PORTER.  

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SERVICES  
OF THE  
FIFTH ARMY CORPS,  
IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA, 1862.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 78.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Washington, April 12, 1878.

The following order has been received from the War Department :

An appeal has been made to the President, as follows :

"NEW YORK, March 9, 1878.

"To His Excellency RUTHERFORD B. HAYES,

*"President of the United States.*

"Sir : I most respectfully, but most urgently, renew my oft repeated appeal to have you review my case. I ask it as a matter of long delayed justice to myself. I renew it upon the ground heretofore stated, that public justice cannot be satisfied so long as my appeal remains unheard. My sentence is a *continuing sentence*, and made to follow my daily life. For this reason, if for no other, my case is ever within the reach of executive as well as legislative interference.

"I beg to present copies of papers heretofore presented, bearing upon my case, and trust that you will deem it a proper one for your prompt and favorable consideration.

"If I do not make it plain that I have been wronged, I alone am the sufferer. If I do make it plain that great injustice has been done me, then I am sure that you, and all others who love truth and justice, will be glad that the opportunity for my vindication has not been denied.

"Very respectfully yours,

"FITZ JOHN PORTER."

In order that the President may be fully informed of the facts of the case of Fitz John Porter, late Major General of Volunteers, and be enabled to act advisedly upon his application for relief in said case, a Board is hereby convened, by order of the President, to examine, in connection with the record of the trial by court martial of Major General PORTER, such new evidence relating to the merits of said case as is now on file in the War Department, together with such other evidence as may be presented to said Board, and to report with the reasons for their conclusion, what action, if any, in their opinion justice requires should be taken on said application by the President.

*Detail for the Board.*

Major General J. M. SCOFIELD.

Brigadier General A. H. TERRY.

Colonel G. W. GETTY, 3d Artillery.

Major ASA B. GARDNER, Judge Advocate, Recorder.

The Board will convene at West Point, New York, on the 20th day of June, 1878, and is authorized to adjourn from time to time, and to sit in such place as may be deemed expedient.

By COMMAND OF GENERAL SHERMAN :

E. D. TOWNSEND,  
*Adjutant General.*

—:0:—

JOHN C. BULLITT, Philadelphia, }

JOSEPH H. CHOATE, New York, }

ANSON MALTBY, New York, }

*Counsel for General Porter.*

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*To the Senate and House of Representatives :*

“ I transmit herewith the ‘proceedings and report’ of the Board of officers, convened by special orders No. 78, headquarters of the army, Washington, April 12, 1878, in the case of Fitz-John Porter. The report of the Board was made in March last, but the official record of the proceedings did not reach me until the 3d instant.

“ I have given to this report such examination as satisfies me that I ought to lay the proceedings and conclusions of the board before Congress.

“ As I am without power in the absence of legislation to act upon the recommendation of the report further than by submitting the same to Congress, the proceedings and conclusions of the board are transmitted for the information of Congress, and such action as in your wisdom shall seem expedient and just.

“ R. B. HAYES.

“ Executive Mansion, Washington, June 5, 1879.”



# STATEMENT.

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# OPENING ADDRESS.

WEST POINT, NEW YORK, JUNE 25TH, 1878.

MR. PRESIDENT AND GENTLEMEN: It has pleased the President of the United States to convene you, a board of military officers, to examine into the merits of my case as they may appear in the light of the newly discovered evidence which will be presented to you.

I am happy that I am to lay my statements and the proofs thereof before officers eminently fitted for the duty of military judges; and that as a result of my unwearied efforts since my conviction and sentence, I at length stand innocent before a board of high officers, prepared to prove to that board and through that board to the President and to my country, that I am innocent of the charges of which I was found guilty by my court-martial.

As the past in a man's career indicates the probable future, I feel sure I shall be pardoned a cursory allusion to the events of my military life in the service of my country which tend to show how improbable was the commission of the offenses with which I was charged, and of which my being found guilty is the cause of my appearance before you to-day.

Belonging to a family whose deeds had added somewhat to the military and naval records and renown of my country, I was trained for military life, and to sustain, if not add to the untarnished records of an honored name.

Graduating with some degree of promise in an intelligent and unusually large class at West Point, I entered in 1845 upon my career of arms as a brevet second lieutenant of the 4th Artillery, in a regiment which bore upon its rolls names well calculated to excite the youthful mind to deeds of honor and bravery. Our wars have since added to those rolls new names of renown.

I subsequently went into active service in the Mexican war, taking part in the battles of Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Molino del Rey, the sieges of Vera Cruz and Chapultepec, and the capture of the City of Mexico.

Twice breveted for my services in these battles, I was wounded in the last battle at the Garita of Belen, City of Mexico, being the only officer of my company who was not killed in that well-earned victory.

In 1849 I was assigned to duty at this station, the records of which witness to the efficiency of my five years service.

My next active duty was in Kansas, during the troubles there in 1856.

In 1857, as chief of staff to General Albert Sidney Johnston, I served in Utah, through the campaign in the Rocky Mountains—memorable for its hardships.

During the early days of our great political trouble, I successfully accomplished the duties assigned me of inspecting and reporting upon

the defenses of Charleston harbor and their need of repairs, supplies and men, and of removing from seceded Texas those troops which could be rescued from the peril of being overwhelmed by numbers.

Satisfied with my efficiency, Mr. Cameron, then Secretary of War, and General Scott selected me for the important duty of protecting the Baltimore & Harrisburg Railroad (Northern Central) from the Baltimore rioters.

I obtained from Governor Curtin, at Harrisburg (Pennsylvania), a body of ninety days volunteers, whom I hastily armed, as best I could from all arsenals, under verbal authority from the Secretary of War and General Scott, to use their name for any good purpose.

With these troops I checked the destruction of the bridges already begun, and prepared to reopen communication with Washington, when all the troops were ordered by the President back to York, Pennsylvania.

It is well known that prompt action was at that time necessary in the disaffected States to prevent their secession.

The action of the people of those States sometimes depended on the success of a comparatively small body of men in obtaining control of arms, munitions and fortifications. Such it was feared would be the case in Missouri.

While at Harrisburg on the duty just set forth I became, through Governor Curtin, whose confidence and aid I enjoyed, cognizant of the necessity of prompt action on the part of the administration to protect the arsenal and other public property at St. Louis, and to prevent these buildings and supplies from falling into the hands of the secessionists.

Those were anxious moments. A day—nay a few hours—of delay might suffice for the secessionists to gain possession of the government arms, stores and munitions, and Missouri might have been carried out of the Union. Of the effect this action would have had upon the war it is useless to speculate, but we know that the difficulties in the way of our success would have been greatly multiplied.

Three days were at that time needed to get a reply from the Secretary of War at Washington, then cut off from us—three days—every hour fraught with peril to our cause.

I assumed the responsibility, and at once in the name of the Secretary of War or General-in-Chief, gave the necessary telegraphic orders and instructions to muster in the Missouri volunteers at St. Louis, to arm them, to place them under Capt. Lyon, and to protect the public property.

The Secretary of War and General Scott warmly approved my action a few days after, upon my reporting in Washington.

And subsequently General Blair thanked me for my prompt assumption of authority, and the great services thus rendered the State, which in his words, "helped to save Missouri to the Union."

The value and effect of my action is known to one of your number, who was on duty in St. Louis.

Military skill was not necessary for this act; physical courage was not necessary for it. But zeal for the cause and love of my country were necessary, and that zeal and that love burned as brightly at Gaines Mill, at Malvern, at Antietam, and at the Second Bull Run as at Harrisburg, and shall die only with my life.

I was next assigned as Chief of Staff to General Robert Patterson commanding the Department of Pennsylvania and engaged in organizing an army of volunteers to protect Maryland and to reinforce Washington City. Faithful and efficient services under General Patterson and his successor General Banks were recognized by the government appointing me Colonel in the Regular army and Brigadier General in the Volunteer service.

After fulfilling the duty of organizing the raw recruits into brigades and divisions, to which I had been assigned at Washington, I was selected to command troops at Fort Corcoran, where I soon formed a division which was commended by the General-in-Chief to the army as a model for the army.

Under General Heintzelman I went to the Peninsula, and was conductor of the siege of Yorktown, until it fell; when I was placed in command of the FIFTH ARMY CORPS, formed for my benefit.

With this excellent body of troops placed as it was in positions of the greatest honor and danger, I served through the Peninsular campaign, fighting the battles of New Bridge, Hanover Court House, Mechanicsville, Gaines Mill, Turkey Bridge and Malvern.

Of the details of these battles it is needless to speak. They will be found recounted in the many histories of our war.

Suffice it to say that at the sanguinary battle of Gaines Mill, from my force of twenty-seven thousand men one-third were lost.

At the glorious battle of Malvern Hill my corps was posted by myself, anticipating a bloody struggle, and was joined on my appeal by portions of the commands of Generals Heintzelman, Keyes and Sumner, amounting with mine to some twenty-three or four thousand men.

Attacked with utmost vigor by the enemy who fought most stubbornly, my gallant corps and their comrades drove back their columns, persistently assailing and reassailing us in greatly superior numbers.

For my services in this campaign, but at no solicitation of mine, I was promoted by the President to be major-general of volunteers and brevet brigadier-general of the regular army.

Afterwards I hastened from the Peninsula with my corps to the assistance of General Pope, reporting to him from Bealeton, August 26, he being at Warrenton Junction.

This march, and more especially the events of my few days' service under General Pope, will be dwelt upon hereafter.

My actions during those days form the subject matter of your investigations.

General Pope's campaign was unsuccessful; the enemy crossed the Potomac into Maryland.

First assigned to the duty of making safe the almost vacated defences of Washington from Fort Corcoran to Hunting creek, and afterwards marching my corps of 9,000 men to Antietam, I took an effective part in that battle, seconding the efforts of my commanding general and my brother generals in every possible way.

On the 12th of November, 1862, two months after the battle of Bull Run, I was relieved from my command at Warrenton, Virginia, on the eve of most important movements.

A court martial was convened and found me guilty of the charges and material specifications preferred against me, involving my motives and conduct during and preceding the second battle of Bull Run.



I was dismissed from the United States Army January 27, 1863, under a sentence whose gravity is only equalled by that of death; convicted of wilfully refusing to obey orders; of refraining from giving battle in aid of my brother soldiers; of neglecting to aid in achieving a success, the failure to gain which caused the loss of the lives of thousands of men and of hundreds of my own corps on the next day, August 30, 1862, with woful disaster to my country.

Had such been in truth my conduct and had my motives been those charged upon me, the sentence of death would have been a light one and I would have deserved everlasting obloquy from my betrayed country.

But I am conscious of my innocence, conscious that my motives were for the best, that my conduct was, at least, not deserving of reproach.

My court martial sat at a time of great public excitement when war was raging a few miles from us, when witnesses actively engaged in the army were unattainable, and when the names of many witnesses to important facts were not known to me, when the facts set up on my side were regarded as fictions by my opponents, facts which are now capable of indisputable proof; when the geography of the battle field was not well known, and when the court members, needed each moment in the field, could not sit with that calm necessary for a judicial deliberation.

The sentence passed upon me could only have been passed from misapprehension of the truth of the whole facts by the court and by the witnesses for the Government.

Since my sentence I have persistently striven for a reopening of my case so that my innocence might be shown forth in unmistakable colors to all beholders. The pamphlets I now submit to you show that I have not waited for time to dull the edge of memory or rust the scales of justice. Unfortunately some of the witnesses against me are no longer living. I regret it. It would afford me great pleasure to convince them also of their mistake.

For the reopening of my case appeal was made in my behalf to President Lincoln, by Hon. Edward Everett, Robert C. Winthrop, Amos A. Lawrence and Gardner Howland Shaw, in August, 1863.

I appealed to President Johnson in 1867, my appeal being supported by Hon. Henry Wilson, Hon. John Sherman, Hon. Lafayette S. Foster, Hon. Ira Harris, Hon. N. P. Banks, Hon. Horace Greeley, Governor Curtin, and Ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, and other prominent citizens.

Again in 1869, I appealed to President Grant.

Many private petitions were made by my friends; and in 1874, I again appealed to President Grant, that I might have a rehearing, and resolutions recommending this act of justice, were passed by the Legislatures of New Hampshire, New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

Eminent lawyers, among them Charles O'Connor, Daniel Lord, and Judge Wm. D. Shipman of New York; Sidney Bartlett, Judges Benjamin R. Curtis and J. G. Abbott, of Boston, and Montgomery Blair of Washington City, had written their opinions of the justice of my case, and these were submitted to the President.

Always have the good wishes and resolutions of my old Fifth Army Corps gone with me.

My appeals were never refused, but were never granted.

And now, in 1878, after fifteen years of undeserved suffering—under

a sentence, which, founded upon mistaken evidence, has long caused the aim of my life to be the vindication of my military honor, President Hayes has granted me a rehearing.

A third of a century has rolled over my head, since as a boy I quitted these halls having demonstrated my fitness to serve my country. Now, a man struck down by an undeserved sentence in the height of my military career, while years of honorable service lay before me, I return to this spot, and shall demonstrate before you that I am not unworthy the name I was born to—the nourishment and education given me here, the trusts and rank bestowed upon me, nor of the rights and privileges of an American citizen.

With these words of preface I pass to my statement of the facts, which I claim shows that I was improperly convicted and removed from the United States Army.



STATEMENT

OF THE

SERVICES OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

IN 1862,

IN NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

BY

GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER.



WASHINGTON:  
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE.  
1879.

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GEN. FITZ JOHN PORTER'S STATEMENT OF THE SERVICES  
OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS, IN 1862, IN NORTHERN  
VIRGINIA.

---

FROM JAMES RIVER TO WARRENTON JUNCTION.

In August, 1862, my command, the Fifth Army Corps, was at Harrison's Landing, James River, and formed part of the Army of the Potomac, commanded by General McClellan.

Early in the month I was informed by General McClellan that the Army of the Potomac would be moved to the Rappahannock to co-operate with the Army of Virginia under General Pope.

The new campaign was to be conducted by General McClellan.

Though held ready to march when the Army should be relieved of the sick and other incumbrances to rapid movements, large details from the Fifth Corps were kept on the south bank of the James River, completing preparations for active operations in the direction of Petersburg.

The corps was composed of the divisions of Morell, Sykes and Reynolds (Pennsylvania Reserves) and of Hunt's "Reserve Artillery," each commanded by the accomplished general whose name distinguished it.

Reynolds, at the last moment taken from the south bank of James River, embarked from Harrison's Landing at night on the 14th of August. He reported on the 23d to General Pope, and was assigned to General McDowell.

Tyler's Artillery (Connecticut) and several "Reserve batteries" also embarked from Harrison's Landing. The batteries joined General Burnside opposite Fredericksburg. Tyler took post within the southern defences of Washington City.

The corps, further reduced in artillery and by details of infantry, and without cavalry, entered upon the campaign conducted by General Pope less than 9,000 strong.

I received my orders at 5 P. M., on the 14th, and at 7 P. M. the corps was marching for Fort Monroe. At 8 A. M., on the 18th, though detained 48 hours to guard bridges and trains, it encamped after a march of sixty miles, at Newport News and Hampton—the department commander (General Dix) wishing it no nearer Fort Monroe till transports, yet to arrive, should be provided.

To accomplish this it had made a night march all the night of August 14th, and also a forced march of 45 miles from Williamsburg to Newport News, marching at daylight of the 17th, and camping at 8 A. M. on the 18th.

On the 16th, at Williamsburg, where I was ordered to wait the arrival and passage through me of the Army of the Potomac, in order to cover as rear guard its movements from any attack east of the Chickahominy, I learned from intercepted letters and reliable sources that all of the Confederate available forces (even stripping the defences for the purpose)

had been sent from Richmond and its vicinity to crush General Pope, then south of the Rappahannock, before he could be reinforced.

I telegraphed the facts to General Halleck at Washington, and to General McClellan on the Chickahominy, adding to the latter that, as our army was withdrawing unmolested everywhere, I should, if not forbidden, push to Fort Monroe and embark for Aquia creek, my purpose being to co-operate with General Pope in pursuance of the information previously given to me by General McClellan, that the Army of the Potomac was to co-operate with the Army of Virginia under General Pope. I also telegraphed to Fort Monroe, and sent an officer to prepare for immediate and rapid embarkation. My action, approved by General McClellan at Fort Monroe, expedited by at least two days the embarkation of the army, and my corps joined General Pope at least four days earlier than if I had conformed to orders.

The following are my telegrams to Generals Halleck and McClellan:

[No. 1.]

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., August 16th, 6 P. M.

GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I sent you letters from people in Richmond taken from negroes. They say troops are moving north against General Pope. The negroes confirm them, and another who left there on Thursday says it is true. Colonel Campbell reports there is no enemy between us and Richmond. Unless you forbid I shall at day-break send everything to Fort Monroe and embark for Aquia Creek. I have asked that transports be in readiness.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

[No. 2.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,

*War Department.*

Time received, 4:45 P. M., August 17th.

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., August 16th, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK:

Two negroes who left Richmond on Wednesday say Jackson's wounded arrived there on Tuesday. All admitted he had been badly whipped. He had asked for large reinforcements and they had gone, and they comprised all cavalry and artillery which could be dispensed with about Richmond. All guns in Manchester, and one or two from those about Richmond, and eighteen thousand men, twelve thousand of which were from about Fort Randolph, had gone up. The cavalry in cars. He says this movement was known on Tuesday. I send this direct, not having immediate communication with General McClellan.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

True copy.

THO. T. ECKERT,

*Assist. Supt. Military Telegraph.*

General Halleck and the Secretary of War put no confidence in my report of the enemy marching on General Pope, and construed my motive, as General Halleck afterwards said to me, to be "the desire to retain the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, and General McClellan in command." It is true that the effect of my dispatch to General Halleck should have been the turning of our steps towards Richmond, instead of continuing the march from that city. Such retention and advance of the army on the Peninsula, would, it is fair to assume, probably, have recalled General Lee to Richmond and have prevented, at that time, the unfortunate termination of General Pope's campaign.

I willingly acknowledge that I was not among those who favored the removal of our army from before Richmond—thus to relieve our oppo-

nents' capital from the burdens and dangers of a siege and take them upon ourselves at Washington. But my opinion was never asked, and when the orders of my superiors reached me, I sought without discussion or hesitation how best to execute them.

I did not hear from General McClellan in answer to my dispatch, because he did not receive it until after I had marched from Williamsburg.

From divers causes the transports at Fort Monroe were very few, and these unprepared for immediate use. The few vessels that were there were loaded with lumber, &c., and had no fresh water. Almost all the vessels had to be sent to Norfolk for water. Those laden were discharged of their freight, cleaned, and the troops embarked for Aquia Creek. The wharves were fully occupied by other necessary work, and every facility for embarking had to be improvised at Hampton and Newport News. New wharves had to be built. These circumstances necessitated much laborious work. Night and day till midnight of the 20th, when I sailed, I was personally engaged in securing and preparing the vessels and embarking troops. By the authorized free use of General McClellan's name, and by the unremitted personal attention and assistance of the Hon. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, and Colonel Sawtelle, A. Q. M., transportation was secured. Through the continual exertions, night and day of the officers, sustained by the cheerful activity of the men, the corps was mainly embarked by midnight of the 20th August.

Reynolds, (Pennsylvania Reserves,) of my command, had sailed as before stated, on the night of the 14th from Harrison's Landing, and I had overtaken him at Newport News, and had hastened his departure by getting him a supply of water for his boilers, for which he had stopped two days unable to obtain it. General Reynolds and his force sailed the first of my troops to Aquia Creek.

Of my eagerness to carry out the plans of the authorities, and that I hastened my junction with General Pope by personal exertions and on my own responsibility, evidence was given at my trial by Generals McClellan and Burnside and Assistant Secretary of War Tucker.

Hunt's Reserve Artillery arrived at Aquia Creek after me some time, and owing to difficulty of landing, and the fact that by the time they could have landed I was far away, and they could not overtake me, six batteries only of this and the division artillery joined me. The others sailed up to Alexandria, either direct or re-embarked after landing at Aquia Creek.

I joined General Burnside, and reported to him as my senior, at Fredericksburg, late on the 21st, but in time to send that night Reynolds' Division and Griffin's Brigade of Morell's Division, to the aid of General Pope. The other brigades of Morell, and the division of Sykes, were arriving all that night and the next day, the 22d. Morell marched the night of the 22d, Sykes the next morning, each as soon as provisioned; both with orders to support Reynolds, report to General Pope, and to join him, if advisable, or if called upon to do so. (Dispatch No. 3.)

General Burnside was ordered by General Halleck to hold the fords of the Rappahannock, and to maintain communication with General Pope, then on the north bank, at and above Rappahannock Station. To this duty my command was assigned, and for my guidance, General Halleck furnished through General Burnside reports from General Pope, with whom he was in telegraphic communication. (No. 5.)

It is proper here to state that the information transmitted by General Halleck, however correct originally, was so erroneous on receipt as to mislead and cause delay. I so reported at the time. (See Dispatches, Nos. 8 and 9.)



Reynolds (Griffin supporting) relieved General Pope's troops on the 22d, at Kelly's Ford, and reported by letter to General Pope. Morell (Sykes supporting) was in position to aid Reynolds and Griffin in an attack ordered by General Pope upon Culpepper Court House, within easy reach of which I then knew were the main forces of the Confederate Army. A sudden rise of the river (No. 5) prevented this movement. General Pope, without notice to General Burnside or any of my command, severed connection, by removing Reynolds, and all troops above him, at the fords. At the same time he destroyed the railroad bridge and buildings at Rappahannock Station and marched away, but whither, I being without cavalry, required some time to ascertain. (Dispatches, Nos. 4 to 15.)

During my personal stay of three days at Falmouth, overcome by my continuous exertions, night and day, since the 14th, I was prostrated by dysentery, and directed my officers from my sick bed. The following dispatches contain some of these directions:

[No. 3.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,  
FALMOUTH, August 23, 1862.

GENERAL MORELL:

Dispatch received. Move on at once to Kelly's Ford, and occupy and hold it. Relieve Griffin when Sykes gets up to him. If you are called upon to go to Rappahannock Station move up to the support of the army there.

Your artillery is on the road to you. Sykes will move up this morning and relieve Griffin.

F. J. PORTER,  
Major-General Commanding.

[No. 4.]

FALMOUTH August 24th, 1862.

GENERALS MORELL AND SYKES:

Keep your commands well in hand for any emergency, and, before advancing another step, *do your utmost* to ascertain the position of Pope's forces and where the enemy is—what force is at Kelly's Ford, and has the enemy been seen on the opposite bank? Give me all the information you have, and the location of your forces and amount of cavalry at the fords. There is no more cavalry here to send you. If you can push scouts over the fords do so as far as possible. What is the latest information?

Send your dispatches so that General Sykes can see them. Direct Griffin to fix the ground or woods at Barnett's Ford so that a small force with artillery can hold it. I am just informed that Pope is on the Rappahannock, at Warrenton Springs, having attacked and whipped the enemy. I wish to hold Kelly's Ford to-morrow, and hope, by the time I join you, that you will be able to inform me what is at and opposite Rappahannock Station.

F. J. PORTER,  
Major-General.

[No. 5.]

August 24th, 2 P. M.

GENERALS MORELL AND SYKES:

Push a scout to Rappahannock Station and find out if Pope has pickets near there, and gain information of Pope or the enemy. Pope attacked the enemy yesterday, near Sulphur Springs, and the latter retreated. He was to renew the attack to-day, and it is probable Pope was pushing after him, knowing the river at Rappahannock was not fordable.

General Halleck's orders are for us to hold the Rappahannock.

Your artillery is *en route*; also Sykes'. You will therefore carry out your former instructions.

Reinforcements will push up to you.

All goes right.

F. J. PORTER,  
Major-General.

Late in the afternoon of the 24th I left Falmouth and joined my command. I began then to send General Burnside the information of our forces and of the enemy which he required.

[No. 6.]

NEAR MORRISVILLE,  
August 25th, 1862, 11:45 A. M.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE :

I find that last night Pope's cavalry was withdrawn by order, and Kelly's Ford abandoned, without any notice to my command or the cavalry picketing the river. No enemy seen on opposite side of river, except what was moving up towards Sulphur Springs. A good ford about three miles above railroad bridge. Kearney is at Warrenton Station picketing to Bealeton. No pickets extending from Pope this way, and no efforts made to keep up communication. The removal of his cavalry diminishes the means. Morell is near Morrisville, with Griffin at Barnett's. Sykes two miles to the rear, with Warren at Barnett's, to take Griffin's place when he goes to Kelly's. I shall go to Barnett's, then Kelly's, and on return give such intelligence as I can gain. Water is very scarce on the road, insufficient for large commands. Regiments have forty rounds, two wagons each; brigade headquarters one; division headquarters two. Will give full report on return. Four companies of Rhode Island cavalry at Rappahannock Station last night. Telegraph advances very slowly, too slowly. More pickets are said to be wanted and wire.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 7.]

FROM DEEP CREEK,  
Received Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE :

The report to me that all Pope's cavalry at Kelly's Ford was withdrawn is an *error*. He left a small company at the fords. I find, or think, the enemy is merely watching us at Barnett's, and was within striking distance of Kelly's. Sufficient force to resist crossing. The enemy has shown himself in small parties. I have decided to leave Griffin at Barnett's for a day longer, send the remainder of Morell to Kelly's and to-morrow, depending on information I get from a party I have sent to Rappahannock Station, to push Sykes there or halt him in supporting distance of Morell, ready to push on to the Rappahannock Station. I find the river can be crossed almost anywhere by cavalry and infantry, so that, with the exception of the prominent fords, watching is all I can do. The special fords I can hold easily. At Rappahannock Station are four companies of Rhode Island cavalry, and Kearney's pickets are at Bealeton. Reno and Reynolds I can hear nothing of. Reno's batteries have been withdrawn from Kelly's and Barnett's. The country is miserable, scarcely producing good telegraph poles, much less subsistence for man or beast for this army.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 8.]

FROM ADVANCE,  
Received Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE :

Have you received my despatches indicating my movements to-morrow? You know that Rappahannock Station is under fire from opposite hills, and the houses were destroyed by Pope. I do not like to direct movement on such uncertain data as that furnished by Gen. Halleck. *I know he is misinformed of the location of some of the corps mentioned in his dispatches.* Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and there is only a picket at Rappahannock Station, and Kearney, not Banks, is at Bealeton. Reno and Reynolds are beyond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rappahannock Station at 5 to-morrow, and will go there myself *via* Kelly's Ford. Does General McClellan approve? About day-break my aid and scout will be in from Bealeton. Have you any orders? I want cavalry to remain with me for a few days. For want of grain and provisions I have had to send home some who came up.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 9.]

FROM ADVANCE, 3:30 P. M.,  
Received Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE :

Despatch of 10.30 received. General Halleck is misinformed in regard to Reno's location. He is not at Kelly's Ford, nor can I hear of him. No one but four companies of Rhode Island cavalry is at Rappahannock Station and Bealeton. This was the last

information I received. I have sent to Bealeton to get information, and shall start Sykes at day-break for Rappahannock Station or its vicinity. The Sixth New York occupy Barnett's and are on opposite bank. I think they can hold and watch that point, with the addition of a Dutch battery; but if there is a battalion of infantry available without breaking a brigade, think it well to put it there to-morrow; shall leave Griffin there. Reynolds has gone, and, like Reno, is beyond reach. *This portion of my corps would have been one day further forward had I any information of Pope's forces or the enemy.*

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 10.]

ADVANCE, Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE:

My aid has just returned from Bealeton. He says Birney is there with two regiments, one at Rappahannock Station. Pope's headquarters are at Warrenton; Kearney at Warrenton Junction. King went to Warrenton to-day. Hooker was to go. Reno is at Sulphur Springs. Reynolds is at Warrenton. Banks and Sigel are at Sulphur Springs fighting to-day. A deserter came over to day, arriving at Rappahannock Station; said enemy moving his forces to our right. Those left down this way are their regiments which have been cut up in the battles. At Brandreth's Station are five hundred wagons guarded by a small force of infantry and squadron of cavalry. At Rappahannock Station the river is fordable for all arms. Are my arrangements satisfactory?

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 11.]

FALMOUTH, Aug. 25.

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER:

Until Sumner's troops arrive it would be well to hold the fords with an ample force. You are now in connection with Pope, and, no doubt, can get what cavalry you want.

When you can dispense with the three companies of Indiana cavalry, please send them back. We will send up the forty wagons with provisions for Morell and Griffin; have sent down to Aquia for wagon load of hospital stores; will send them with supply train if they arrive. The wagons and ambulances will be sent out as they arrive with the direction you request. All quiet here. Your despatches all received, and your disposition of troops is all right. You state that Reno is expected to pass to your left. To what point is he to go?

A. E. BURNSIDE,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 12.]

ADVANCE, BARNETT'S FORD,  
S. A. M., Aug. 26, 1862.

All quiet at and on the Rappahannock during the night. At Kelly's Ford the impression exists that two brigades of infantry, with one regiment of cavalry, are opposite Rappahannock Station. A squadron was seen last evening opposite Kelly's. A company from Bealeton to-day says Kearney is there with his whole division. I expect Sykes to halt about four miles short of Bealeton, at water, and until I can find a proper camp. Water is to be had only by going within range from opposite shore. I shall go through Rappahannock Station and Bealeton to Sykes, where my camp will be. Please have the telegraph run up that way by troops. Barnett's and Kelly's Fords will communicate with you by telegraph to-night. Many men are sick, and, for want of medicines and ambulances, will suffer. I have directed trains to be sent for grain.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 13.]

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Have been to Rappahannock Station. I find it in possession of General Kearney, whom I will relieve to-morrow. No enemy in front; river fordable anywhere; Sykes is here; Morell, with two divisions, is at Kelly's, and Griffin at Bealeton; Reno is expected to pass to my left.

F. J. PORTER.

From Bealeton Station, received August 25, '62.

[No. 14.]

FROM BEALETON, *via* WASHINGTON,  
Received August 26th, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Sykes is within three miles of this, in camp, and I will be up to-morrow to relieve Kearney. Reading your dispatch of last night, I expected to find Banks and Reno



here. I consider the fords below perfectly safe, with much less force; but for future movements I think they should remain. Sykes will get provision and grain here. His wagons can come up with ammunition and medical supplies.

F. J. PORTER.

*Major-General.*

[No. 15.]

FROM ADVANCE, SIX MILES FROM BEALETON,

Received August 26, 1862.

TO GENERAL PARKE:

I dispatched you from Bealeton, under the impression that Sykes was three miles off. I went to Burnett's. All is well at the first two. Griffin is at first. Morell, with two divisions, at the second. I have decided to post Sykes at Bealeton, and picket, with strength from infantry and artillery, Rappahannock Station, and patrol with cavalry. The Rappahannock is fordable everywhere, and if the enemy desired to cross he could do so with a larger force than I have. Camp, for want of water, cannot be found nearer, except within gunshot. I have sent back cavalry as fast as I could, and ordered them from the divisions, and directed Morell to use those at the fords. This I had done before receiving your telegram. The one hundred and fifty cavalry will be a good thing. Send grain. Provisions can be brought to Bealeton from Warrenton. Please send up the wagons and ambulances and have the drivers directed to pick up sick in a house about nine miles from Bealeton, on right-hand side, and bring them here. The supply train must go to Barnett's and Kelly's Fords; ambulances, also, which belong to Morell's. Please have sent up to-morrow an operator and instrument, for Bealeton, to work the other lines; also the corps' mail.

F. J. PORTER.

Though, as stated, I had been ill at Falmouth, I had hastened on the 25th to join General Pope, some of whose troops I found on the 26th at Rappahannock Station.

There I was informed by General Kearney that on the 23d at Catlett's Station, on the railroad in General Pope's rear, the enemy's cavalry had captured General Pope's personal baggage and official papers containing full information of his movements, strength, and anticipated reinforcements; and that engaging General Pope's attention by displays at the crossings of the Rappahannock, the enemy had sent large forces up the river to General Pope's extreme right. My instructions confined me to the river below, but no force of the enemy being there, I deemed it my duty voluntarily to report to General Pope, then at Warrenton Junction, as to where my command would be most useful. This I did at 11 a. m., by letter, by the hands of General Kearney.

That night, 26th, Sykes was five miles east of Bealeton; Morell was at Kelly's Ford and below. Both officers and men were greatly wearied by broken rest at night and constant travel or labor since the 14th.

Reynolds having joined McDowell, August 24, the corps entered upon his campaign, as heretofore stated, less than 9,000 strong.

At 11 p. m., 26th, I received the following order from General Pope, given in reply to my report for duty. This I dispatched at once to General Burnside. General Pope gave the supposed position of the enemy and of his own troops (McDowell, Sigel, Banks, Reynolds, Reno, Cox, and Sturgis), and announced his strength at 57,000, exclusive of Heintzelman—then with him at Warrenton Junction with 9,000 men—and of Cox, who did not join.

[No. 16.]

FROM ADVANCE, 11.45 P. M., Aug. 26.

Received August 27, 1862, 7 o'clock A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to within two miles of Warrenton, and to call up Morell to same point, leaving the fords guarded by the cavalry. He says the troops in rear should be brought up as rapidly as possible, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station, and that he cannot see how a gen-

eral engagement can be put off more than a day or two. I shall move up, as ordered, but the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a supply of subsistence will cause some delay. Please hasten back the wagons sent down, and inform McClellan, that I may know I am doing right. Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Reno on his right; Cox joins to-morrow, Sturgis next day, and Franklin is expected. So says General Pope.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION, August 26, 1862, 7 o'clock A. M.

GENERAL.—Please move forward with Sykes' division to-morrow morning through Fayetteville, to a point two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take position where you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. Call up Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavalry forces to watch the fords. If there are any troops below, coming up, they should come up rapidly, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station. You will find General Banks at Fayetteville. I append below the position of our forces, as also those of the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more than a day or two.

McDowell, with his own corps, Sigel's, and three brigades of Reynolds' men, being about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Reno joins him on his right and rear, with eight thousand men, at an early hour to-morrow; Cox, with seven thousand men, will move forward to join him in the afternoon of to-morrow; Banks, with six thousand, is at Fayetteville; Sturgis, about eight thousand strong, will move forward by day after to-morrow; Franklin, I hope, with his corps, will, by day after to-morrow night, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap Railroad intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington City; Heintzelman's corps will be held in reserve here at Warrenton Junction until it is ascertained that the enemy has begun to cross Hedgeman's River. You will understand how necessary it is for our forces to be in position as soon as possible. The enemy's lines extend from a point a little east of Warrenton Sulphur Springs around to a point a few miles north of the turnpike from Sperryville to Warrenton, with his front presented to the east, and his trains thrown around well behind him in the direction of Little Washington and Sperryville.\* Make your men cook three days' rations, and keep at least two days' cooked rations constantly on hand. Hurry on Morell as rapidly as possible, as also the troops coming up in his rear. The enemy has a strong column still further to his left towards Manassas Gap Railroad, in the direction of Salem.

JOHN POPE,

*Major-General Commanding.*

Major-General FITZ JOHN PORTER,

*Commanding 5th Army Corps.*

[No. 16 a.]

HEADQUARTERS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
6 miles from Bealton, Aug. 26—11 p. m.

Major-Gen'l JOHN POPE,

*Com'd'g Army of Virginia, Warrenton Junction:*

GENERAL.—Your dispatch of 7 p. m. is at hand, and your instructions will be obeyed as rapidly as possible. My forces have been disposed of under instructions from the General-in-Chief, and owing to the fact that their wagons have been sent to Falmouth for provisions (that on hand being expended), they may not move as rapidly as you may wish, but they will be there in time for effective service.

No troops are in my rear, that I know of. Sumner is to land at Aquia, but I know nothing of him. I shall leave at the fords the cavalry force which has been guarding them.

I have no cavalry.

I am, general, very respectfully, your ob'd't servant,

F. J. PORTER,

*Maj. Gen'l Com'd'g.*

I will thank you to direct grain for 800 animals for 3 days to be sent to Bealton early in the morning. I am out entirely, and there is none to be had in this country. I have very few wagons.

F. J. P.

\*General Pope was either ignorant of Jackson's movements to his right with some 25,000 men, or unsuspicious of his purposes, as no steps were taken to guard against his operations. This force completely surprised General Pope near Antietam about the hour he was writing the above dispatch.

None to carry subsistence or ammunition, and have only 40 rounds of the latter. The wagons have not come up, and we have been hastened forward to occupy positions, and depend on the small transportation which General Burnside could provide. I have no ambulances, and no medical supplies. I mention these facts in the hope you may provide deficiencies.

F. J. P.

[No. 17.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,  
August 27, 1862.

Major-General MORELL,  
Commanding Division:

GENERAL.—The commanding general directs that you hurry up with your command, pass through Bealeton and Fayetteville, and join the commanding general in the vicinity of Warrenton. Smead will be directed to join and report to you with his battery.

When your command passes through Bealeton and Fayetteville, have your ranks well closed up, so that a good impression may be made by the appearance of our troops. Permit no straggling.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. T. LOCKE, *A. A. G.*

P. S.—After getting to Bealeton, send all your men belonging to the cavalry back to their commands. If Griffin cannot get all the way up to-day, let him stop at Bealeton.

Try and keep three days' cooked rations always in possession of your men.

General, lose no time in getting up. You will find me near Warrenton, and if you send forward an officer to me, will have you located. Do all you can to get up provisions, and put as much bread in haversacks as possible—three days. We go right to the railroad, and, with your cattle, will manage to get all that is wanted. Hurry up Griffin; don't wait for him. Hope you are improving.

F. J. PORTER.

The enemy fell upon General Pope's rear that night, 26th, near Bristoe Station, and occupied his communications with Washington by numerous forces under Jackson and Stuart.

At 9 A. M. on the 27th, on arriving at Bealeton, while en route to Warrenton, I was turned, in all haste, to Warrenton Junction, as shown by the following dispatch:

[No. 18.]

FROM ADVANCE.

Received—August 27, 1862.

BEALETON, 9 A. M., Aug. 27th, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I am ordered to move direct to Warrenton Junction, and to push the command at Barnett, &c. The enemy have struck with their cavalry the railroad near Manassas; I expect to be out of reach of you, and you must keep back trains, &c. If you can push up ambulances, I want them much; your animals will have to rely on grassing; there is no grain.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION, August 27, 1862, 4 o'clock A. M.

GENERAL.—Your note of 11 A. M. yesterday is received. Major-General Pope directs me to say that, under the circumstances stated by you in relation to your command, he desires you to march *direct to this place* as rapidly as possible. The troops behind you at Barnett's Ford will be directed by you to march at once direct to this place or Weaverville, without going to Rappahannock Station. Forage is hard to get, and you must graze your animals as far as you can do so. The enemy's cavalry have intercepted *our railway communication near Manassas*, and he seems to be advancing with a heavy force along the Manassas Gap Railroad. We will probably move to attack him to-morrow in the neighborhood of Gainesville, which may bring *our line*

*further back towards Washington.* Of this I will endeavor to notify you in time. You should get here as early in the day to-morrow as possible, in order to render assistance, should it be needed.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major-General F. J. PORTER,  
*Commanding Fifth Army Corps.*

This was five hours reaching me, five miles from General Pope.

My command arrived at Warrenton Junction at different hours—some after dark—all greatly fatigued by the hot and long march, made mainly without food or water. Till a late hour they were engaged in securing food, of which they had none, and which was very scarce with General Pope's army, as appears by the following dispatch:

[No. 19.]

WARRENTON, 27th P. M.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford. Can you have it hauled to Fredericksburgh and stored? His wagons were all sent to you for grain and ammunition. I have sent back to you every man of the First and Sixth New York cavalry, except what has been sent to Gainesville. I will get them to you after a while. Everything here is at sixes and sevens, and I find I am to take care of myself in every respect. *Our line of communication has taken care of itself, in compliance with orders.* The army has not three days' provisions. The enemy captured all Pope's and other clothing, and from McDowell the same, including liquors; no guard accompanying the trains, and small ones guard bridges. The wagons are rolling on, and I shall be here to-morrow. Good-night!

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Between 10 and 11 A. M. I found General Pope at Warrenton Junction much disturbed by the untoward position in which he was then placed. He stated that, released by the withdrawal of the army of the Potomac from near Richmond, General Lee's whole army had come upon him, and it seemed inevitable that he would be compelled to withdraw toward Alexandria; indeed, he added, then sitting at the telegraph desk, "He was then perfecting arrangements for that purpose with General McDowell at Warrenton." He expressed great dissatisfaction with some of his generals, and with the plan of the campaign he had been compelled against his will to adopt, and the way he was forced to carry it out. He said that the unfortunate position of the army was not due to him; he had been pushed, contrary to his advice, beyond the Rappahannock, and there held to draw the enemy from Richmond in order "To save the army of the Potomac." "If my wishes had prevailed," he added, "Instead of guarding the line of the Rappahannock, I should have been ere this near or behind Bull Run, where I could be reinforced quickly."

General Pope seemed to accept the situation, and to be disposed to meet the emergency of retiring towards Washington, now forced upon him by the enemy in rear as well as in front.

Uneasiness, arising in part from late serious disasters and from want of confidence in the plan and management of the campaign, existed at Warrenton Junction. It was vastly increased throughout the day by the rapid passing towards Alexandria of immense wagon trains, which manifested preparations for, if not the commencement of a hasty and compulsory retreat.

I was ordered to remain at Warrenton Junction that night and until relieved by General Banks, when I was to march in the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, and unite with the remainder of the army under General McDowell. As late as 3 p. m. General Pope professed



ignorance of the number and character of the enemy's forces in his rear, and of the damage done to his railroads and depots.

I became informed that the general policy of the campaign was to avoid a general action with the main forces of the enemy, till large reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac should join us, but of the details of General Pope's plan of campaign or of his purposes beyond what had been published in his orders, and what I have stated already, I was not informed. All that I did learn from General Pope at that time was given in the following dispatch from Warrenton Junction to General Burnside.

This dispatch (No. 20) enclosing the subjoined order, was also written with sufficiently full information of the movements of the enemy to form an idea of their destination.

[No. 20.]

FROM WARRENTON JUNCTION,  
August 27, 1862—4 P. M.

General BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia :

I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as the present. Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty power was propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is moving to Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter got to Buckland Bridge in time to put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to the Shenandoah or Loudoun County. The forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, Whiting's, Ewell's, and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions.

Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. They have much artillery and long wagon trains. The raid on the railroad was near to Cedar Run, and made by a regiment of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The place was guarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavalry. They routed the guard, captured a train and many men, destroyed the bridge, and retired leisurely down the roads towards Manassas. It can easily be repaired. No troops are coming up except new troops that I can hear of. Sturgis is here with two regiments;\* four were cut off by the raid. The positions of the troops are given in this order. No enemy in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized when Stuart's aid-de-camp was seized, directs Stuart to leave a squadron only to watch in front of Hanover Junction, &c. Everything has moved up north. I found a vast difference between these troops and ours, but I suppose they were new, as to-day they burned their clothes, &c., when there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoralized, and needed some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run,† and I presume will be there in a few days if strategy don't use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I would like some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburgh to push towards Hanover, or, with a larger force, to push towards Orange Court-House. I wish Sumner was at Washington, and up near the Monocacy, with good batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. I was informed to-day by the best authority that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army that could take care of itself. Pope says he long since wanted to go behind the Occoquan. I am in great need of ambulances, and the officers need medicines, which, for want of transportation, were left behind. I hear many of the sick of my corps are in houses on the road—very sick, I think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Rappahannock. The cavalry are all in the advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and Barnett's fords much property was left, in consequence of the wagons going down for grain, &c. If you can push up the grain to-night, please do so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or anywhere, and this army is wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says he never could get enough. Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, please do so. Make what use of this you choose, so it does good.

Don't let the alarm here disturb you. If you had a good force you could go to Richmond. A force should at once be pushed on to Manassas to open the road. Our provisions are very short.

F. J. PORTER.

\* Piatt's.

† General Pope.

After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Burnside.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION, August 27, 1862.

*General Orders, No. —.*—The following movements of troops will be made, viz:

Major-General McDowell with his own and Sigel's corps, and the division of Brigadier-General Reynolds, will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, if possible, to-night.

The army corps of General Heintzelman, with the detachment of the ninth corps under Major-General Reno leading, will take the road from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Major-General Reno will immediately communicate with Major-General McDowell, and his command, as well as that of Major-General Heintzelman, will support Major-General McDowell in any operation against the enemy.

Major-General Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction till he is relieved by Major-General Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing.

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the charge of the trains, and cover their movement towards Manassas Junction. The train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, will pursue the road south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will take post behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded with the public and private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned so as to impede the further passage of the railroad trains he will assemble them all as near together as possible and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. If the enemy is too strong before him, before the bridges can be repaired, he will be careful to destroy entirely the train, locomotives, and stores, before he falls back in the direction of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major-General Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are not provided for and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon train of his own corps (even if this should necessitate the destruction of much baggage and regimental property) and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty devolved upon Major-General Banks, the Major-General commanding the Army of Virginia feels assured he will discharge with intelligence, courage, and fidelity.

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until further notice.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Col. and Chief of Staff.*

At 3 P. M., preceded some hours by Hooker's Division of Heintzelman's Corps, General Pope left Warrenton Junction in the direction of Manassas Junction, having first assigned to me two pieces of artillery and about 1,100\* infantry, remnants of Piatt's Brigade of Sturgis' Division.

In the proceedings before the court-martial, the last-mentioned and other dispatches, which will hereafter be set out, sent by myself to General Burnside, were the subjects of severe animadversion, and were urged as the grounds upon which my conduct was to be regarded as sustaining the charges and specifications against me. It may be a question, perhaps, whether in my then relations to General Pope, I should, as a matter of taste, have spoken of the operations of the Army of Virginia as I did; but I do not admit for a moment, that in sending them I was guilty of the charges made against me, or that they can be adduced as in the slightest degree proof that I was not ready to perform my duty faithfully as a soldier, and that I was not, in every sense, true to the interests of my country. To understand why these dispatches were sent, my position must be thoroughly understood.

Up to the time I joined General Pope, General Burnside had been my immediate commander after my arrival at Aquia Creek.

I had used extraordinary exertions to join General Pope, and to put myself under his command at the very earliest moment, because I learned of the enemy's intention to make the effort to crush his forces. I had still to maintain communication with General Burnside. I could do so while passing from the command of General Burnside to that of General Pope.

This was necessary, because I was obliged to rely upon him more or less for supplies of provisions and grain, and in addition, was this necessary for the security and usefulness of his own command. I had also been requested by General Burnside to advise him as to the state of affairs, and, as an incentive to frequent communications, he stated that the President was without information, and deprived of all other means of hearing from the Army, and was often calling for information from me.

I communicated to General Burnside the orders received by me from General Pope, and endeavored to give him as precise an account of the condition of affairs, from day to day, as my information enabled me to furnish. During all this period I was suffering from the disease that was upon me; the dispatches were written hurriedly, and without time or opportunity for the correction, or the careful selection of language.

My object was to convey to General Burnside the exact truth, and deeply impressed as I was with the fatal results likely to ensue from the mistakes which I thought were being made, I intended to convey those impressions to General Burnside, in order that the evils apprehended by me might be guarded against if possible.

In this connection, it is proper that I should also refer to the allusions to General McClellan made in my dispatches.

It must be remembered that General McClellan had been my commander; that when I passed from his immediate command to that of General Burnside, he was still my commander, as General Burnside was subordinate to him. I had joined General Pope on the 27th, and the last of these dispatches was written at 6 P. M. on the 29th, when in point of fact my communications with General Burnside were still being maintained, and on him I was dependent for my supplies.

It appears to me that it can hardly be charged as a crime that I should speak with respect and playful kindness of an old boyhood friend, under whose command I had served such a length of time, and to whom I was sincerely attached.

While these communications were intended for the information of General Burnside, they were not of such a character as to preclude those expressions which are ordinary in a friendly and familiar correspondence between officers of the Army occupying the relations which then existed between General Burnside and myself.

#### WARRENTON JUNCTION TO BRISTOE.

To be prepared for an early march to Greenwich under the General Order (20) if required, I sent that afternoon (27th) two aids, Captain Montieth and Lieutenant McQuade, to be used as guides, to observe the character of the country, and find the road to Greenwich. They reported the road at Catlett's Station, where that to Greenwich branches off, and beyond toward Bristoe, blocked by over 2,000 wagons, which for hours had been rolling in from Warrenton.

The road was narrow, through timber, was often crossed by the railroad and numerous small streams, and so encumbered as to be almost impassable even by daylight.



The night came on so dark that it was impossible to move about except by groping.

About 10 P. M.\* I received this order from General Pope on the railroad at Bristoe, 10 miles distant, again turning my line of march toward Washington:

[No. 21.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

Bristoe Station, August 27, 1862, 6.30 P. M.

GENERAL: The major-general commanding directs that you start at one o'clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately. Also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch, who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that effect.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER,  
*Warrenton Junction.*

P. S.—If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately. If Banks is not at the junction instruct Colonel Cleary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

The order directed me to march at one o'clock that night to join General Pope. It said "the enemy has been *driven back*, but is *retiring* along the railroad." The object of my presence with him was to "*drive* the enemy from Manassas" five miles beyond him "and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is."

At the time this order was received, that is, about ten o'clock at night, my command were busily engaged in securing rations and preparing their supper. Few, if any, had gone to bed; no night march being anticipated. They had marched, part of them twelve miles, and most of them nineteen miles that day through the great heat and dust, mainly without food and water, and were greatly wearied by their incessant exertions since August 14th.

On receipt of the order, Generals Morell, Sykes, and Butterfield, division and brigade commanders, whose judgment and zeal are undoubted, represented their men without food, and, after a long and fatiguing march extending into night, as in no condition to renew the march without some interval of rest. It was urged that, owing to the disorder which would ensue in the darkness and the delay and additional fatigue which would result from the obstructions along the road, any useful body of the command would reach Bristoe as early by starting at day-break as at one o'clock, and that on arrival all troops would be serviceable for the additional duty required "between Manassas and Gainesville," which they would not be by marching at one o'clock. The letter of the order required the whole corps (artillery and infantry) at Bristoe by daylight. Its spirit required it in serviceable condition for a further and continued



march of at least eight miles. The object of the order was stated, as if to authorize me to exercise my judgment how best to accomplish it. Literal execution was physically impossible. After careful consideration of all the circumstances, I felt sure that the spirit of the order would be best carried out and the best interests of the service promoted, and none endangered, by postponing the hour of march to three o'clock, soon after which daylight would lend aid to a rapid march. I believed then I was fully justified in exercising a discretion in a matter within the province of a general commanding, when his superior, miles away, knew nothing of the circumstances in operation.

I dispatched to General Pope the reasons for this departure from the letter of his orders. I had no cavalry (the only useful force to apply), and I asked him to aid my march by having cleared of wagons the road near him, the officer who had brought the order stating that, on account of these obstructions, he had experienced great difficulty in getting to me. Events confirmed the wisdom of the delay. Officers of General Pope's staff, conducted by an experienced guide, left my camp at midnight for Bristoe. Forced from the road by obstructions they lost their way in the darkness and did not reach General Pope till near seven o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock the darkness was impenetrable. At three, when the column was put in motion, the road was discoverable only by the use of lights, and close to camp was found blocked by two batteries from General Banks. The railroad was occupied by running trains; darkness and obstructions soon caused inextricable confusion and prevented real progress till daylight. Even then some time was required to free the commands so as to allow them to move. Seeing the command in motion and making every effort to clear the road of wagons, I hastened to join General Pope to whom I reported in person before eight o'clock, and from whom I learned the necessity for an earlier appearance of my corps had not existed. The head of my column soon arrived and was halted at Broad Run for the closing up of the command, broken into and separated by unruly wagon trains. About 10 A. M. the command crossed Broad Run and took its place in line.

I was charged with disobeying this order.

General Pope testified on the trial that, as General Hooker had reported being short of ammunition, he feared Jackson at Manassas might learn of his weakness and return to unite "with Ewell to attack him; it was for the purpose of meeting this attack that he was anxious for my presence at daylight."

It appears from the evidence that he did not know for an hour after sending the order to me, that Hooker was short of ammunition, and he never informed me. The cars containing ammunition I sent to General Pope early in the night. He took none from them and Hooker marched next day without replenishing.

Two hours and a half after he dispatched the order to me, General Pope ordered Generals McDowell, Kearney, and Reno to march "at the earliest blush of dawn" to accomplish between Manassas and Gainesville exactly the same thing as I was to aid in doing, "to bag the whole crowd, Jackson, Ewell, and A. P. Hill." He states to them no fear of attack, no lack of ammunition. He had the one exultant thought in his mind and he needed efficient troops to execute it. Their commands had no obstructed roads to travel. Yet the last two—near Greenwich, less than five miles distant—did not join him earlier than I did, and the first not that day.

Generals Morell, Sykes, Butterfield, Griffin, Locke, Weld, and others testified to the impracticability of the march at one o'clock and three

o'clock when the corps attempted to move: and the difficulties and delays encountered after daylight, in part arising from starting in the darkness. To their evidence can be added much of an important character; all showing my change in the hour of march was fully justified by the circumstances.

On my arrival at Bristoe, General Pope informed me that Ewell's division of Jackson's corps, after a slight affair the previous day with Hooker, had retired early in the night of the 27th in the direction of Manassas, somewhere beyond which was the remainder of the corps and Stuart's cavalry; that he had ordered upon Manassas from Gainesville, McDowell with his whole force, and should go himself with Heintzelman and Reno, "to beat up the enemy" so soon as Reno and Kearney, due since sunrise from Greenwich, should join him. With these forces he expected to "bag Jackson." He left after 11 A. M., on 28th.

As guard to the sick and wounded and to trains gathering there, I, not being needed with him, was left at Bristoe. Seeing occasional firing in the direction of Groveton and determined not to be left in a false position, if I could avoid it, I sent aids-de-camp\* twice that day to General Pope for orders and information. He expressed himself satisfied with my position there. Each time I was instructed "to stay at Bristoe;" "when wanted you will be sent for," and I was informed that up to 5 p. M., when at Bull Run, he knew nothing of the enemy, though he believed them at Centreville, where he had sent Heintzelman and would send Reno. Before and during the absence of my messenger-aids, and while one of them was in General Pope's presence, at his camp on Bull Run, there was in plain sight and hearing of General Pope and of me, much artillery firing in the vicinity of Groveton, between a part of McDowell's command and Jackson's corps, which had taken its stand there to await the arrival of General Lee's main army under Longstreet, known to have been following Jackson, and to be now advancing rapidly by way of Thoroughfare Gap.

The forces of the enemy which General Pope was searching for in the direction of Centreville were then at Groveton. General Pope had been deceived into the belief they had gone to Centreville.

#### FROM BRISTOE TO MANASSAS JUNCTION, AND THENCE TOWARDS GAINESVILLE.

After sunrise, August 29th, I received the following order:

[No. 24.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

NEAR BULL RUN, August 29, 1862, 3 A. M.

General: McDowell has intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn. Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major-General PORTER,

This order surprised me. It carried me from the field of action. No "severe engagement" could take place near Centreville. Jackson's army had not gone there. It was between Groveton and Sudley Springs. A small detachment only, if any, was on that side of Bull Run. The

\* Captain Monteith to Manassas Station at 1 p. M., and Lieutenant McQuade to Bull Run at 5 p. M.

aid who brought the order could not explain it. He knew only that "the enemy had been at Centreville, and pickets were there last night." Still, as late as eight o'clock this morning General Pope seemed to expect an engagement in that vicinity, for when marching from Manassas toward Centreville, in fulfilment of this order, I received messages "to hasten to Centreville," "to post a force at Bull Run to protect trains," &c. It is proper here to state that, if General Pope correctly stated the circumstances, the rapidly changing events so altered the conditions before the receipt of his order as even to make their execution unnecessary, and often improper, as in this case, or impossible.

Near Manassas Junction, at the Weir house, I met General McDowell. He also was surprised at my orders. What I did not then know of the position of the contending forces, I learned from him, and the condition was as follows:

That under General Pope's rapidly changing orders of the day before, the 28th, to General McDowell on the Warrenton Pike, between Buckland Mills and Gainesville: 1st. "To march with his whole force upon Manassas;" 2d. "To march upon Centreville;" 3d. "To march upon Gum Spring;" General Sigel, taking the road from Gainesville to near Manassas Junction, and thence the road to Sudley Springs, found himself, 3 P. M., same day, near Groveton confronting Jackson extending from that place to Sudley Springs. Reynolds joined Sigel about dark. King following the Warrenton Pike from Gainesville, had successfully engaged near Groveton Jackson's right, and at dark was a formidable obstacle to his retreat. Knowing that Longstreet was passing through Thoroughfare Gap early on the 28th, General McDowell had sent Ricketts and cavalry, in all about ten thousand men, to hold him in check at that point. At night the prospects were promising for crushing Jackson, but Ricketts, after a slight resistance to Longstreet, had retired and was then marching on Bristoe, while King, with about nine thousand (9,000) men, in violation of repeated orders to hold his position on the Warrenton Pike, and in disregard of assurances of ample support in the morning, had withdrawn and was at Manassas Junction, each having feared being crushed between Longstreet and Jackson. Thus the Warrenton Pike had been left unobstructed. Jackson was not intercepted, but was awaiting Longstreet who, unopposed in his march through Thoroughfare Gap, was hastening to his relief.

This was the substance of the information communicated to me by General McDowell, and it will be found set forth in his official report and his defense before his court of inquiry as to the then condition of affairs.

General McDowell was much disturbed by this state of things in his command. Moreover, he had left Sigel at Groveton that morning, the 29th, with orders to move upon Jackson, and for Reynolds to support him. He said, however, he expected no contest there, and no good result should there be one, and had come to Manassas Junction in search of General King and in the hope of seeing General Pope there. (Dispatch No. 25a.) My troops had marched from Bristoe Station beyond Manassas Junction, and the head of the column had passed the Weir house in execution of the order I had received. Hastening in advance of my command to join General Pope, I met Captain Piatt, of General Pope's staff, with verbal orders "to march to Gainesville and take King with you."\* The critical condition of affairs and the serious conse-

\* I always so understood the message, but Captain Piatt, who delivered it to me, has testified that he was taking the message to McDowell to turn the division over to me, and that he merely gave me its purport. However, I at once acted on it, and, facing the corps about, put it in motion towards Gainesville.

quences likely to arise from any mistake in the understanding of orders, led me to ask, when acknowledging the receipt of the above message, that the orders to me then and in future should be in writing. In the same dispatch I gave General Pope substantially the above information as received from General McDowell. Dr. Abbott delivered this note about 10:30 A. M. This verbal order required me to reverse my march and move back through Manassas Junction and along the Gainesville Road past Bethlehem Church to Gainesville. On my return to Manassas Junction, about 9:30, in execution of the verbal order, General Gibbon of King's Division, just from General Pope, gave me the following order. General McDowell had seen it, and had immediately asked General Pope to return King to him.

[No. 25.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

"Push forward with your corps and King's Division, which you will take with you upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton Turnpike. Be expeditious, or we will lose much."

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

The object of this order was to enable me with a large force to intervene near Gainesville on the Warrenton Pike, between Jackson and Longstreet, and thus regain the advantages lost by the retreat of King and Ricketts early that morning. Expedition was enjoined as Longstreet, near by, was hastening to join Jackson. The distance from Manassas Junction to Gainesville is eight miles; from Gainesville to Thoroughfare Gap, where Longstreet debouched on the 28th, is six miles. Longstreet and Jackson were each estimated about 25,000 strong. My command—Morell, Sykes and King—was now about 17,000.

The position of the contending forces as then supposed by us, about 9:30 A. M., was as follows:

Longstreet, in part at least, east of Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th, was hastening to and along the Warrenton Pike to join Jackson, whose right was near Groveton and left was off towards Sudley Springs.

Heintzleman and Reno were between Centreville and Groveton, moving on Jackson.

Of McDowell's command, Sigel north and Reynolds south of the Warrenton Pike, near Groveton, were fronting Jackson.

King and Porter were at Manassas Junction, the latter moving towards Gainesville.

Ricketts, of McDowell's command, was on the road from Gainesville to Manassas Junction by way of Bristoe.

Buford with his cavalry had been to Thoroughfare Gap with Ricketts, and was on the same road near Gainesville watching Longstreet.

Banks was moving from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe.

General Pope was at Centreville and about six miles from Manassas Junction.

General McDowell, personally, was at the Weir house, his command being disposed as stated.

I had not been through this country, and had no knowledge of its character, number of roads, &c., in which I was to move, and there was no one with me who had the information.

I sought General McDowell as of all persons most capable of giving information. He said he knew no more about it than I did. He loaned me his map, however, but said that it was very inaccurate. He pro-



longed the interview till after 10 A. M., evidently expecting orders for King's Division to be returned to him. I availed myself of the interview to obtain a knowledge of the past, of the probable future operations, and of the ruling policy. He said he knew the plans of the campaign and of the changes likely to occur from the concentration of the enemy, of whose movements he seemed well posted.

During this period the sound of artillery, in the direction of Groveton, had been heard by us. It was spoken of between us, and he characterized it as the "usual artillery duel at long range, as of no importance, and leading to no result." He assured me, his absence from his command at that hour seeming to sustain his belief as expressed, that "there would be no fighting at Groveton;" that "there was no design of battle that day," and that the intention was "to form a new line of this army, and of the reinforcements (Sumner and Franklin) coming from the Army of the Potomac." He was evidently annoyed at King having been assigned to me, and, expressing the belief that I would not reach Gainesville, asked me, as a favor, "to place King on my right, in the *new line about to be formed*, so that connecting with Reynolds, at Groveton, he could reclaim him at the proper time, and have his command together."

General McDowell spoke encouragingly of the future, and from his explanation of the operations of the Army of Virginia, and the plan of the campaign, I felt then that his was the ruling spirit in these operations. In this I was confirmed, when an hour or more later, I received the joint order hereafter set out (the tenor, indeed the language almost, of which he had just expressed), placing him in command of our united forces. The impressions having thus been made upon my mind, I gave to his opinions and suggestions the respect due to supreme authority.

During this conversation my troops were proceeding on the Gainesville road, in execution of the order delivered to me about 9:30 A. M., through General Gibbon.\*

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\* When General McDowell testified before my court martial (Record, pp. 90, 91, 92) he was questioned as to his recollection of what passed between us during our interviews at the Weir House, near Manassas Station, Aug. 29, 1862. I expected him to state substantially what I have above related, that he told me of the movements of King and Ricketts and the reasons therefor. I felt that on his testimony my honor if not my life depended. His memory was so defective on some points and so much at variance with mine on other points that I was greatly disappointed with his testimony. Having then no knowledge of witnesses to what was said during our interviews (and I deemed the matter vital to me) I felt as helpless as I conceive a drowning man would feel without even a straw to clutch at.

General McDowell at that time denied that when at Manassas that "he had got up with either King's or Ricketts's division and of having said to me, or *having known*, anything about the motives for these divisions falling back to Manassas, other, than perhaps as a question of supplies. He said "he found those divisions after our interview." I will here state that at the time of our first interview King's division had been at Manassas Junction over two hours, and that General McDowell passed it early in the morning, between the Sudley Spring road and Manassas Junction on his way from the Warrenton Pike to Manassas. General King was present at the Weir House, and also quite a number of his officers and some of the wounded of the previous night's engagement.

General McDowell, then also testified that as King's division of his corps had been assigned to me, I suggested that he commanded our united forces, and that before the joint order reached us, he and I started from Manassas, with the understanding that, under the article of war applicable in such cases, he had the command of the whole force—his division and my corps; and that when the joint order was received by each of us, "We" (he thereby claiming that he was with me at the time or had directed my movements, which was not the case) "had ourselves done the very things the joint order had directed."

Now, this whole statement I claim is utterly absurd; but to permit a fair judgment of whose memory is at fault—General McDowell's or mine—I now give his despatch and its postscript discovered since the adjournment of the board in January.

On February 14th, one month after the close of the hearing before the Board, the

General Morell, being at the head of his division there, the advance of the column, on the direct road to Gainesville, met the enemy about 11:30 A. M., and was prompt to take an advantageous position on the southerly side of the Manassas Gap Railroad, and about a mile and three-quarters westerly from Bethlehem Church. This position was along the course of a small stream, on the east side of an open valley, and commanded within ordinary range of field artillery, the opposite slope. This valley, except to our left, was surrounded by thick brush-wood and heavy timber, affording ample facilities for opposing forces to conceal from each other their exact position and movements.

Our skirmishers were in the timber, on the opposite slope, west of the stream, and were engaged with the enemy's skirmishers at that point.

At this time I had not accurate information, or even as much information as I subsequently received, but having been informed by General McDowell that Longstreet was passing through Thoroughfare Gap, nine miles distant, early on the 28th, and therefore could have reached my front, at the time and place now under consideration: having seen dust rising from the direction toward Gainesville, having also received information, through prisoners that were captured, my belief was that Longstreet's force was the one which was immediately in my front.

Knowing, as I did, that his force could not amount to less than 25,000 men, as my own force amounted to about 17,000, and as the enemy's forces were strongly posted, I felt it necessary to act with prudence and caution in my movements.

I set about placing my troops in a position to make a forward movement, which, at the time, I believed necessarily involved an attack upon the enemy in front of me.

My troops were actually being deployed for this purpose, and a brigade was moving to take possession of the rising ground in front beyond the stream, when General McDowell came up about noon, and showed me the joint order—a copy of which I had just before received at the hands of Dr. Abbott.

following fragment of a despatch (No. 25a) with its postscript, was given to me. I knew nothing of its existence prior to that day.

The despatch was written by Gen. McDowell near Manassas Junction, about 10 A. M. August 29th, to be delivered to Gen. Pope at his headquarters at Centreville. But Gen. Pope left Centreville to join the army before the arrival of the messenger, and did not see the despatch till after 2 P. M., when it was shown to him near the battlefield at Groveton. This despatch is not therefore the one from Gen. McDowell, which Gen. Pope testified was mainly the cause of his writing the "joint order." (No. 26.)

[No. 25a.]

" . . . till late. This morning, I was told by Reynolds that King's div. was ordered to Manassas, and Ricketts' to Greenwich, and Sigel to Gainesville. Supposing these orders were from you, I left Reynolds on the left of Sigel, and came here to see you and get my two divisions. I find here that King came here on his own order, finding himself overmatched and Ricketts the same. King's div. is getting supplies of food and ammunition, and will be ready to move soon. I have not heard from Ricketts' div. coming, but understand he is coming here. It was Gibbon's brigade that was ordered yesterday.

"A. R. respectfully,

"IRVIN McDOWELL,

"M. G."

"I have not seen your last order telling Porter to take King. Of course this is but temporary, and I have ordered Porter to place King on his right, that I may have him when you are so."

"I. McDOWELL."

It is proper for me to state that I have no knowledge of the first part of the despatch, and am informed that it was accidentally destroyed.

This order directed General McDowell and myself to "move forward with your [our] joint commands towards Gainesville," and as General McDowell was my ranking officer, under the Sixty-second Article of War, he was entitled to the command. I recognized him as having that position, and he assumed the command.

This order was in response to General McDowell's application for the return of King, and to my request for written orders, to which I have previously referred.

[No. 26.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
CENTREVILLE, *August 29, 1862.*

GENERALS McDOWELL AND PORTER:

You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzleman, Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton Turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his Aid-de-Camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton Pike, until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzleman's Corps, or at this place.\*

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

General McDowell and I were then in front of the line of battle which my command had largely formed. He could see from the position of my forces that they were deploying in line of battle. Assuming the command, as he did, he at once said to me: "This is no place to fight a battle; we are too far out." He also showed me the following dispatch from General Buford:

[No. 26b.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE, 9:30 A. M.

"Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cavalry passed through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this."

JOHN BUFORD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

GENERAL RICKETTS.

\* The following order was placed in my hands March 14th, the day after the board closed its public sessions. The fact that the order had been written was unknown to me prior to that day.

This order was written by Gen. Pope at Centreville, and about 12 M. was delivered to the officers addressed five miles distant, near the battlefield of Groveton.

[No. 26a.]

HEAD QRS. ARMY OF VA.,  
*August 29th, 1862.*

TO GENs. HEINTZLEMAN, RENO AND SIGEL:

If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy you will not push matters further.

Fitz John Porter and King's division of McDowell's corps are moving on Gainesville from Manassas Junction, and will come in on your left. They have about twenty thousand men. The command must return to this place to-night or by morning on account of subsistence and forage.

JNO. POPE,  
*Maj.-Gen. Com'd'g.*

This was shown me by him as confirmation of what he had said to me at our previous interview about the appearance of Longstreet's forces, and as proof that it was Longstreet's troops which were then in our front. We conversed on the subject of its being Longstreet's troops. At that time I had been positively convinced by the facts to which I have referred, that Longstreet had arrived with a heavy force.

We discussed the objects of the order and how best to accomplish it. It was not, according to the decision of General McDowell, a question of further advance, but of extending the line I had then in part formed, and thus making connection with Reynolds or the troops northward towards Groveton. General McDowell had asked me earlier in the day to place King's division on my right, so that, uniting with Reynolds, he should have his command together. With this object I rode with him, at his request, to our right beyond the railroad, as far as a small stream, but the wooded and broken character of the country made it evident to both of us that King could not be moved to my immediate right without great labor, delay and danger; and it was suggested, perhaps by myself, that the only way he could have King on the left of Reynolds or of the troops near Groveton, was by taking King, then in my rear, on the road near Bethlehem Church, up the Sudley Springs road, to come in between Reynolds and me.

With the understanding—equivalent to an order so long as he was present—that I should hold to my present position on the Manassas-Gainesville road and stand on the defensive, General McDowell decided to take his divisions, then on the road immediately in my rear, and to turn back and go by the Sudley Springs road to Groveton to place them on the left of the troops at that place. He thus undertook to relieve me of the unfulfilled and impracticable obligation of establishing communication with Sigel. He accomplished his great desire to reclaim King, and went to a point from which he could "easily reach Bull Run by night or next morning;" he also left the road free to me to withdraw when ordered. These were the "considerable advantages" which induced him "not to carry out the order strictly."

The three objects to be accomplished under the joint order were: 1. To move towards Gainesville. 2. To establish communication with Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno. 3. When this communication was established, to halt.

But the troops should occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run by night or the next morning. There was nothing in this order that contemplated a battle.

On the contrary, the command, being to halt when communications were established, implied the contrary.

The joint order had been fulfilled as far as it could be complied with, when General McDowell rendered it impossible to move any further towards Gainesville with our joint forces, by taking King's division with him.

After he left me, I was not only authorized but bound to exercise the discretion authorized in the joint order holding in view "that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning." The corps had already marched ten miles, and was then about eight miles from Bull Run.

At the time General McDowell separated from me, my position was an embarrassing one. He took King's division, 8,000 men from me, leaving my force proportionally reduced.

I was satisfied the enemy was before me, in strong force. I had that



morning received an order from General Pope to push forward with my corps and King's division upon Gainesville.

I had afterwards received, with General McDowell, the joint order to move forward towards Gainesville, informing me that Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno were moving on the Warrenton Pike, and must be not far from Gainesville.

I knew that in this General Pope was mistaken; that they could not be farther advanced towards Gainesville than I was, and that Heintzelman and Reno had not joined Sigel; that General Pope did not realize the fact that Longstreet had already reached my front; that instead of the "main forces of the enemy" moving at a pace that would bring them to Centreville by to-morrow night or next morning, they were already practically in our front; that if my troops should attempt to move farther, it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for them to be in a position to reach Bull Run by night or next morning. In other words, that General Pope was under the impression that it would be twenty-four hours before the whole force of the enemy would be in position to make an attack upon us. Whereas, in fact, they were then in actual position, preparing for the conflict, and seemed to be, as far as I could judge, inviting an attack upon our part.

In addition to this, General McDowell had informed me that the plan of the campaign was preparation to form behind Bull Run a line of this army and of the reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac, and not to bring on a general engagement until this was done. This plan was clearly borne out by the terms of the joint order, which shows that General Pope intended to get his army in position behind Bull Run some twelve hours at least before the whole force of the enemy should be upon him. On the other hand, my orders had been to move towards Gainesville. These were given upon the theory that Longstreet had not then formed a junction with Jackson.

I felt bound to adopt and act upon the theory of the orders as far as it was possible for me to do so, and to make the effort to prevent the junction of Longstreet with Jackson, if it had not already actually taken place.

While returning to my command, I saw the enemy's infantry coming to the railroad, and artillery moving to a slight elevation north of it.

Impressed as I was with the strength of the force in my front, I yet determined to make the effort to move towards Gainesville if it was at all feasible to do so.

Believing that then, if ever, before the enemy formed in too great strength so close to us, was the time to strike with our united forces, I determined, General McDowell having left me, to take the responsibility, and directing Morell to continue the deployment for an advance, sent my chief of staff, Colonel Locke, to instruct King not to go away. Sykes was coming up as rapidly as Morell's deployment permitted.

Colonel Locke soon returned and gave me the following message from General McDowell, whom he had found with King's division. "Give my compliments to General Porter, and say I am going to the right and shall take King with me. He had better remain where he is, but if necessary to fall back, he can do so on my left." (Record, p. 135.)

This message decided my course. Not that I regarded it as an order obligatory upon me—for I was now independent of General McDowell—but, in face of what we had the best reason to believe was a largely superior force to mine, and General McDowell's moving away with King's force beyond all possible assistance to me, left me no alternative but to conform to the course he had adopted, because I was too weak

to make an effective attack. His going away and his consequent inability, for hours, to be of service at either point, coincided with the general policy of no battle that day nor till the Army of the Potomac should join in force. It did not deviate from the one of forming a line of observation, and of the necessity of "retiring behind Bull Run to-night or by morning," foreshadowed in General Pope's order. No useful body of my corps could, in face of an enemy, cross the country to Groveton, and there was no known or apparent necessity of risking the attempt. A further advance towards Gainesville would the more widely separate me from the right wing, and either course would bring on a most unequal contest with the strong and well posted body of the enemy between Jackson and myself. My observation and experience during our war had proven that the attacking forces had always sustained signal repulses when the attacked were well posted and in sufficient numbers to be self-protective. With this view I felt persuaded of my ability to resist any assault which the enemy might make upon me. But, on the other hand, I was satisfied that an attack by myself would inevitably be disastrous.

My conclusions under all the circumstances were, that in the exercise of the discretion vested in me by the joint order, and also, by reason of my command being a separate one, from the further fact that the condition of affairs was so different from anything supposed by General Pope in his orders to me, I should best fulfil my duty by holding the enemy in my front in check.

My most effective service, therefore, was to act on the defensive. My action thereafter and my orders aimed by inviting attack or by threatening it, to keep in my front the forces which otherwise would have been available to go against General Pope's scattered army.

General Morell was again deploying and the other troops were coming up, when I received General McDowell's last message. Morell was then recalled, and advantageously posted, concealed largely by the brush and timber with which our ground abounded. Sykes was thrown back on the road and held immediately in the rear of Morell.

While Morell was taking position artillery opened upon him. This fire was soon silenced by one of his batteries, though it was subsequently opened farther to our right and was again silenced. From that time the enemy rapidly increased in force and formed to resist attack, occasionally threatened by my command.

Having recalled Morell to the ridge which he occupied when General McDowell left me, and having seen his command posted partly concealed, so as to invite attack, and having directed him to occasionally threaten an attack, and having Sykes immediately in rear supporting him, I took my position at the rear of Sykes' troops, at Bethlehem Church near the junction of the Gainesville and Sudley Springs road—this point being the most suitable from which to control my command and to quickly communicate with General McDowell, he having taken the Sudley Springs road to Bull Run and Groveton.

There was nothing in the attitude of the opposing force to induce attack, but much to forbid it after King's division left me. The enemy was in great strength, both in numbers and position, and reported to be occasionally threatening an attack. I entertained, however, no fear of the result had he made one, and aimed, as my orders will show, to keep the enemy from going against General Pope. This course was successful.

Morell was aware that the general policy and the tenor of General

Pope's order were not to battle; but to "occupy a position from which we could reach Bull Run that night or next morning."

Verbal and written communications from Morell were frequent, keeping me informed of all matters in his front. This information showed the enemy was threatening, and at one time being reinforced from the troops (Record, p. 146) opposing General Pope. All this information was at once forwarded to General McDowell, he having furnished mounted men for the purpose. He was thus kept informed of matters with me.

The following despatches passed between General Morell and me; they show the tone of all communications during the day.\*

Early in the afternoon, an effort to give aid to or join General Sigel was directed in the following despatch, but the difficulty of penetrating the intervening country between us even with infantry, and the impossibility of carrying artillery, and the necessity of holding the enemy in our immediate front, caused it to be abandoned:

[No. 28.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass, but see if you cannot give help to Sigel. If you find him retiring move back towards Manassas, and should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Look to the points of the compass for Manassas.

F. J. PORTER.

At another time an erroneous report from my front stated that our troops near Groveton were retiring, and under this supposition, it being folly to attack, and being unable to join General Pope, except by calling my troops down the road towards Manassas, I sent the following note stating efforts to communicate with troops at Groveton had failed and indicating an intention to act, in case I found the reports true:

[No. 29.]

GENERALS McDOWELL AND KING:

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in great force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messages have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery, and cavalry, and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing, and how affairs are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back?

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

On "going to the head of the column" I found I had been misinformed. The opening of an artillery fire beyond Groveton towards Sudley Springs on General Pope's extreme right, and the cessation temporarily of that near Groveton, had created the erroneous impression that "the firing of the enemy had advanced and ours retired." No action was taken to carry out the determination expressed, and there was no withdrawing to Manassas, or falling back of any kind.

The above despatch, inquiring for as well as giving information, shows intention to seek it in the right place. It was but a timely warning of

\* For the proper arrangement of these despatches, in connection with the newly-discovered despatches, see them under the head of Telegrams and orders.

what was likely to occur under specified circumstances, and gave to General McDowell the opportunity to correct or affirm the reported condition of affairs in the direction he was marching, and in response to it I received the message that "all was doing well on the right," and "the enemy is retiring up the pike."\* (Record, p. 150.)

[No. 30.]

GENERAL:

Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the woods on our right, towards the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this be so, it will be hot here in the morning.

GEO. W. MORELL,  
*Major-General.*

This was returned to Morell, endorsed as follows:

Move the infantry, and everything behind the crest and conceal the guns. We must hold that place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them they do over us, and get your men out of sight.

F. J. PORTER.

[No. 31.]

GENERAL PORTER:

I can move everything out of sight, except Hazlett's battery. Griffin is supporting it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. The other batteries and brigades are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean by everything?

GEO. W. MORELL,  
*Major-General.*

Endorsed as follows:

GENERAL MORELL:

I think you can move Hazlett's battery, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes with the others, so as to deceive. I would get everything, if possible, in ambuscade. All goes well with the other troops.

F. J. P.

To a verbal report, that the enemy in front of us was being increased from their forces in front of General Pope, I wrote:

[No. 32.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Tell me what is passing quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to him, and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Followed immediately by:

[No. 33.]

General MORELL:

Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing?

F. J. PORTER.

To which I received the following reply, sent in by Colonel Marshall, then on the skirmish line, relating to the force extending to his left:

[No. 34.]

General MORELL:

The enemy must be in a much larger force than I can see. From the commands of the officers, I should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on left as the movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close.

E. G. MARSHALL,  
*Col. 13th N. Y.*

The above was endorsed as follows:

\* This is probably the message Lieut. Weld sent to me from Gen. Hatch and subsequently delivered in person. I received no other message that day from Gen. McDowell.



[No. 35.]

General PORTER:

Colonel Marshall reports a movement in front of his left. I think we had better retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the movement. Stay where you are to aid me, if necessary.

MORELL.

The threatened attack not being carried out, I gave the following order:

[No. 36.]

General MORELL:

I have all within reach of you. I wish you to give the enemy a good shelling without wasting ammunition, and push at the same time, a party over to see what is going on. We cannot retire while McDowell holds his own.

F. J. P.

This movement, however, was abandoned, because our threatening attitude proved sufficient to hold the enemy to our front, which was the object to be accomplished.

## THE ORDER OF 4.30 P. M., AUGUST 29TH.

Up to 4 P. M. my despatches to General McDowell had furnished full information of my doings and of the enemy's presence. Receiving no instructions or intimations to the contrary, I concluded my course was satisfactory and its policy should be maintained till night when I supposed orders would probably direct me "to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville." My troops were without food at this time, and so continued throughout the next day, except a small supply of hard tack which they received that night. But, to be sure I was doing right, I sent my aid-de-camp, Lieutenant Stephen M. Weld, to General Pope, with a note informing him that Morell would soon be engaged, and asking for information and orders.

About 6 o'clock favorable reports from the right wing, "stating that the enemy was retiring up the pike," induced me to direct General Morell to attack, which I did by the following order (C. M. Rec., pp. 129 and 150):

[No. 37.]

GENERAL MORELL:

I wish you to push up two regiments, supported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the party with the section of artillery opposed to you. The battle looks well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling when our troops advance.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Judge Advocate General Holt has mistaken, in his review (Rec. p. 310), this order, directing a reconnoissance in force for the later and verbal order borne by Colonel Locke (Record, p. 136), commanding an attack by General Morell with his whole division; in pursuance of the 4.30 order of General Pope.

General Morell believing this attack by two regiments would bring on a disastrous repulse followed by a strong pursuit, commenced putting all his command in his front line, and urged me, in consequence of the great strength of the enemy, not to make it. During the time occupied by this preparation, I became satisfied that Morell was right, and that by holding the enemy before us, we were producing all the good effects of a battle, and would get none of its evils.



Hence, as the day was nearly ended—then sunset—I suspended the attack by an order, which put the troops in position for any service that might be required after the return of Lieutenant Weld:

[No. 38.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Put your men in position to remain during the night, and have out your pickets. Put them so that they will be in position to resist anything. I am about a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well, and we are getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy: Ricketts has gone, also King.

F. J. PORTER.

*Major-General.*

Between sundown and dark Lieutenant Weld returned, but without orders, and with but little information. He had delivered my note to General Pope in rear of Groveton, near the crossing of the Warrenton Pike, by the Sudley Springs road. After his return I received the following order, which, if properly dated and promptly dispatched, was much delayed in delivery:

[No. 39.]

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,

August 29, 1862—4:30 P. M.

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's right flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but he can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

JOHN POPE,

*Major-General Commanding.*

Major-General PORTER.

Up to the hour of the receipt of the above order, my command had remained substantially in the positions it held when General McDowell left: that is, Morell in line of battle, with supports from his own command, and General Sykes immediately in rear, extending along the road to my position near Bethlehem church. Morell had, at times, shown part of his forces to indicate an intention to attack, and at other times, with the view of inducing an attack, thrown them slightly to the rear, under concealment of the brush, which abounded on his ground.

These movements have been erroneously connected with the dispatch sent by me to Generals McDowell and King (No. 29), and have thus been made the ground of charging me with having retreated. No action was taken in accordance with that dispatch, as I soon found my information was incorrect.

At no time was there any retreat, or order by me or any of my officers for a retreat, or any movement leading to a retreat, to my knowledge. The denunciations which my enemies have resorted to, had no better foundation than the movements above mentioned, which necessarily arose from placing my command in proper position for defence and to induce attack, and in proper support.\*

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\* If additional evidence is needed that I had no intention to retreat, I call attention to the dispatch which I number 38 c, and which will be found on page 304 of the Board record. The original is with the court martial manuscript. It was introduced for the record. Its context points its date, and other kindred dispatches fix the hour it was written—after 6 p. m., or after sunset.

I held, all the afternoon of the 29th and till 4 A. M. of the 30th, the same line in front as I occupied when General McDowell left me.

The enemy in the mean time had been increasing in strength, occasionally driving in our skirmishers, as if intending to attack, or desiring to prevent our learning their movements. Our officers on the skirmish line were, however, vigilant, and early ascertained the existence of a large force in our front. They were prompt to report its presence to Colonel Marshall, commanding the skirmishers, who, for verification, reconnoitered in person and ascertained the facts, and reported them to General Morell. The details of the information concerning this force General Morell reported to me at various times throughout the afternoon.

This order was delivered to me, according to my best recollection, *after* 6:30 P. M. The sun set about 6:31, Warrenton time. The order was delivered to me by Captain Pope, one of General Pope's aides. I was then quite near Bethlehem Church, at the junction of the Sudley Springs road with the Manassas-Gainesville roads.

It may be that when the order was delivered to me I was lying down, as described by Orderly Duffee. I do not recollect whether this was so or not, but I had been ill at Falmouth, was still suffering from the disease, and was compelled to lie down the greater part of the time, except when I was on horseback, as I had been that day, from probably 7 A. M. to 3 P. M. in the afternoon.

This order asserted that "your line of march brings you in on the enemy's flank," and directed me to attack Jackson's right flank, the flank of the forces "massed in front of us," "and to keep close communication with General Reynolds." It showed the entire ignorance, on the part of General Pope of Longstreet's separate force then confronting and outflanking me, and also of the impracticability of any speedy movement across the country between me and "the right wing," which I was "to keep close communication with." Its execution involved an attack upon Longstreet—an attack, which, in a smaller degree, I had been attempting, and which, in so large a degree, I had regarded as leading to no good result.

However, I immediately on receiving the 4:30 order despatched Colonel Locke with orders to Morell to attack with his whole division, saying that I would join him immediately. Having thus despatched Colonel Locke, I then acknowledged the receipt of the order by General Pope's returning aide. This reply was in writing. I said that, though I believed the order had arrived too late to be executed, I would do all that was possible to carry it into effect, and I added that I could promise no good effect and believed that disaster would attend any attack without the aid of the divisions taken away by General McDowell.\*

General Pope, in his testimony on my trial, acknowledges having received from me a message somewhat of this character, but he said the message made no impression upon him, and he does not give the precise language as it was sent him by me.

This note or the envelope which contained his order to me, and which was returned to him, contained a statement of the hour I received his order of 4:30 P. M., and from my best recollection I would state that it

\* Soon after Gen. McDowell left me, taking King and Rickett's with him, I began sending despatches to him according to agreement, to be delivered to Gen. Pope if first reached, and when I received this 4:30 P. M. order I supposed Gen. Pope, though misstating the conditions, had the information I had been giving, and had ordered an attack despite the circumstances. For this reason I did not hesitate, as I would otherwise have done, to give the necessary instructions to execute it. I now know he was totally ignorant of the conditions in my front. Gen. McDowell did not forward or deliver any of my despatches.

was not earlier than 6:30 p. m. I am sure, if the note and envelope are produced, one of them will sustain me in my assertion. It was my misfortune that neither this nor any other one of the important dispatches sent by me to General Pope during this period was produced by him, although he was requested during his examination as a witness before the court martial to produce them. My alleged disobedience to this 4:30 order was the chief ground of attack upon me, and I was found guilty of it, and had put upon me the severest penalties that could be imposed short of death.

My reply to that order becomes of vital importance in determining the true test to be applied to my conduct. It can hardly be supposed that a reply in writing made to a commander by a subordinate officer to an order requiring him to execute so important and dangerous a movement, especially in view of the fact that he then contemplated ordering the arrest of that officer, would have been carelessly thrown aside or mislaid.

I submit that every inference to be drawn from the note must be favorable to myself, or rather, that the failure to produce the note and envelope is in itself strong evidence that, if produced, they would negate the charge that I had wantonly or wilfully disobeyed the order.

But to return to my narrative :

My order to attack with his whole force, found Morell executing the previous order to put his troops in line of battle for the night.\* It hastened his movements to get his troops in position. A few minutes thereafter I joined him. But it was then so dark that it was impossible to make aggressive movements.†

\* It seems that the order to post his troops for the night did not reach Morell till after Locke gave the order to attack with the whole division, though sent prior to the one by Locke. When he received the order to pass the night, he construed it as commanding the order to attack, and as a reply to his protest against an attack with two regiments. He knew nothing of the 4:30 order, and considered the message by Locke as merely urging him on.

† The following dispatches (numbered 29a, 35a, 38a, and 38b, to correspond with kindred dispatches) appeared for the first time in testimony before the Board.

Their connection with the other dispatches and their bearings upon the evidence of facts during the afternoon of the 29th Aug., when the dispatches were written, are made clear in the arguments of Mr. Bullitt and of Mr. Maltby.

General Warren's dispatch is explained in his testimony, and that explanation makes it clear that there was no retreat.

The other dispatches were brought before the Board by General McDowell. He desired to give his reasons for wishing he had presented them before the Court-Martial (New Rep., p. 896), but the Recorder supplied the deficiency (pp. 439 to 439), which was that after General McDowell left me, and after he had sent word that he was going to take King away from me, I moved my troops to the right and front, or attempted to do so, notwithstanding I have said such a movement was a "gross military blunder," and that I recognized thereby and otherwise, Gen. McDowell's controlling authority over me.

No y, if these dispatches prove anything, they prove—

1st. That the 4:30 order was not in my possession at 6 p. m.

2nd. That I made every effort to keep General McDowell, and through him General Pope, fully informed of the state of affairs in my front that day, and was anxiously seeking information and instructions to guide my actions.

3rd. That they show co-operation on my part in the carrying out of some plan or understanding with General McDowell by which both were to act or were acting together, and that understanding was *not*—after he had taken King and Ricketts away—that I should attack or move over the open ground to my right front, without some further information from Gen. McDowell or Gen. Pope.

The first of this family of dispatches is yet missing—I mean the one I testify before General McDowell's Court of Inquiry that I had sent to General Pope, informing him that General McDowell had separated from me.

If that dispatch ever comes to light, I have no doubt it will give my understanding of the reasons why General McDowell left me, the objects he was to accomplish, and what I was to do till I heard from him or from General Pope.

But to silence forever, I hope, the accusation that I designed any movement to the

It is proper to add that throughout the day the firing of artillery had been plainly audible in the position of our troops, and the bursting shells of the combatants could be seen.

These had served to indicate to us the relative positions of the con-  
 rear except in connection with giving help to my companions on my right, who at one time, and for a moment only, I erroneously supposed were being driven or were falling back, I present dispatch No. 38c, which must have been written after No. 38 directing General Morell to post his troops for the night. It was written after Ricketts' division had gone up, and we know that was after sundown, and it makes preparation to be able to remain in that vicinity a few days.

This dispatch (38c) was taken from the unprinted files of the Court-Martial, where it has laid secreted for sixteen years.

(No. 29a.)

"General McDowell: The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance, and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate, please do so. I have sent many messengers to you and General Sigel, and get nothing.

(Signed)

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

"An artillery duel is going on now—been skirmishing for a long time.

F. J. P."

(No. 36a.)

5 h. 45 m. p. m., Aug. 29, '62.

General SYKES:

I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and support Morell. I faced about and did so. I soon met Griffin's brigade, withdrawing, by order of General Morell, who was not pushed out, but returning. I faced about and marched back 200 yards or so. I met then an orderly, from General Porter to General Morell, saying he must push on and press the enemy; that all was going well for us, and he was returning. Griffin then faced about; and I am following him to support General Morell, as ordered. None of the batteries are closed up to me.

Respectfully,

G. K. WARREN.

(No. 38a.)

"General McDowell or King,—I have been wandering over the woods, and failed to get a communication to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have to retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the battle? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left.

(Signed)

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General Volunteers.*

(No. 38b.)

General McDowell,—Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about the woods for a time I withdrew him, and, while doing so, artillery opened on us. My scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not succeeded, as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of scouts think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men from infantry firing.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General Volunteers.*

Aug. 29, 6 p. m.

(No. 38c.)

Gen. MORELL: Send down some good energetic men to Gen. Pope at Centreville. Get hold of Colonel Beckwith and get some rations. Bring beef up to kill; we have nothing else; and get enough to last two or three days.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

Ricketts has gone up, also King.

So it seems from this that even at the late hour at which this note was written (after Ricketts had passed up), I not only had not received the 4.30 order, but that I did not even know that Gen. Pope had left Centreville.



tending forces in the vicinity of Groveton, but they did not convey to the mind of any one experienced in the war, the idea of anything more than an artillery duel at long range. The noise of any infantry contest must have been deadened by the intervening forests.

That we were ignorant of infantry contests going on will be seen by the evidence of General Griffin, on p. 165 of Court Martial Record, who says "he heard no firing whatever, except artillery at a long distance," until "a little after dark there was some heavy volleys of musketry."

General Morell says (Rec., p. 147): "Just at the close of the day there were one or two volleys of musketry. \* \* \* There were a few shots exchanged between our pickets and those of the enemy when we first came upon that ground and a few scattering shots during the day. With that exception, I did not hear any until the volley I have just spoken of."

These generals were at my front in the main line of battle. General Reynolds, who was at Groveton, just south of the Warrenton Turnpike, and two miles nearer General Pope than I, says (Rec., p. 170): "As near as I can recollect, it (the infantry fire in force and volume) must have been between four and five o'clock, probably five o'clock. That is, I refer to the part near me. There may have been infantry firing on the right which I could not hear."

And prior to this answer, when asked :

"Q. On the 29th, before four o'clock, P. M., what was the character of the battle; artillery or infantry?"

"A. Principally artillery."

General Pope himself, in his report (Conduct of the War Supplement, Part 2, p. 154), does not allege that a battle was raging, but simply that "from twelve to four very severe skirmishes occurred constantly at various points on our line, and were brought on at every indication the enemy made of a disposition to retreat."

At about half-past five he ordered an attack.

But General Reynolds was nearer these severe skirmishes than I, and he testifies that he did not hear infantry firing in force and volume, until probably five o'clock.

Captain Pope, who, as the bearer of an important dispatch, would naturally have been observant of all signs of battle, did not remember to have heard infantry firing at the time of the delivery of the 4.30 order variously affirmed to be 5, 5½ and 6½ P. M.

I have been held culpable for the course pursued this day on the left wing of General Pope's army.

The judge advocate, in his argument to the President, asserted (Record, p. 313):

"That a vigorous attack upon the enemy by the accused at any time between twelve o'clock, when the battle began, and dark, when it closed, would have secured a triumph for our arms, and not only the overthrow of the rebel forces, but, *probably*, the destruction or capture of Jackson's army, the record fully justifies. This opinion, in effect, is emphatically expressed by Generals Pope, McDowell and Roberts, and Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, all of whom participated in the engagement and were well qualified to judge."

Whatever, at that time, may have been deemed the qualifications of these witnesses, I will show before closing this narrative and the evidence to be laid before this Board, that their testimony, in the light since thrown upon the then clouded events of that day, is not entitled to the weight which was given to it, because they testified in ignorance of the facts which then actually existed and which I am ready to



prove; and that the court, in forming conclusions on their inferential testimony, and the President in confirming them on the "probabilities" of the Judge-Advocate, were led into serious errors, which now it would be impossible to commit, and which, as far as it is possible, should be rectified.

For the operations of this day I was charged with,

*Under the 9th Article of War.*

1st. Disobeying the joint order to General McDowell and me.

2d. Disobeying the order of 4:30 P. M., and,

*Under the 52d Article of War.*

1st. "That in disobeying the order of 4:30 P. M., I did retreat from the advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops who were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack I was there ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army, a result which must have followed from said flank attack had it been made by me, in compliance with said order."

2d. "That being with my command between Manassas Station and the field of battle then pending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within sound of the guns, and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action of great consequence was being fought, and that the aid of my corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on to the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy, without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowing the forces from which I had retreated."

3d. That being near the field of battle of Manassas, while a severe action was being fought by the troops of General Pope's command, and being in the belief that the troops of General Pope were sustaining a defeat and retiring from the field, did fail to go to the aid of said troops and general, and did shamefully retreat away and fall back with his army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters of a presumed defeat the said army, and did fail, by any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety of the Capital of the country.

Of these charges I was pronounced guilty, except so much as implies I "did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy" *after* the receipt of the 4:30 order.

It will be observed:

*First.*—That the joint order to General McDowell and myself enjoins—

1st. That General McDowell and I shall move towards Gainesville with our joint commands.

2d. That our joint commands shall halt as soon as communication is established between our forces and Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno, thereby requiring us to look to the future for orders or events to govern our course.

3d. That one thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning.

*Second.*—That the 4:30 P. M. order shows on its face that which General Pope has since declared was the fact:

1st. That I was to attack the "flank" and, if possible, the "rear" of Jackson's forces then massed in the woods in front of him at Groveton, and mainly north of the Warrenton turnpike.

2d. That there was no knowledge on the part of General Pope of Longstreet's force, or of any other considerable force in my front and between me and Jackson.

Even to this date, July, 1878, General Pope asserts that my court martial statements of affairs and representation of force in my front—the same as herein given—were not correct, and that, with nothing to justify, I disobeyed of purpose the "joint order" to McDowell and me, and also the order of 4:30 P. M.; and that under the circumstances, as known to him, I should without orders, early in the day, have attacked Jackson then contending with Sigel, Reynolds, and Heintzelman. He insists there was no enemy lying between me and Groveton, as I then claimed and proved there was. He errs in his assertion of facts. But I let facts speak for themselves.

#### I.

General Pope's understanding of the situation is shown as follows:

He testified, Record, p. 16: "Had General Porter fallen upon the flank of the enemy, as it was hoped at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, it is my firm conviction that we should have destroyed the army of Jackson."

Again (pp. 34, 35):

"General Porter was expected to attack, if possible—and as I understood it to be practicable—the right flank of Jackson's forces, and if possible the rear of his forces, to prevent, if it were practicable, the junction of Longstreet's forces with Jackson's, and to crush Jackson's flank before Longstreet could effect a junction with him. I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that at the time (4:30 P. M.) any considerable portion of Longstreet's corps had reached the vicinity of the field. I do not know that General Porter, between 5:30 P. M. and 7 o'clock, had the enemy immediately in his front, though I would think it altogether likely that Jackson would have pushed out some force to observe the road between Gainesville and Manassas Junction. It is altogether likely, therefore, that some of Jackson's troops were in presence of General Porter's advance, though of my own knowledge I do not know that."

Again he says, in his report (p. 22) to General Halleck, January 27, 1863, and to "Committee on Conduct of the War," May, 1865:

"I do not hesitate to say that if Porter had made a vigorous attack on the enemy, at any time up to 8 o'clock that night, we should have utterly crushed or captured the larger portion of Jackson's force before he could have been, by any possibility, sufficiently reinforced to have made an effective resistance. \* \* \* I believe, in fact I am positive, that at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th General Porter had in his front no considerable body of the enemy. I believed then, as I am very sure now, that it was easily practicable for him to have turned the right flank of Jackson and to have fallen upon his rear; that if he had done so we should have gained a decisive victory over the army under Jackson before he could have been joined by any of the forces of Longstreet, and that the army of General Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to have been no longer in condition to prosecute further operations of an aggressive character."

In support of his opinion he adds, extracting from the record of the court (pp. 86, 93):

"I submit the testimony of General McDowell," "an intelligent and reliable witness."

Question by Judge-Advocate: What would probably have been the effect upon the fortune of the battle if, between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, General Porter, with his whole force, had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy (Jackson) as directed in the order of 4:30 P. M. of the 29th of August?—A. *It is a mere opinion that you ask?*

Q. Yes, sir.—A. I think it would have been decisive in our favor.

Q. I must state the ground on which you formed the opinion that if the accused had attacked the right wing of the rebels, as he was ordered, the battle would have been decisive in our favor?—A. Because on the evening of that day I thought the result was decidedly in our favor, as it was; but, admitting that it was nearly equally balanced, I think, and thought, that if the corps of General Porter, reputed one of the

best, if not the best, in the service, consisting of between twenty and thirty regiments, and some eight batteries, had been added to the efforts made by others, the result would have been in our favor very decidedly; \* \* and besides the mere advantage in numbers from which that result would have followed, the position in which this force would have been applied, while the main body was so hotly engaged in front, would have been an additional powerful reason for so supposing.

That the testimony of this "intelligent and reliable" witness was inferential entirely is made apparent when cross-questioned by the court (p. 221):

Q. From your knowledge of the condition of things on the 29th of August, was there any considerable force of the enemy in front of General Porter's corps, near the Manassas Railroad, on the south side of it?—A. I have no positive knowledge on that point; I have not supposed that there was, but I cannot support that supposition by any positive facts.

Q. If there had been any such force in front of General Porter's corps, and south of the railroad, do you think, from your knowledge of the ground, that would have prevented General Porter from obeying the order to attack the right wing of the main body of the enemy?

(The accused objected to the question as not being in the nature of rebutting evidence. No member of the court sustaining the objection, it was ordered that the question be answered.)

A. *I do not know where the right wing of the main body of the enemy was at that time; such a force of the enemy, in such a position, would itself most likely have been the right wing of the enemy, so far as I can imagine the case; the distance from General Porter's head of column to the road at that time was not so great as to have enabled a large force of the enemy to be between them and to be detached from the main body of the enemy.*

Again, under the supposition that Longstreet did not intervene, Gen. McDowell testified, p. 97:

To have defeated Gen. Porter in an attack upon the enemy's (Jackson's) right flank and rear, would have required a large force of the enemy, which would have relieved the attack in front, and, I think, would have still resulted in a success to our side.

That that "large force of the enemy" was there immediately confronting me, and also that an attack by me would *not* "have relieved the attack in front" made by Gen. Pope, will be made apparent ere I close.

I desire, just here, to call attention to the position on that field, which Gen. Pope *supposed* I held that day—shown on his map presented with his reports, and republished by the War Department, and now laid before you, with this narrative. It is also placed in red ink on the annexed printed sketch, and upon the larger maps, giving the positions of all troops on that field that day. It will be seen that he located me at least a mile in advance of my actual position, and with no enemy in the position occupied by Longstreet.

Gen. Roberts, my accuser on the record, was also as inferential in his testimony. He testified (pp. 49, 50, 51, 52, 214, 216, 217):

Answer. As I understood the relation of General Reynolds with the Pennsylvania reserves to the enemy's right (Jackson's) General Porter's reserves having attacked the right of the enemy, would have brought him in close connection with Reynolds' left.

Q. Will the witness inform the court whether, at any time in the course of the day of the 29th of August, he saw the command of the accused and the enemy in such a position as to make an attack by General Porter upon the flank or rear of the enemy possible?—A. I did not see General Porter's command on the field on Friday, the 29th of August. But I *suppose* that I know nearly the position where General Porter's command was between four and five o'clock, and I *supposed* that I had seen smoke from guns of his command. I know the direction of the road from Manassas Junction to the field of battle, and, in my opinion, General Porter was in a position where he could have moved forward and have attacked the right of the enemy; and I also believed he could have turned the enemy's right flank and attacked their rear, from what I know of their relative positions and from what I know of the country.

Q. Between four and five o'clock p. m. of the 29th of August, did the witness know

whether or not Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, had made junction with Jackson on Jackson's right?—A. I did not know; but I had reason to believe that they had *not made junction*, as I had been requested by General Pope, before going on to the field, while at Centreville in the morning to take a position, and with a glass to observe whether troops were moving from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville; and having closely observed that country for a long time I became convinced, from the clouds of dust that arose above the Bull Run range beyond Thoroughfare Gap, towards a gap north of Thoroughfare Gap, the name of which I now forget, that Longstreet was moving very rapidly to get through that northern gap, and to reinforce Jackson. But, from the distance from the head of the column of dust to Gainesville, I did not believe that he would be able to effect a junction before late in the evening, and so reported to General Pope.

Q. Such having been the opinion of the witness during the day of the 29th of August, will he please state whether, up to the present time, he has become satisfied that Longstreet's forces, in whole or in part, did effect such junction with Jackson's right in the afternoon—say between five and six o'clock, or before that time—on the 29th of August?—A. I am convinced, by information that I have received since that day, that a part of Longstreet's forces effected a junction with Jackson in the evening of the 29th—I think about dark.

Q. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day in the absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been the result upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, as ordered by the order of 4:30 P. M., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy?

The accused objected to the question.

The court was thereupon cleared.

Some time after the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced that the court determined that the question shall be answered.

The question was again propounded to the witness as follows:

Q. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day in the absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have been the results upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked as ordered by the order of 4:30 P. M., either on the right flank or the rear of the enemy?—A. I do not doubt at all that it would have resulted in the defeat, if not in the capture, of the main army of the Confederates that were on the field at that time.

The witness had been requested by Gen. Pope to learn what enemy was on his right, and he sent cavalry to find out.

He testified (p. 214.):

I found only a force of mounted men with some light artillery, who were watching all our movements on our right flank, and I *inferred* that it was a similar force to that, which was on our left watching our movements there, which were in front of General Porter.

Again (p. 216.):

Q. From your knowledge of the position of the enemy on the 29th of August last, will you state how many of them were south of the Manassas Railroad, or in front of General Porter's command?—A. I do not believe, from what I know of the enemy's forces, that there was any force in front of General Porter's command on that day, except a cavalry force in observation there, with some light artillery.

Lieut-Col. Thomas C. H. Smith, another prosecuting witness, testified (pp. 71, 72, 75), on direct-examination:

Q. Are you sufficiently acquainted with the disposition of the forces under General Pope, and of those of the enemy at that hour, to express an opinion as to what would have been the effect of an attack by General Porter's corps upon the right flank of the enemy at between five and six o'clock P. M. of that day?

This question was objected to by the accused.

The court was thereupon cleared.

After some time the court was reopened, and the Judge-Advocate announced the decision of the court to be, that the witness shall answer the question.

The question was then repeated as above.

A. I do not know as I am sufficiently acquainted with the numbers and disposition of the enemy to give a conclusive answer in regard to that. I can give my view of it, and give the reason why I think a flank attack would have been successful. The enemy were fighting a defensive battle.

At this point the accused suggested to the court whether in view of what the witness had said in regard to his knowledge of the numbers and disposition of the enemy, it was proper for him to proceed with his answer.



At the request of a member of the court, the court was cleared.

After some time the court was reopened. Whereupon the Judge Advocate announced the decision of the court to be that the witness proceed with his answer.

The witness continued as follows:

A. The enemy were fighting a defensive battle. The right lay near the turnpike road between Warrenton and Centreville. The main force, from which they were detached for the time being were off towards Thoroughfare Gap, or beyond it. Their position was a strong one for defence in front, and in the direction in which the three corps of Sigel, Heintzelman, and Reno were fighting them. Far, and back from the front, they had a line of retreat towards Thoroughfare Gap, towards their main force. The direction of a flank attack moving on the road from Manassas to Gainesville, and then moving in upon their flank, was such as to cut off their line of retreat. We drove them off the ground as it was. I believe that if the attack had been made on their flank at that time, between five and six o'clock, exhausted as they were by the fighting through the day, it would have made the defeat a rout, by striking them on their line of retreat towards their main force, and rolling them up on Bull Run and the east of the Gum Spring road, and so on in that direction.

In saying that I did not know their disposition sufficiently to give a conclusive answer, I meant, of course, that I did not know the amount of force on their right. But from the fact that all our attack had been directed with our left resting on that road, and their right apparently resting there, I supposed that if they had a heavy force beyond that road they would have attempted a flank attack upon us. The appearance of the field was such as to lead one to suppose that the entire force of the enemy, except, perhaps, something thrown out to guard that flank, was right in front of us on those ridges. That was where all their artillery fire was, and there was where the fight continued during the day. They were fighting in that position, with their backs towards their main force. Of course, though we might drive them off the field, we could accomplish not any great success, with their great force in the rear and off before Thoroughfare Gap. This flank attack was the main attack to decide the battle, by striking them quartering on the flank and cutting off their line of retreat, so that they could not unite with their main force in that direction.

Q. You have no knowledge of General Porter's position with his command during the 29th of August?—A. I have not.

Cross-questioned by the defence:

Q. You have said, if understood correctly, that the whole of the enemy's forces, while the battle of the 29th of August was going on, was not on the field in front of the Union troops?—A. Yes, sir.

Q. What portion of the enemy's forces was in the rear on that occasion, as you supposed?—A. I believe, as far as we had information from spies, etc., that we had Jackson and Ewell in front of us then, and a part of Longstreet's force that came on to the field.

Q. Was not General Longstreet there?—A. I do not know; I understood that General Buford counted a portion of the enemy that passed through Gainesville, which were all the reinforcements that got up for the enemy that day, *I think*. I cannot remember distinctly when he reported that, or how it came to us.

Q. Do you now know whether General Longstreet, with the forces under his immediate command, joined the enemy at that time, and on what portion of the enemy's lines?—A. No, sir; as I said before, all I can give is the impression derived from the appearance of the field in front of us as to where the enemy were and what their force was; that combined with such information as we had received of their movements the two or three days previous.

Such is the testimony of the four "reliable and intelligent" witnesses for the prosecution. Not one of them knew my position, or supposed that any "but a small force of cavalry and artillery" was in my front during the day, or that Longstreet was present till a late hour in the day.

My actual position and Longstreet's will be proved to have been as now represented on the map, respectively east and west of the small stream separating us.

## II.

Now, in reply, as to Longstreet's forces being in my front:

### 1st. *New evidence—Statements of Confederate officers.*

General officers commanding the troops opposing us certainly knew where they were that day, and were capable of judging of their ability



to meet our attacks. They are entitled to credence, and I traverse the above suppositions by extracts from their statements. (Pamphlet. After-discovered evidence and original letters.)

I wish here to state that witnesses are within easy call to orally sustain all that is here presented.

General Lee, commanding and present on the field, writes, 9th September, 1870 :

"As far as I can judge, the position assigned to the troops of the army of N. E. Virginia, on the map or a little in advance is that held by them on the 29th August, 1862."

Again, 31st October, 1867, he writes :

"Longstreet's command arrived within supporting distance of Jackson on 29th August, '62, between 9 and 10 A. M., and his line was formed by noon."

"It was after 12 M. that General Stuart reported the approach of a column of troops which threatened our right, and *General Wilcox, with his three brigades, was sent to reinforce it.*" \* \* \* "I was with that portion of the troops south of the turnpike."

"General Longstreet's command was formed by 12 m. on the 29th August, in two lines on Jackson's right. General Hood's division crossing the Gainesville Turnpike, and General D. R. Jones' division the Manassas Gap Railroad; artillery was between Jackson's right and Longstreet's left, and cavalry, under General Stuart, guarded the extreme right flank."

"*The result of an attack before 12 M., with 25,000 men, cannot be certainly pronounced; but it ought to have been repulsed if made after Longstreet's troops were formed.* His whole force, except Anderson's division, was up, and that arrived before next morning."

"*The probable result of an attack on Longstreet after 12 M., with less than 12,000 men, would have been a repulse.*"

18th Feb., '70:

"*The result of an attack upon Longstreet after 12 M., August 29th, 1862, with about 12,000 men, would have been a repulse, and, 'if a repulse, especially at an early hour, or before 5 p. m.,' the effect would have been an attack upon General Pope's left and rear by Longstreet and Stuart, which, if successful, would have resulted in the relief of Jackson, and have probably rendered unnecessary the battle of the next day.* If the attack had been made after 5 p. m. on Longstreet, he would have been able to have resisted it with his whole force, which, if successful, would have equally secured Jackson's safety."

And July, '70:

"I had no anxiety for Jackson at 2d Manassas. I knew he could hold on till we came, and that we should be in position in time."

"Porter could not take Jackson in flank while he was attacked in front. He could do nothing of that sort. I was there then. *I saw Porter approach. I went out and reconnoitered his corps, and made the proper dispositions to meet it. We flanked him. He could not flank Jackson.*"

"*I suppose we should have cut Porter to pieces if he had attacked to get at Jackson's flank.*"

The map referred to above, and hereafter is the lithographic sketch herewith attached.

General Longstreet says, Sept. 7th, '68, and July 1st, '75:

"My command (25,000 in round numbers) was within supporting distance of General Jackson at 9 A. M., August 29th, having passed Thoroughfare Gap at early dawn."

"My command was deployed in double line for attack, between 10 A. M. and 12 M. on the 29th, extending from Jackson's right across turnpike and Manassas Gap Railroad."

"My command was ready to receive an attack after 11 A. M., and all were particularly anxious to bring on the battle after 12 M., General Lee more so than the rest."

"If you had attacked any time after 12 M., it seems to me that we would surely have destroyed your army. That is, if you had attacked with less than (25,000) twenty-five thousand men."

Generals Wilcox, Hood, Ewell, Early, and others confirm these opinions.

Colonel Charles Marshall, aid de-camp to General Lee, says :

I think it safe to say, that our total effective force present that day was about as follows:

Longstreet's infantry .....	30,000
Jackson's " .....	20,000
Artillery .....	4,000
Cavalry .....	2,500

I cannot speak positively as to the hour of Longstreet's arrival on the morning of the 29th, as I did not accompany the column from Thoroughfare Gap, but I know that his troops had reached the turnpike on the right of Jackson, and within supporting distance, as early as 10 A. M. As they came up they were formed on the right of Jackson, extending our line nearly at a right angle with, and east of the turnpike; Hood and Evans on Longstreet's left, supported by Wilcox and Kemper; D. R. Jones on the right extending towards the Manassas Gap Railroad.

Most of these troops were in position or about moving into position when Stuart, whose cavalry was on our extreme right, reported the approach of a Federal force from the direction of Manassas Junction, or rather by a road passing by our right, one branch leading to Manassas and one to Bristoe Station.

Thereupon General Lee directed Jones' division to be disposed so as to meet this advance, and Wilcox, with his three brigades, was transferred from Longstreet's left to support Jones.

The troops, whose approach caused this change in the arrangement of our line of battle, I learned afterwards, were yours, and I can state positively, from personal observation as well as on the authority of the official reports of the officers commanding on that part of our line, that those troops made their appearance after Longstreet's command had arrived, as I have above described.

General Jones remained in the position assigned to him during the whole of the 29th, and took no part in the engagement of that day.

General Wilcox was not withdrawn until late in the afternoon, when he was ordered back to support Hood. When he reached Hood's position the firing had ceased.

The next day (August 30) Jones was thrown forward on our right, and participated in our engagement, which occurred in the afternoon.

Had not Wilcox and Jones, with their six brigades, been occupied in watching your advance, they would, of course, have been available in the action of the 29th August—the former near our center, where Hood was hotly engaged, and the latter to operate against the flank of the force which assailed our left and center.

I repeat that I was an eye-witness of the circumstances that were afterwards made the ground against you, and can assure you that in the opinion of every Confederate officer who was present, including General Lee and General Longstreet, so far as our movements were concerned, the facts were not correctly stated to the court.

#### General B. H. Robertson says:

"Longstreet was on Jackson's right, extending in an almost perpendicular direction across Warrenton Turnpike and the Manassas Gap Railroad. My brigade was on his right flank. Longstreet's right extended beyond Porter's left flank, and my orders were to protect his right. Upon making a reconnoissance, a large body of Federal troops was discovered—afterwards known to be Porter's. I was instructed to watch their movements. This was about 12 o'clock (Friday, 29th), and I am quite sure that most of Longstreet's forces were in line of battle at 11 A. M., or very shortly afterwards. Although Stewart was present, I had the immediate command of all the Confederate cavalry at 2d Manassas. And there was no cavalry in that direction but mine, which was held there the remainder of the day to guard the right and watch Porter."

The result of that day's battle upon the success of their arms is seen in their official reports published in Vol. 9 Rebellion Record, pp. 278, 571, 633, and are in marked contrast with the above inferential opinions of the prosecuting witnesses. I extract, however, from a letter of General Longstreet, written since General Pope's claims became known. It throws much light on events of that day. He says:

"Just after passing Gainesville, while in the act of deploying, General Lee ordered me to attack as soon as I could find a favorable or assailable point. As my right was forming into line, I rode forward to examine the Federal position. As my own reconnoissance and that of others did not justify precipitated battle, I reported against attack till a more favorable moment. This did not satisfy General Lee, who still urged immediate attack."

"About this time, say 2 P. M., a report from our cavalry advising of the approach of a considerable force (infantry and artillery) against my right, three brigades\* were sent to reinforce the threatened point. After examining the force and position myself, I reported it too weak, in my judgment, to mean real battle."

"General Lee then again urged me to attack, but upon my suggestion that it was late to begin a battle, that it would be better to make a forced reconnoissance at nightfall,

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\* Wilcox's Division, sent to meet a movement ordered of and commenced by Morell. The approach of this division was reported to me at the time.

and attack at daylight, if justified in so doing by our reconnaissance, he consented to put off battle for another day.

"At nightfall, or a little before the reconnaissance was made, and before midnight, we had reports from all points of my line representing the Federal position strong, success probable, but at a great sacrifice. Believing myself warranted by previous conversation and understanding with General Lee, I ordered the withdrawal of my troops to their original position, sending forward *aces to cut up some artillery that had fallen into our hands during the reconnaissance*. The troops returned to position long before daylight on the 30th. It seems now that the Federal commander mistook my reconnaissance of the 29th for my battle, my withdrawal for retreat, and thus misled, moved forward on the 30th, to renew his attack upon General Jackson."

It is clear our opponents did not consider the result of that day's action in our favor.

### *2d. New Evidence from Federal Sources.*

Captain J. A. Judson, an Assistant Adjutant-General in King's Division, a prisoner in the hands of the enemy on the night of the 29th August, says, writing of the attack by the division that evening:

Here, near Warrenton Pike, on the Sudley Springs road, we remained until nearly dark, when an aid-de-camp dashed up with a message to General Hatch from General McDowell, to the following effect: "The enemy is in full retreat down the Warrenton Turnpike. General Hatch will pursue with his division, overtake and attack him." Instantly the division filed out into the road, and well closed up, began a rapid march along the Sudley Springs road toward its junction with the turnpike. At the intersection of the two roads, and on our right sat General McDowell on horseback, surrounded by his staff and cavalry escort. I was riding by General Hatch's side, and as we approached, General McDowell said, in loud tones, "General Hatch, the enemy is in full retreat," and he added, pointing down the pike towards Groveton, "pursue him rapidly." We moved on at double-quick, Hatch at the head of the column, followed by his own brigade, then Doubleday, and then Patrick and then Gibbon, an order of march I feel sure I recollect, though I cannot remember the place in column of the artillery. It was now quite dark when we reached and crossed the arm of the Ball Run close to Groveton. As we pressed on rapidly no signs were seen of a retreating enemy, when suddenly our skirmishers encountered those of the enemy. A well-sustained and rapidly-increasing musketry fire from an unyielding line, together with a vigorous cannonade on his part, soon convinced General Hatch that the enemy, far from being in retreat, was strongly posted and determinedly resisting our advance. After considerable time had elapsed, to make this certain, he ordered me to ride back and tell General McDowell so. I did so, finding General McDowell at the same spot where we left him. When I had delivered my message, General McDowell said, "What! does General Hatch hesitate? Tell him the enemy *is* in full retreat, and to pursue him." I delivered this reply to General Hatch, but it was no longer a question. So far from being "in retreat," the enemy had not yielded to Hatch's furious attack at all, but bringing up reinforcements, first poured in volleys from their right, which they had so advanced as to almost enfilade our left,—second did the same thing on our right, having advanced their left also,—and finally, with a charge, compelled our division to retire. The large number of killed, wounded and prisoners, *and the loss of several guns*, attest the stubborn fighting of our division, and the mistake in believing "the enemy in full retreat." Myself and twenty or thirty officers and a large number of enlisted men were captured, and what I saw that night and the next morning may be of use to you as going to prove the accuracy of the enemy's position, as shown by you on your map sent me.

1st. The individual to whom I surrendered, was an officer—a lieutenant of infantry—who, in reply to a question, said we "had been engaging a part of Longstreet's corps."

2d. The prisoners were immediately marched a short distance down the pike towards Gainesville, the battle having been fought on the same ground where our division fought the night before—the 28th. A very short distance from the battle field, on each side of the pike, I saw in the darkness indications of large bodies of troops quietly in camp. We were that night kept here, not being taken to Gainesville until later in the day of the 30th. In the gray dawn of the 30th I *saw* these troops, Longstreet's corps, in camp, and was told they had been there since early on the 29th, nor did the Confederate officers fail to joke us on General Pope's failure to intercept Longstreet's march through Thoroughfare Gap.

The statements of Generals Hatch, Patrick and others, now in my possession, of the strong resistance met by Hatch's attack, confirm Cap-

tain Judson's narrative. I do not present their opinions formed at that time, though they are against General Pope's opinion of the result of that day's battle being in our favor, as, like those of Generals Pope, McDowell and Roberts, and Lt. Col. Smith, they were all guesses. They had, however, better opportunities of judging of the result, having been in the battle.

### 3d. *The old evidence on the record.*

In the light of the new evidence now open to view, it is manifest that the testimony of Generals Morell, Griffin and Marshall, and Major Hyland, Lieutenant Stevenson and others, is fully sustained. That I knew of Longstreet's force being in my front—is made clear from the frequent reports of these officers; and from my orders and despatches of that day. I had also been informed at an early hour, by General McDowell and others, of the rapid advance of Longstreet, and the marching of Ricketts and King from the Warrenton Pike, because of his anticipated early arrival that day, and, besides my own observation, and the reports of my officers and the statements of prisoners, I had the report of General Buford stating his arrival, shown to me by General McDowell. I expected these facts to be substantiated by General McDowell before my court, and although he failed to remember it on my trial, it is evident that he had the information, because in his official report of November 9th, 1862, he says: .

"The night of the 27th I saw General Sigel at Buckland Mills and informed him *Longstreet would be coming through the Gap next morning.*" \* \*

"*Knowing that Longstreet would be coming through Thoroughfare,* I sent, early in the morning (28th), Colonel Wyndham's New Jersey cavalry to the Gap, and sent up other cavalry as fast as I could get hold of it; and on receiving word the enemy was coming through (at 10:45 A. M.) I detailed Ricketts' division to hold him in check."

"This departure from your orders to move with 'my whole force' on Manassas I felt called upon to make, to carry out the spirit of your plan of crushing the enemy (Longstreet) at that place before his reinforcements, of whose position I had just received positive intelligence, could join, as those reinforcements, I thought, would be better held in check at the Gap than this side of it."

And I find in his printed defense (p. 43) before his court of inquiry sitting in the same building, and at the same time as my Court Martial, that he was proving that he knew all about these corps of the enemy, and had taken steps to prevent Longstreet joining Jackson—steps which a corps commander had condemned him for not taking, and General Pope regretted he had taken.

### 4th. *The disobedience of the "joint order."*

The "joint order" contains, as I have shown, only three injunctions, and these are addressed jointly to General McDowell and me. Wherein the order was disobeyed no witness testified, and the Judge-Advocate alone could reveal.

General Pope testified, Rec., p. 16:

I do not know whether he obeyed it; he did not obey fully; how far he obeyed it I am not able to say; he certainly did not obey it fully.

If he had obeyed it, it would have brought him up with the enemy before half past four in the evening.

I was "up with the enemy."

General McDowell, who was my commander present with me on the ground, testified, Rec., pp. 83, 85, 87, 90, 92:

I commanded General Porter's corps and my own division: we there (on the ground) received the joint order, which directed the very thing we had ourselves done.

When that joint order reached us we were doing what that joint order directed us to do. *That joint order found the troops in the position it directed them to be.*



That joint order contemplated General Porter's corps and my own to be employed differently from the way I had arranged when I left General Porter, which arrangement was to separate them, leaving him alone on the Gainesville road, whilst I went up the Sudley Spring road.

I decided, under the latitude allowed in that order, that General Porter should put his troops in to the right of where the head of the column then lay, and that I would take mine away from the road on which our two commands then lay up the Sudley Springs road into the battle, in this dissolving the joint operations of our two corps.

His object in leaving me, he says (p. 85), was to place his troops on the left of those at Groveton. \* \* \* To join General Reynold's division.

The object of this joint order was, that with our united forces, we should have force strong enough to intervene between Longstreet and Jackson on the Warrenton Pike. General McDowell's direction and action, for which he had full authority, annulled the order. Of course, as soon as he left and took away his troops I was free (having no restraining orders) to exercise my own discretion—holding in view the injunction “that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning.” Still, notwithstanding his declared intention to take King's division away, I made an effort to retain it, with the view of using it for a continued advance, feeling sure that our united forces were needed to accomplish any good result. However, General McDowell took King away beyond all support of me, and his going away compelled me, in presence of the force then known to be between me and the Warrenton Pike, not to undertake an advance which, with our united forces, my superior had avoided. It forced upon me the *posting* my command on that ground and trying to hold the enemy there, and to induce him to attack us, in place of attacking him. My arrangements for that purpose threw some of my command to the rear, where they were held, in support of my main body confronting the enemy, all that day and night.

The Judge-Advocate called this arrangement a “falling back,” and a disobedience of the order.

He tells the President, *Rec.*, p. 308:

“The court concluded, and justly, that his falling back, under the circumstances, and for the purposes mentioned in his note (p. 22) to Generals McDowell and King, was a violation of the joint order.”

As the note to Generals McDowell and King was written an hour or more after this movement, the reason assigned by the Judge-Advocate shows that the court was in error.

This joint order commanded General McDowell and me to halt. It avoids the idea of a battle in whole or in part. It prohibits it, evidently with the view of enforcing some general policy or united action by the whole army, which circumstances might force on General Pope might enjoin—whether to attack, to wait an attack, or to fall back behind Bull Run.

General Pope's course that day accords with this view, which at first sight of the order, as well as careful study of it and of facts, shows must have been intended. His location of his headquarters with Heintzleman's corps at Centreville, some twelve miles from me; his not getting to the field near Groveton, till near 2 P. M.; his feeling for the enemy till late in the afternoon, with skirmishers and single brigades, and possibly a division, all show intention of combined action and of waiting till a late hour, when he expected the united effort of General McDowell and myself on his left wing. It was only at a late hour, and when he learned that General McDowell was coming to him by a totally different



route from what he expected, and was close at hand to join in this combined movement, that he issued the order of 4.30 p. m.\*

That I so construed the joint order, and so adopted it as the best course of action, is evident from my action that day. My orders all show that I strived to keep the enemy from going against General Pope, that I strived to induce an attack upon me, and kept my command at times threatening an attack, and at times concealed from the view of the enemy. And I now repeat (and it is shown on the record) that at no time before dark, had I or my officers, knowledge of any other than an artillery contest going on, or of any battle pending, or that General Pope needed any aid,† and, in fact, if he had needed aid, the best way of rendering it was by the very course I adopted. Had I attacked I should have been repulsed, and have done no good, as I then believed, and as facts now show would have been the case. Had I attacked at an early hour my repulse would have been followed by the enemy's attack with combined forces upon General Pope's centre at Groveton. The result may perhaps be conjectured with General McDowell's corps out of the field of action. Had I left my post on the left wing, I should have been compelled to take the same route as was taken by General McDowell, and during that time have been of no use to any one, and in the meantime the main force under General Longstreet would have been free to go against General Pope, as we now know was designed.

As for a retreat to Manassas Junction, or any retreat, the record of the court does not prove it; my officers all say there was none, and that no orders were given by them or by me for such purpose, and I now reiterate that there was no retreat, and am fully prepared to refute all such accusations.

#### *5th. Violation of the 9th and 52d articles of war.*

Under this charge it was claimed that within sound of the enemy's guns, and knowing that a severe battle of great consequence was being fought, I was inactive all of the 29th August, from the time General McDowell left me to dark, when the contest closed; and that I did fall back and retreat, not knowing the forces of the enemy; also, that I disobeyed of purpose the order of 4.30 p. m. of that day.

At the risk of some repetition, I have to say:

1st. It was shown on the trial by the evidence of General Morell, General Marshall, General Griffin and others, that General Pope and the other witnesses for the prosecution misunderstood entirely the condition of affairs in my front. That showing is now fully sustained by new evidence not attainable during the trial.

It is evident from their own showing that General Pope and his witnesses did not know, as I did, that a force larger than mine, and advantageously posted, was, that day, in my front, and between me and Jackson's force "massed in the woods in front of us" (*i. e.*, General Pope personally), which I was expected to attack; and also that I was over

\* It is somewhat surprising that General McDowell, from about 12.30 p. m., when he left me, till 5.45, when he reported in person to General Pope, made no report to General Pope of his action under the joint order—that he had separated from me. Gen. Pope says, in his September 3d, '62, report, expected Gen. McDowell and me to attack together under the 4.30 order. He seems to forget what he has said from time to time.

† It is evident from my note to McDowell (No. 29) and King, and my instructions (No. 28) that I *suspected* the troops at Groveton needed help. But that impression was of short duration, as despatch No. 33 suspended the movement ordered in No. 28. It was not even commenced. No aid was needed. The order was given under a wrong impression, and moreover the movement would have been too dangerous to risk; the position then held was too important to vacate.

two miles from Jackson's flank instead of less than one, as they supposed, and as General Pope has located me on his map. They stated in their evidence that they supposed I had no opponents other than "a cavalry force in observation there and some light artillery;" and that I was expected "to attack the right flank of Jackson," and "get in his rear, which they believed practicable." The evidence of my officers states that we had no knowledge till about dark of any contest going on other than one of artillery at long range, and I assert that prior to the receipt of the 4:30 order I had no knowledge of any intention of battle or of one likely to take place except from what might arise from our forces standing on the defensive.\*

With the knowledge of this large force between me and the Warren Pike (additional evidence that its presence was known I now have); with no knowledge of a contest pending or going on, but with a belief that if this force in my front could be kept from going against General Pope, he had abundant force to take care of his assailants; and with the belief that an attack by me upon my opponents would lead to no good result, and might derange plans and do great harm, I held to my place. My orders and the despatches from my officers—returned to me since my trial and heretofore given—on that afternoon prove that I was not an inactive occupant of that ground,† and that I was not a useless one is shown in the facts that of all of Longstreet's forces confronting me, no part of them engaged in the contest with General Pope, having been held there to meet any movement I should make against them. It is true, as records now show, that General Wilcox's division, which was sent from in front of General Pope to meet a supposed attack by me, was, at a late hour (after 5 o'clock), recalled to take part in an attack by General Hood upon General Pope's forces at Groveton, yet movements of my forces indicating an attack detained him till too late to be of service.

It may not be out of place to here state that General Wilcox occupied the ground which General Pope erroneously says, on his official map in Report to the Committee on the Conduct of the War, I "had fallen back from," and to reach Hood he had to go a much less distance than I would have had to march to attack Jackson, and yet, unopposed and moving on an unencumbered road, he did not reach Hood till after dark.

2d. General Pope claims that the order of 4:30 p. m., to attack Jackson's flank, reached me in ample time to be carried into effect, supposing there was no enemy between Jackson and me—this against the evidence of General Sykes, Colonel Locke, Lieutenants Weld, Monteith and Ingham—and on the evidence of Captain Pope and his orderly. The proof was strong and clear that it was delivered to me about sundown (6:30) instead of 5 to 5:30, as they claimed. General Pope had my despatch acknowledging the receipt. It gave the hour—but he said he could not find it. There is reason to believe that no special haste was made to deliver the order to me, even if the bearer did not lose his way, and was not greatly delayed thereby.

General Pope also claims that had I attacked "at any time up to eight o'clock that night it was his firm conviction that we should have destroyed the army of Jackson"; and the Judge-Advocate, to convince

\* From about 10 a. m., when Gen. Pope sent me the joint order from Centreville, till after 6:30 p. m., when I received the 4:30 order, I received no instructions or indications of Gen. Pope's purposes from him or Gen. McDowell, though I had sent many messages to both of these officers. Apparently I was left out in the cold—forgotten, as was Gen. Banks on the 30th.

† The despatches newly presented by Gen. McDowell (Nos. 29a, 38a, 38b), which have been sleeping or concealed these sixteen years, accord with other despatches showing consistent vigilant action all that day, and sustain my statement above.

the President of the justice of my conviction, tells him "that even had the attack failed General McDowell states that the number of troops which would have been withdrawn from the main battle by the enemy (that is, Jackson's forces) to effect this result would have so far relieved our centre as to render our victory complete."

Wherein any victory was attained by our side that night it was difficult to see, as it was then known, that the enemy were in possession of the field on which General McDowell threw his troops, and also of artillery captured from his command. And it is now as well established a fact that I could have given no assistance better than I did give and that not a man would have been withdrawn from the enemy in front of General McDowell to have met an attack by me.

3d. On the ground that the order was received in time to be executed, General Pope asserts that I disobeyed the order, and that I should have attacked no matter what the force opposed to me, or the result. He says that I had no discretion under the maxim "*A military order exacts passive obedience only when it is given by a superior who is present on the spot at the moment when he gives it.*" Having then knowledge of the state of things, he can listen to the objections and give the necessary explanations to him who should execute the order." He has claimed that he was in my immediate presence, and that so far as I was concerned, the risk of my sacrifice may have been taken and resolved upon. The order carries the contrary on its face. The blame of any utterly useless and disastrous sacrifice would have fallen on me, and very justly for having executed an order issued by Gen. Pope in utter ignorance of the circumstances existing at the time of issue and of receipt. He forgets that I was arraigned for not attacking Jackson, and was condemned for not attacking Longstreet, of whom he knew nothing. He also forgets that I had been preparing for a demonstration at the time his order reached me, and was prevented by the lateness of the hour from carrying it into effect.

4th. Another assertion is that I could and should have passed my corps from my position on the Manassas-Gainesville road directly north to Groveton (as the enemy passed over the same ground the following day in their attack on General Pope), or have taken the Sudley Springs road to the same point as did General McDowell. Had I done this last, as questions by the court indicated they thought it was advisable, I should have been justly condemned for abandoning the field, and letting loose upon General Pope, at Groveton, the main force of the Confederate Army, comprising their right wing, and thus have hastened the disaster which came on him the following day—a movement which the Confederate leader had ordered, had arranged, and the execution of which the presence of my command on his front prevented that day.

No doubt a corps could take position on that ground between me and Groveton if unopposed in such a flank movement; but the question of its advisability and practicability was settled by General McDowell not adopting it himself when present with me. It is true, General McDowell says he deemed the country practicable, for the following reasons. He testified, p. 93 :

"My knowledge of the country is derived principally, first, from having gone over the railroad from Manassas to Gainesville in a car, or on a locomotive, which gave me but little idea of it, as I was engaged whilst going over it with matters which prevented my paying attention to the country; next, in marching from Buckland Mills to Gainesville, and from Gainesville east along the Warrenton turnpike for a mile or two—I do not remember the exact distance—then turning off to the right and south, and going across the country to Bethlehem Church, and thence to Manassas; then from the fact that General Reynolds' division, which had the lead on the occasion that I refer to,

going from Gainesville towards Groveton, had gone further on that road than I went myself, had turned to the right and gone towards Bethlehem Church; and from the fact that General King's division, which had gone on that same road towards Groveton from Gainesville, and had turned down south of that road, had again gone north on to that road, had engaged the enemy at a certain place, had fallen back to Manassas from that place, which place I learned were nearly reached, if not quite, on Friday, the day of the battle, by the troops moving from Groveton west; and from the fact that the enemy's force had moved to the south on Saturday, and turned our left on that day. These movements by these two divisions of my corps, my own movements, and the movements of the enemy, give me the belief that troops could move through the country comprised between the Warrenton turnpike and the Sudley Spring road, and the road from Bethlehem Church to Gainesville. I will mention, further, that that country is a mixture of woods, cleared ground, and hills, and that it is easy for troops to march without being seen, or seeing the enemy."

Facts, however, do not confirm these statements or conclusions, and they should not be relied upon for the following reasons, 1st: His own knowledge is slight, and there is a great difference between the free movement of a few persons on horseback, and a corps of artillery and infantry opposed by a vigilant foe; 2d: General Reynolds testifies that he was forced by the difficult character of the country from marching over it, except by following the roads; 3d: That King marched entirely on the roads; 4th: That the enemy marched over but a small part of that country in its attack on General Pope the next day, and that march was entirely unopposed by me being called to Groveton, or by any one; 5th: That there were no roads available from my position, and the roads moved over by Generals McDowell, Reynolds and King, were held by Longstreet.

Of all this I have full proof.

With a few comments I will close my narrative of the events of this day.

From the time (August 27) I joined General Pope to August 30th, the general movements of the enemy from day to day, were largely known to me. From General Pope at Warrenton Junction I learned sufficient, with what I then knew, to convince me of the enemy's plans and of their aim to reach Maryland as early as possible. I so reported to General Burnside at the time and suggested, in the way to reach the government, the means of thwarting them. (Despatch No. 20.) I also learned the policy, as well as the necessity forced upon General Pope, of putting Bull Run between him and Lee's army unless he should be joined in time by the Army of the Potomac in large force. (No. 20.) From day to day and almost from hour to hour, I kept myself well informed of the movements of our army. I thus had, at that time, a tolerably correct knowledge of the management of the campaign, special as well as general. Therefore in the absence of restraining orders, my chief, General Pope being distant, I knew how best to act, if necessary to act promptly; and on receipt of a discretionary order from him when distant, I could and must judge of its applicability when the circumstances under which it was issued, and the accompanying statement, were so contrary to the facts known to me to be existing at the time and place of receipt of the order as to make its execution exceedingly culpable, even if possible. The only positive order received by me on the 29th, I tried to execute, but it was received too late for any result to be obtained.

Till a late hour on the 29th, General Pope's army was scattered, and from the hour when General McDowell left me till 5 p. m., when King's division under General Hatch alone joined General Pope, McDowell's corps was available for no purpose. It was not good management for me under such circumstances, to voluntarily bring on a general action with my small and isolated command. When General McDowell was



with me we knew that Longstreet's force, then largely in my front, composed full one-half of the opposing army—at least it was so strong that on the 28th, King's 8,000 and Ricketts' 7,000 had vacated the Warrenton Pike, each fearing to be crushed between Longstreet and Jackson. (See No. 25a.)

The time, if any, for attack on the 29th was before General McDowell left me, while he was with me controlling our united forces. Then, within an hour, if it had been possible that day, an attack, with any hope of success, might have been made upon Longstreet's forces. General McDowell, however, decided otherwise. Leaving me on that ground with power only to engage the attention of the enemy, and thus to retain forces otherwise available to reinforce Jackson and attack General Pope, he turned aside some 15,000 troops and marched them away five miles beyond support of me, to join General Pope at Groveton, whom he reached hours after—too late in the day to be of effective service.


I believe my course throughout this day was governed by correct principles and intentions. Heretofore, as now, I have maintained I disobeyed no order of General Pope, and that under conditions of which he was totally ignorant, I sought in all my acts the best interests of the service, and I have rested under the belief that I did my full duty. Up to the time General McDowell withdrew his command from united action with me I was not responsible for our movements. After that hour my movements were controlled by the circumstances under which he left me. No charge of disobedience can be laid against me, unless constructively by showing that I erred in judgment, which, in the light of the knowledge I then possessed, I have failed to see after all the criticisms of my personal enemies, whose persecutions I have endured. Nor do I believe any error of judgment can be charged to me in the knowledge of facts since disclosed. On the contrary, I believed then, as I have reason to know now, that the presence that day of the Fifth Army Corps on the left flank of our army, delayed the combined attack of the Confederate army upon General Pope till the next day, when, besides other causes, his being driven from the field was hastened by the transfer of the corps from the position it held on the 29th to the centre near Groveton.

## SECOND BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

Soon after sunrise (by orders No. 40 of 8.30 p. m., 29th, received at 3 o'clock a. m., 30th), I reported to General Pope near the crossing of the Warrenton Pike by the Sudley Springs road, and relieved King's division—that part of McDowell's corps not in reserve.

General Morell, fearing an attack, withdrew Griffin's brigade so cautiously and slowly from the immediate front of the enemy as to lose sight of the rest of his division. He kept the direct road to Centreville, believing he was "following Sykes" as he was instructed (despatch No. 41), instead of turning at Bethlehem Church towards Groveton. Piatt, who had rejoined from detached duty at Warrenton Junction without my knowledge, followed Griffin. From a dispatch (No. 41a) to Gen. Sturgis, which saw the light for the first time before this board, it is evident I did know of Piatt's presence near by, but I had forgotten the fact, even in 1863, when I testified before General McDowell's court of inquiry, and when I wrote this narrative. Orders to Morell on the Gainesville road to hasten up, did not reach him; he, however, came up from Centreville, but not in time to allow of his taking part in the action of the day.



Our army, facing westward, was posted in a form of an inverted V with unequal arms, thus, , the opening towards us. The short arm just south of the Warrenton Pike was occupied by Reynolds' division. The long arm, north of the pike, stretching off toward Sudley Springs, was held in the order named—by me, Sigel, Reno and Heintzelman—Ricketts and King being in the reserve. Elevated ground immediately in front, and to the left of Reynolds, was covered with dense timber, interspersed with patches of pine and scrub oak. A narrow but dense forest was on my right front. Between the forests—one-half mile apart—and skirting the Warrenton Pike, on the north and in my front, was cleared ground, a natural glacis rising rapidly to an elevated ridge held by the enemy and crowned by numerous artillery. This artillery commanded the pike and the cleared ground, and concentrated a flank and direct fire upon any attacking column.

The enemy's skirmishers held the open ground and the forests. His forces and movements were concealed from us, whilst the least of ours as far back as Centreville were open to his view. Unsuccessful efforts on the 29th to gain possession of these forests had caused heavy losses to General Pope, revealed the presence of large forces south of the pike and the fact that Jackson had acquired great strength north of it, by standing behind a railroad embankment.

I learned at General Pope's headquarters that those efforts of the 29th had been mainly a series of skirmishes, artillery contests at long range, and a few attacks (after strong protests and delay) by brigades, and separate divisions resulting in repulses and heavy losses, and that about dark, King's division, the only part of McDowell's command which at that hour had reached General Pope at Groveton, was sent into action, lost heavily, and did no good.

Early in the day General Pope suggested plans of attack, the favorite one being with corps on our right along the Haymarket road. All were based on the erroneous impression that the enemy had been some hours retreating. General Reynolds—since early 29th engaged with the newly arrived body of the enemy—coincided with me in the opinion that the enemy had been strengthened, not weakened, and was in great force along our whole front and especially on our left. No such impression, however, could be made on the mind of General Pope.

Seeing great danger in the enemy holding in our immediate front, the forests which masked his strength and movements, and as no plan was decided upon, and each commander was left to act on his own judgment, General Reynolds and I arranged to clear our respective fronts and ascertain if possible, the strength and position of the enemy. We succeeded—our skirmishers not meeting strong resistance. I soon found the enemy well posted behind the railroad embankment—and his front and flanks well protected by numerous artillery. General Reynolds from his newly acquired elevated position, at once informed me of a numerous enemy in my front, and of his intention to at once report that his left was being turned by a heavy force. He did in person so report. He told Gen. Pope in order to get to him he had to pass through the enemy's skirmishers getting to his rear, but General Pope put no confidence in what he said and sent General Buford to ascertain the truth of his statement.

General McDowell, returning from a reconnoissance on our extreme right, reported to General Pope, the enemy as having withdrawn. The contraction of their line was mistaken for a "retreat." About the same time a union soldier—recaptured by my skirmishers and sent by me to General Pope—reported that he had "heard the rebel officers say their army was retiring to unite with Longstreet." So positively did our

knowledge of Longstreet and the indications before us, contradict the statement of this soldier, that on sending him to General Pope, I said, "In duty bound I sent him, but I regarded him either as a fool or designedly released to give a wrong impression, and no faith should be put in what he said." Unfortunately General McDowell's report was considered as confirmed by his story, and I received this message, "General Pope believes that soldier, and directs you to attack; King will support."

I received the following orders about 2.30 P. M., about an hour after the verbal order, and after I had prepared to attack:

[No. 42.]

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR GROVETON,  
August 30th, 1862, 12 M.

SPECIAL ORDER, No. —.

The following forces will be immediately thrown forward *in pursuit of the enemy*, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to *the command of the pursuit*, Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the division of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds.

The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman.\* The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made.

The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnpike.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Col. and Chief of Staff.*

[No. 43.]

HEADQUARTERS 3D CORPS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 30th, 1862.

Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to *pursue the enemy*, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds. Heintzelman, with his corps, preceded by Ricketts' division, will move on your right, on the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of Reynolds' division, on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report to you. Push it well to the left as you advance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Col. and Chief of Staff.*

Major-General PORTER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c.*

No orders of this campaign, to my knowledge, more erroneously stated the attitude of the opposing forces or led to more serious disaster. Anticipating strong resistance from the enemy, well posted and waiting attack, I had asked that Sigel should be held ready to assist me.

Confident I was to attack a well posted and well prepared enemy, I arranged to make a strong attack, and deferred "pushing forward" "in pursuit of the enemy," till I got my forces in position for this strong attack.

On the receipt of General Pope's verbal order I sent Butterfield (commanding Morell's two small brigades) to develop the strength of the enemy beyond the forest on my right: held Sykes to support, called up Hatch (King's division) who had reported, and directed him to deploy in four lines to Sykes' right. I had thus become so involved in a movement against Jackson that I could not, on the receipt of the above order, make the change, "to push forward on the Warrenton turnpike." I had largely completed my dispositions to attack with my whole force. A

heavy artillery fire was directed upon us. Butterfield had twice reported he could make no headway against the infantry fire which opposed him. I therefore informed General McDowell on receiving his order "to push forward," &c., that, availing myself of the cover of the timber, I should attack Jackson, and if successful, would wheel to the left, and move towards the turnpike. Anticipating strong resistance, indeed fearing repulse, I again urged that Sigel should be brought up to assist, if necessary.

By this time General McDowell had uncovered our left wing by withdrawing Reynolds (though Reynolds had reported his left being turned by large forces) from his commanding position, and putting him north of the turnpike in my rear.

Colonel Warren, prompt to remedy errors, and to take advantage of positions, seeing the key to our whole line thus vacated by the removal of Reynolds, without waiting for orders but with Sykes' ready approval, threw his small brigade into the gap.\*

Jackson was too strongly posted against Butterfield's repeated efforts. Hatch having deployed, I ordered a renewed attack with my whole command, hoping by the time we would be engaged, Sigel would be close by. Bayard being useless in front, and it being impossible "to push him well to the left" or to use him in any other manner, I had directed to keep in rear beyond the artillery shot pouring upon us, and to arrest the wounded and stragglers now flocking to our rear from our forces fiercely engaged.

General McDowell, still not appreciating the real state of affairs, replied to my request to have "Sigel pushed up."

[No. 44.]

HEADQUARTERS 3D ARMY CORPS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 30th, 1862.*

GENERAL:

Major General McDowell directs that you push on the movement, suggested in your note to him, to the left, and General Heintzelman, now here, will attend to the front and right. You have at your disposal to reinforce you, King's division and Reynolds'.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

He added in a postscript, the presence of an aggressive enemy only then becoming evident to him:

"The enemy having shown indication of advancing by the right, Reynolds has been withdrawn from your column and put over on your left. It is still thought you will be strong enough to effect your purpose with King; if not General Pope will send you Sigel."

And again, as if he had expected my 6,000 men (Griffin being absent) to overcome Jackson, that which General Pope's right wing had failed to do on the previous day, he directed thus:

[No. 45.]

HEADQUARTERS 3D ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
*August 30th, 1862.*

Major General McDowell is now busy attending to our left; he directs me to inform you that you must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's division in connection with the service you are to perform.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major-General PORTER, *Commanding, &c., &c.*

\*The removal of Reynolds took all of our troops from the south of the turnpike, thus uncovering entirely my left.

GENERAL McDOWELL:

I fear for the result unless you push up Sigel. Our right is also attacked.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General*

Replies came too late to get Sigel up to join in our attack.

From his elevated, crescent shaped position, the enemy swept with numerous artillery, every foot of ground over which we had to pass. He opposed us also by a terrible musketry fire from behind the railroad embankment, where he was driven and stood almost unharmed by us. Butterfield, aided by Sykes, with Hatch on his right emerging from the sheltering timber, rapidly advanced, gallantly attacked and desperately contended for victory. The resistance could not be overcome. The enfilading artillery, combined with the direct infantry fire, almost annihilated line after line, as each was about to crown the embankment. Many of the enemy, hard pressed, had not time to reload, and received us with stones, severely wounding many and killing some of our men. Four successive, unceasing vigorously desperate attacks were repulsed. General Hatch apparently badly wounded, on asking to leave the field, reported the condition desperate, and my presence necessary with his division to induce renewed attack. Colonel Sullivan, commanding one of his brigades, reported affairs deplorable, and added that one brigade could not be forced against the fire. I had started with him to use my personal influence when I met the evidence of disastrous repulse in numerous wounded and stragglers, and in remnants of regiments declaring themselves out of ammunition. As if to add to our discomfiture, came to our ears the shouts of Longstreet's forces, pushing down upon our almost defenceless artillery to gain our rear and cut us off from the turnpike. Renewed attack by us on Jackson was madness. The enemy dared not attack us, he had enough to occupy him in "Heintzelman, Ricketts and Reno attending to the front and right," and sufficient to oppose him in reliable parts of King's command, and in my artillery at hand and being well served. I therefore assigned to the serviceable part of King's division the protection of that part of the field, and sent such of my own divisions as had ammunition to form south of the turnpike, near the Henry house in the rear of our left, to which point I had authorized Sykes (ever prompt to see and meet imminent danger) to hasten with the remnants of his division and give aid to Reynolds, now striving to hold against vastly superior forces the vital point of our line.

After securing the numerous artillery in my vicinity, and using it successfully to arrest attempts to follow up our repulses, I joined Sykes, now with Reynolds contending against Longstreet.

The force that had almost annihilated Warren threw itself upon artillery belonging to and defended by the Pennsylvania Reserves. Though twice driven from the defence of the guns, this gallant division regained them temporarily, re-enacting scenes of stubborn resistance and gallantry frequent in the Corps on the Peninsula.

Other troops\* were brought to the left, where now took place the all important contest. These forces were thrown into action at the same

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\* McLean's brigade of Schenck's division and Milroy's brigade, both of Sigel's corps; Tower with two brigades of Ricketts' division; Reno's division of the 9th Corps; Buford's Cavalry; Graham's, Randol's, Smead's, Weed's, and some other artillery were all severely engaged in this contest on the left, and were all the troops of General Pope's army which, with Sykes' and Reynolds' divisions and Piatt's brigade of Sturgis' division, stubbornly resisted till dark the attack of Longstreet in turning the left of our army, south of the turnpike.



point, often so quickly upon the heels of their predecessors, as mid the excitement, to mistake friends for foes and fire upon them. Reynolds and Sykes (Buchanan's and Chapman's brigades of regular troops) moved to the left and thwarted the enemy, continually working around to our left and rear. The remainder of Sykes' division was held close by in reserve, and on emergencies, occasionally arising, sent support to their companions. These, their ammunition being expended, fell back to the division as they were replaced by fresh troops.

General McDowell took charge of this part of the field—General Pope appearing about sundown. Soon after dark the battle ceased. I was directed by General Pope to repair to Centreville, whither such of the army as had not gone was ordered to assemble.

As evidence of the efforts of my command in this day's struggle, I have to say of 6,000 men present, the loss in killed, wounded and prisoners was 2,171 of which 112 were officers.

Of the losses in King's division I have no report.

The following extract\* from the report of General Jackson, shows the estimate the enemy held of our efforts on that day :

# REPORT OF GENERAL JACKSON OF OPERATIONS FROM AUG. 15 TO SEPT. 5, 1862.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, A. N. V.,

April 27, 1863.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL R. H. CHILTON, A. A., General Headquarters Department A. N. V. :

\* \* \* \* \*

During the day the commanding general arrived, and also General Longstreet with his command. On the following day (thirtieth) my command occupied the ground and the division the same relative positions to each other and to the field which they held the day before, forming the left wing of the army. General Longstreet's command formed the right wing. A large quantity of artillery was posted upon a commanding eminence in the centre.

After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day, the Federal infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place and pressed forward, as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our position. *So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding general for reinforcements, but the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict.* As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of the field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

T. J. JACKSON,

Lieutenant-General.

In presence of an enemy vastly our superior, defeat would probably have resulted from remaining west of Bull Run with an army dispirited by fatigue, and by scarcity of food ; but, be that as it may, it was hastened by uncovering the left wing and by abandoning a strong position to attack a concealed foe, whose elevated position masking his own, revealed to him all our movements, and made him master of the situation—to attack, moreover, a supposed or declared to be retreating enemy, actually prepared, as I had reason to know, with full force to give battle under the most favorable circumstances.

\* This extract is the one Generals Pope and McDowell used as describing the battle of the 29th August.



## TELEGRAMS TO GENERAL BURNSIDE.

General Pope has made such improper use of my telegrams that I deem it proper to explain their origin and real purpose.

General Burnside, who was opposite Fredericksburg, felt that early and reliable information of General Pope's army, and as far as possible of the enemy, was vital to the usefulness as well as the safety of his command. Information furnished by General Halleek for his guidance proved so inaccurate on receipt as to mislead and delay, and thus destroy confidence in that source. I so reported at the time to General Burnside. (No. 8 and 9.)

At General Burnside's solicitation, and to expedite my own movements and supplies, I established telegraphic communication with him.

General Burnside asked me to dispense with the formality of official correspondence, and to send him everything of interest, and my own impressions of the state of affairs.

This correspondence I maintained till I left Bristoe at 7 A. M., August the 29th. At that hour (the distance to the wires becoming too great for safety), I gave it up, trusting to one which must soon be opened and be more expeditious and safe through Centreville, towards which General Pope's order of 3.30 A. M., received about 6 A. M., urgently called me.

On the 27th August, when I reported in person to General Pope at Warrenton Junction, Jackson and Stuart held General Pope's line of communication with Washington. I then informed General Pope of this channel of telegraphic communication and urged him to use it, but he declined. General Burnside informed me, as an incentive to frequent communication, that President Lincoln, to whom he was sending many of my dispatches, was without information, and deprived of all other means of hearing from the army and was often calling for information from me. Under these circumstances, I felt it my duty to General Burnside, to the forces with which I was serving and to the government, that I should not only give information, but that I should withhold nothing which would give the military authorities the means of forming a correct estimate of our condition.

My dispatches were frequent. Each transmitted an order of march from General Pope, and gave information of the rapidly changing phase of affairs, which made his orders often improper if not impossible to execute. In some cases they suggested how to take advantage of the enemy's errors and to provide against the effects of past and other inevitable losses on our side. They exhibit a state of affairs either misunderstood by General Pope, or much changed, after his orders were issued. Their accuracy, now fully established, shows that I was better acquainted than General Pope was, with the positions and movements of the contending forces, and with the dangers to ours. Their value was acknowledged by the President, in person to me, on the battle-field of Antietam.

Up to this time I had taken for granted that the original plan of the campaign, (page 5) as I understood it, was to be carried out in full faith. I knew nothing to the contrary. I thought that the main body of the Army of the Potomac was landing at Aquia Creek, and would join the Army of Virginia by the line of the Rappahannock; that the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Virginia, under their respective commanders, McClellan and Pope, would co-operate and be manœvered by one head—General McClellan. I did not then know or suspect that "it had been decided that General McClellan was to have nothing to do with the campaign."

After August 20th, when I left Fort Monroe, I received no instructions from General McClellan. His instructions had been to hasten to and give to General Pope, all possible help. From August 23d to September 2d, I heard nothing whatever from him or of him. I knew nothing whatever of his status in regard to the army. I believed that he still commanded the Army of the Potomac, and that my service under General Pope was temporary. Hence an occasional reference to General McClellan in my dispatches to General Burnside. Under this belief, and knowing that the main body of the enemy had passed to the right, leaving his rear comparatively very insecure, I suggested, August 27th, 1862, see dispatch No. 20, that I might be recalled to the Rappahannock, there to unite with the Army of the Potomac or with Burnside, in order either to push to Richmond, now defenceless, or to strike upon the enemy's rear near Orange Court House. Either of these movements I felt sure would arrest the enemy's almost unimpeded march towards Maryland, and would give time at Washington for ample preparations (also suggested) to prevent the crossing of the Potomac. All this will be seen in my dispatches.

Before I united with General Pope, reverses had come upon him, and from a campaign conducted as this was, others at least as serious seemed inevitable. The army had no confidence in his management, and my suggestions were only a part of the prevailing wishes of the army, or indicative of the apparent means to remedy the effects of past failures, or to alleviate those which seemed inevitable. I asked General Burnside "to make use of my dispatches to effect any good purpose," and though addressed to him I expected the Government would act upon them, in all probability through General McClellan, the only officer in whom, as I then knew, both armies had confidence.

Such was the origin, the object and the tenor of those dispatches. I had nothing to conceal. When I found the prosecution before my court was seeking in them something evil on my part, I immediately brought forward all I could get. Conscious of my own innocence, I gave every assistance to aid their presentation to the court.

All the prosecution claimed that these dispatches proved was, that I had no favorable opinion of General Pope or of his ability to conduct the campaign. The same charge could have been made against many officers of high rank whose patriotism has never been suspected.

Because I was supposed to entertain an unfavorable opinion of General Pope, it was undertaken to infer that I could not or would not do my duty to him, to the army and to the country.

With the exception of those presented by the prosecution, my dispatches when offered were excluded, and at the close of the trial, when all the injury to my case that could arise from their exclusion, had been done, some of them were admitted to the record, but so disconnectedly as to destroy the effect of the honest object of all the dispatches. I have, however, in closing this subject, to state that on the battle-field of Antietam, President Lincoln in person, gave me his congratulations for the past, his warmest wishes for the future, and his "thanks for having furnished these messages and letters—the only correct information received at the time from the army—and which had led to the happiest results."

#### INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL POPE AT FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE.

About 9 o'clock A. M., September 2d, soon after arriving at Fairfax Court House, before I knew of the receipt by General Pope of any order

\* The timely recall of the Army of Virginia, under General Pope, and the success at Antietam, of which we were speaking.

for the Army of Virginia to fall back within the intrenchments of Washington, and *before* I knew anything whatever of the relations General McClellan held with the army and with the Administration, I received this despatch:

[No. 50.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Sept. 1, 1862—5:30 P. M.

I ask of you for my sake, that of the country and of the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms are at stake, and all depends upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make to them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and doing all I can to render your retreat safe should that become necessary,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

Major-General PORTER,  
*Commanding 5th Corps.*

General McClellan testified of this despatch:

Q. As you have stated that you never doubted that General Porter would be true to his duty to General Pope, how came you to send General Porter such a despatch as that?—A. I sent it in accordance with the request of the President of the United States, who sent for me on that day, and told me that he had understood that there was an unkind feeling on the part of the Army of the Potomac towards General Pope, and requested me to use my personal influence to correct it, by telegraphing either to General Porter or to any other of my friends there. I told him that I did not consider it necessary, but was perfectly willing to do it. I had no doubt that, in my own mind, but that the Army of the Potomac, and all connected with it, would do their duty without there being any necessity for any action on my part.

Q. I understand you to say, then, that you sent the telegram to quiet the apprehensions of the President, and not to remove any apprehensions of your own?—A. Entirely so.

At a loss to conceive why I should have been thus addressed, I sought Gen. Pope for an explanation, desirous of learning what, if any, complaint he had made against me or my command, determined to meet at once in the presence of trustworthy witnesses, active participants in the campaign, any complaint or false representation which might have been made by him to shift the responsibility of the failure of his Virginia campaign.

After showing the corps commanders present at General Pope's headquarters General McClellan's dispatch, I asked of General Pope the transmission of the following reply:

[No. 51.]

FAIRFAX C. H., Sept. 2d, 1862—10 A. M.

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every other lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of orders and plans. Our killed and wounded and enfeebled troops attest our devotion to duty.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General Commanding 5th Army Corps.*

Gen. GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Maj.-General Commanding, Washington.*

In the conversation which ensued, General Pope declared that he had made no complaint of me or of my command, and that none existed except in the single case of Griffin's brigade, which had not engaged in the battle of the 30th August, yet expressed himself satisfied with my

explanation, promptly given, how that brigade happened to go to Centreville that day.

General Pope said that *"he had had cause to complain of me prior to my joining, inasmuch as in a letter which had fallen into the President's hands, I had commented upon his military conduct and ability, had predicted disasters, and had unjustly criticised as his, the plan of the campaign just closed."* The letter referred to was a private one (written from Harrison's Landing, in July, before I had any idea of joining him), on receipt from Washington of a plan of campaign about to be commenced under the control of General Pope. The just criticisms of the proposed campaign, and predictions of inevitable failures contained therein, induced the receiver to lay it before the President, in the hope of doing some good.

Unable, at the instant, to recall the criticisms, I replied that "if I had been unjust, I would make all amends possible, and that if I had predicted misfortune, he must admit the justice of the prediction." Frustrations of his plans had commenced prior to my arrival, and were legitimate results of his operations, and readily to be foreseen in a campaign executed with a comparatively small force in the face of an active foe, and on a plan such as that proclaimed in his orders.

A correct statement of this conversation was of importance to me on my trial, as showing that at that date General Pope had denied all cause of complaint against me. Any testimony as to what took place at that interview was objected to by General Pope as irrelevant, and the objection was sustained by the court. All efforts to elicit a statement were defeated till General Pope, after twenty-four hours' reflection, said he desired to make one. The court then accepted it.

There are points of difference between General Pope and myself, as to actual occurrences, so great that I feel compelled to call attention to them and to point out the differences between his sworn statement and other of his statements and between his sworn statements and established facts.

In all essential particulars, my version as above is corroborated by the testimony of General George D. Ruggles, chief of General Pope's staff, the only witness of the interview.

General Pope (Record, p. 20), says of this interview: *"General Porter asked me why I had supposed such a despatch (General McClellan's) had been sent to him, seeming to apprehend, or to believe, or to suspect, that I had reported his conduct to Washington, and made complaint of him which had made it necessary for this despatch to be sent. I told General Porter that I had not reported him to the Department in Washington, and that as matters stood, I thought I should not take any action in his case, though I felt bound to do so in the case of Griffin. This is about the substance of what I said."*

Taking this, his sworn version of the interview, I was surprised at subsequently seeing a despatch (No. 55) to General Halleck, dated September 1st, speaking of me and my command as follows:

*"The commander of a corps, who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction, to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all, worse still, fell back upon Manassas. Their (the officers') constant talk, indulged in publicly, and in promiscuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not fight, that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula," &c. I have yet to learn the name of any officer of the Army of the Potomac who ever entertained such an opinion.*

It was the sight of this despatch that caused the President to ask General McClellan to telegraph me or some other of his friends.



General Pope further testified in regard to our interview :

I said to General Porter that I had received information from friends of mine in Washington, that he (General Porter) had written letters, or sent despatches to General Burnside, dated before he had joined me, which criticised my conduct, my military capacity and the campaign, which I was conducting very severely, and which exhibited a very unkind spirit. \* \* \* \* He seemed surprised that his letter had become known, and stated that it was a private letter, which he had never intended should go further than General Burnside;\* that *General Kearney had expressed opinions opposite to his own on the subject of the campaign, and that therefore both sides of the question would now be heard.* (Record, p. 22.)

This reference to General Kearney's opinions is quoted by me merely to point out the impossibility of such version of our conversation. I did not know, nor could he have known of these opinions, as beyond the person to whom General Kearney's letters were addressed, they were made known only by their publication in *Wilkes' Spirit of the Times*, October 18th and 25th, 1862, some weeks after our interview at Fairfax C. H.

By the next quotation from his testimony, it would seem that General Pope did not know, at the time of our interview, of the telegrams to General Burnside, above referred to, and he could not have known of them, as no communication had been held with Washington. - Indeed, General Pope so testified :

"It was not until the campaign was closed, and *I came to Washington City*, on the 4th or 5th of September, that I was informed by the President of the United States that he had seen several despatches or letters from General Porter to General Burnside, dated a day or two previous to these battles, which had occasioned him very grave apprehensions that General Porter would fail to do his duty. This communication of the President opened my eyes to many matters, which I had before been loth to believe." (Record, p. 23.)

Thus it appears that he had to be shown my letter, doubting his ability to conduct the campaign, written long before the events inquired into, and to learn of my telegrams pointing out the errors into which he was falling, in order to instigate him to this prosecution and to induce the belief, on his part, that I had committed offences which called for it.

A few words more and I close on this point.

General Pope denied under oath that he knew Longstreet was on the field of battle at Groveton during the 29th of August, and said that a small portion only of his forces reached there at sundown. Yet, he despatched to General Halleck on the 30th August as follows, and subsequently admitted before the Court Martial that the expression "combined forces," referred to "Longstreet and Jackson :"

"We fought a *terrific battle* here yesterday with the *combined forces* of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from *daylight till dark*, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy." (No. 53.)

To that part of his despatch, September 1st, relating to the conversation of officers, etc., I give, so far as I am concerned or know, an unqualified denial. At that time I discussed General Pope and his officers with no one.

The corps which I had the honor to command joined General Pope after many days of excessive fatigue, arising from long and hard marches, and almost sleepless nights. United heart and hand with all who periled their lives for their country, they were the first to seek the side of their companions in arms under General Pope, known to be in danger, and then, as ever before and since, unhesitatingly to take their places in the front line of duty, animated by an ardent and pure patriotism.

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\* No such letter was ever written to General Burnside by me.



Though almost broken down by fatigue and hunger, they were yet charitable even to forgetfulness of palpable errors and incapacity, and they left unperformed no practicable duty, nor avoided any effort, however desperate. Relying on the justice of our cause to crown our efforts with success, they boldly contended on the plains of Manassas for the honor of our arms and for the safety of our Capital.

With the hope that such efforts would at least be recognized by their country, they sought victory in bloody sacrifice. It is lamentable that such noble endeavors have been met by misrepresentation and neglect, and availed of to elevate and sustain the unworthy.

#### TELEGRAMS AND ORDERS.

Sensible of the insufficiency of the evidence on my trial to warrant conviction, the prosecution sought to create the belief of an evil *animus* on my part. The Judge Advocate said:

"As the *animus* of the accused towards his Commanding General in pursuing the line of conduct alleged against him must largely affect the question of his criminality, and may furnish a safe and valuable light for your guidance" (he addressing the President of the United States, not the Court) "in determining points *otherwise left doubtful* by the evidence, it is proper that it should be ascertained before entering at large upon the review of the case, which you have instructed me to make."

For the purpose of convicting me of bad intention before the court, he selected four dispatches out of some fifty, and resisted the presentation by me of any of the others, until this effect had been produced. He then accepted a small number, and these in such a way as to prevent the effect of the evidently honest purpose, shown by these dispatches as a whole.

General Pope seeks the same object in the following manner in his "Brief statement of the case of Fitz John Porter:"

"It will also be noticed that in this statement no reference is made to the *motive* of Porter's conduct. It will be admitted, I think, that this conduct can only be explained on one or two theories. 1st, Incompetency and cowardice; or, 2d, Deliberate treachery with a view to bring about the defeat of the rest of the army. If there be any other alternative, I confess I am unable to see it. As a practical question it has no bearing upon the sentence of the Court Martial, which must have been the same in either case; but as the mass of the witnesses called by Porter for the defence testified to his brave and skillful conduct during the battles on the Peninsula, he has himself narrowed down the question of motive to the second alternative. Unfortunately for him, he has put upon record as complete proof of his motive as he did of the conduct for which he was cashiered. On the files of the Court Martial proceedings will be found dispatches from him to Burnside intended for the use of McClellan, who was then at Alexandria. These dispatches were written and sent, in violation of all military propriety, whilst he was under my command. They contain the falsest and most malicious reflections upon me, his then commanding officer, hoping that 'Mack' is at work to get him out of this," etc. All these dispatches were written in the face of the enemy, in the midst of severe fighting in which he alone was not engaged, without knowledge of the enemy's forces and position, on our own, and show from first to last an aim and intentions fully carried out in his subsequent shameful desertion from the field of battle. I will venture to say, that for personal malevolence, false statement, insulting insinuation and bad manners, these dispatches are without a parallel in military history, and they exhibit a state of mind capable of any act whatever. It is almost impossible to believe that such dispatches could have been written by any sane man under such circumstances, but he himself admitted their authenticity before the Court Martial, and they furnish the most complete explanation of his conduct that can be given."

In examining these dispatches it should be borne in mind that to August 31st, not one of them was addressed to or intended for General McClellan, of whom I knew nothing.

They were addressed to General Burnside, who was my Commander a large part of the time, and who, after I passed under General Pope's orders, was continually calling for information, and urging, as an inducement for sending it, that the President was without any news from the army and anxiously calling for it from me. It should also be borne in mind, that before I left Harrison's Landing I was informed that General McClellan would command the two armies—his own and General Pope's; that when I learned at Williamsburg of the enemy's intention to crush General Pope I hastened, without orders, to his aid; and that when at Falmouth I was ordered to defend the line of the Rappahannock, but finding no enemy there, I voluntarily put myself under the command of General Pope.

To the 25th of August, I was ill at Falmouth. The information sent to General Morell and General Sykes was a repetition of erroneous information received from General Pope through General Halleck.

Dispatches Nos. 1 and 2, with others, were excluded by the ruling of the Court as not coming within the period embraced by the charges. The fact of their having been sent was testified to by General McClellan and General Burnside, who also testified that *my* motive for deviating from General McClellan's instructions to remain at Williamsburg till the army should pass me, was my desire, in the quickest way, to give aid to General Pope.

The Judge Advocate General thus perverts my motive in presenting the case to the President:

"It should likewise be borne in mind that the transfer of the Army of the Potomac, once begun, was a movement of extreme peril, and that extraordinary efforts on the part of all engaged in it were prompted, not only by those high considerations of patriotism which must be *supposed* to have been presented, *but also by the equally urgent instincts of self preservation.*"

Dispatches numbered 1 and 2 show that no part of the movement could have been hastened by any apprehension of an attack from the enemy. The enemy were fifty miles away, hastening to attain a particular point before this Army of the Potomac could intervene.

General Halleck and the Secretary of War put no confidence in my report of the enemy marching on General Pope and construed my motive, as General Halleck said, to be "the desire to retain the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula and General McClellan in command." The effect of my dispatches on General Halleck should have been to cause him to order our steps towards, instead of continuing the march from Richmond.

Such retention and advance of the Army on the Peninsula would, it is fair to assume, probably, have recalled General Lee to Richmond, and have prevented, at that time, the lamentable termination of General Pope's campaign.

I willingly acknowledge that I was not among those who favored the removal of our army from before Richmond—thus to relieve our opponent's capital from the burdens and dangers of a siege, and take them upon ourselves at Washington. But my opinion was never asked, and when the orders of my superiors reached me, I sought, without discussion or hesitation, how best to execute them.

The following dispatches are all that I could secure from the government. They form but a small part of the whole. The most of them were published in the *World*, of New York, January 5, 1863, and a part only in the Record of the court:

[No. 1.]

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., Aug. 16th, 6 P. M.

GENERAL McCLELLAN:

I sent you letters from people in Richmond taken from negroes. They say troops are moving north against General Pope. The negroes confirm them, and another who left there on Thursday says it is true. Colonel Campbell reports there is no enemy between us and Richmond. Unless you forbid, I shall, at day-break, send everything to Fort Monroe, and embark for Aquia Creek. I have asked that transports be in readiness.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 2.]

UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH,  
War Department,

Time received, 4.45 P. M., Aug. 17th.

WILLIAMSBURG, VA., Aug. 16th, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL H. W. HALLECK:

Two negroes who left Richmond, on Wednesday, say Jackson's wounded arrived there on Tuesday. All admitted he had been badly whipped. He had asked for large reinforcements, and they had gone, and they comprised all cavalry and artillery which could be dispensed with about Richmond. All guns in Manchester, and one or two from those about Richmond, and eighteen thousand men, twelve thousand of which were from about Fort Randolph, had gone up. The cavalry in cars. He says this movement was known on Tuesday. I send this direct, not having immediate communication with General McClellan.\*

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

True copy.

THO. T. ECKERT,  
*Assist. Supl. Military Telegraph.*

With the exception of the artillery, which was pushing to Falmouth as rapidly as it disembarked, my command had marched (Aug. 22d and 23d) to hold the line of the Rappahannock: orders for that purpose having been received from General Halleck through Gen. Burnside.

[No. 3.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,  
FALMOUTH, August 23d, 1862.

GENERAL MORELL:

Despatch received. Move on at once to Kelly's Ford, and occupy and hold it. Relieve Griffin when Sykes gets up to him. If you are called upon to go to Rappahannock Station, move up to the support of the army there.

Your artillery is on the road to you. Sykes will move up this morning and relieve Griffin.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

[No. 4.]

FALMOUTH, August 24th, 1862.

GENERALS MORELL AND SYKES:

Keep your commands well in hand for any emergency, and before advancing another step *do your utmost* to ascertain the position of Pope's forces, and where the enemy is—what force is at Kelly's Ford, and has the enemy been seen on the opposite bank? Give me all the information you have, and the location of your forces and amount of cavalry at the fords. There is no more cavalry here to send you. If you can push scouts over the ford do so as far as possible. What is the latest information?

Send your despatches so that General Sykes can see them. Direct Griffin to fix the

\*Just after the date of this despatch, Mr. William Henry Huribut, now of New York City, then in Washington, strove in vain to make General Halleck believe that General Lee was pushing his forces against General Pope. He had just escaped from Richmond, and had seen the confederate army in motion.

The correctness of our reports are confirmed by General Lee's and Jones' report, vol. 2, *Rebellion Record*, pp. 294, 636.

ground or woods at Barnett's Ford so that a small force with artillery can hold it. I am just informed that Pope is on the Rappahannock, at Warrenton Springs, having attacked and whipped the enemy. I wish to hold Kelly's Ford to-morrow, and I hope by the time I join you that you will be able to inform me what is at and opposite Rappahannock Station.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 4a.]

FALMOUTH, August 24.

General MORELL:

If there is no large force at Kelly's Ford push on to Rappahannock Station; Sykes will follow, and the whole corps will move on to join Pope, near Sulphur Springs, at which point he attacked and drove the enemy over the river. Give aid to the telegraph operators; cut poles for them and push it along. The artillery is in motion; Graham and Smead join Sykes for the present.

F. J. PORTER.

[No. 5.]

August 24th, 2 P. M.

GENERALS MORELL AND SYKES:

Push a scout to Rappahannock Station and find out if Pope has the pickets near there, and gain information of Pope or the enemy. Pope attacked the enemy yesterday, near Sulphur Springs, and the latter retreated. He was to renew the attack to-day, and it is probable Pope was pushing after him, knowing the river at Rappahannock was not fordable.

General Halleck's orders are for us to hold the Rappahannock.

Your artillery is *en route*; also Sykes'. You will therefore carry out your former instructions.

Reinforcements will push up to you.

All goes right.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Early on the morning of the 25th I left Falmouth and joined my command. I began then to send Gen. Burnside the information of our forces and of the enemy, which he required.

[No. 6.]

NEAR MORRISVILLE,  
August 12th, 1862, 11:43 A. M.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I find that last night Pope's cavalry was withdrawn by order, and Kelly's Ford abandoned, without any notice to my command or the cavalry picketing the river. No enemy seen on opposite side of river, except what was moving up towards Sulphur Springs. A good ford about three miles above railroad bridge. Kearney is at Warrenton Station picketing to Bealeton. No pickets extending from Pope this way, and no effort made to keep up communication. The removal of his cavalry diminishes the means. Morell is near Morrisville, with Griffin at Barnett's. Sykes two miles to the rear, with Warren at Barnett's, to take Griffin's place when he goes to Kelly's. I shall go to Barnett's, then Kelly's, and on return give such intelligence as I can gain. Water is very scarce on the road, insufficient for large commands. Regiments have forty rounds, two wagons each; brigade headquarters one; division headquarters, two. Will give full report on return. Four companies of Rhode Island cavalry at Rappahannock Station last night. Telegraph advances very slowly, too slowly. More pickets appear to be wanted, and wire.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 7.]

FROM DEEP CREEK,  
Received August 25th, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

The report to me that all Pope's cavalry at Kelly's ford was withdrawn is an *error*. He left a small company at the fords. I find, or think, the enemy is merely watching us at Barnett's, and was within striking distance of Kelly's. Sufficient force to resist crossing. The enemy has shown himself in small parties. I have decided to leave Griffin at Barnett's for a day longer, send the remainder of Morell to Kelly's, and to-morrow, depending on information I get from a party I have sent to Rappahannock Station, to push Sykes there or halt him in supporting distance of Morell, ready to

push on to the Rappahannock Station. I find the river can be crossed almost anywhere by cavalry and infantry, so that with the exception of the prominent fords, watching is all I can do. The special fords I can hold easily. At Rappahannock Station are four companies of Rhode Island Cavalry, and Kearney's pickets are at Bealeton. Reno and Reynolds I can hear nothing of. Reno's batteries have been withdrawn from Kelly's and Barnett's. The country is miserable, scarcely producing good telegraph poles, much less subsistence for man or beast for this army.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

[No. 8.]

FROM ADVANCE,

Received Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Have you received my despatches indicating my movements to-morrow? You know that Rappahannock Station is under fire from opposite hills, and the houses were destroyed by Pope. I do not like to direct movement on such uncertain data as that furnished by General Halleck. *I know he is misinformed of the location of some of the corps mentioned in his despatches.* Reno has not been at Kelly's for three days, and there is only a picket at Rappahannock Station, and Kearney, not Banks, is at Bealeton. Reno and Reynolds are beyond my reach. I have directed Sykes to go to Rappahannock Station at 5 to-morrow, and will go there myself via Kelly's Ford. Does General McClellan approve? About daybreak my aid and scout will be in from Bealeton. Have you any orders? I want cavalry to remain with me for a few days. For want of grain and provisions I have had to send home some who came up.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

[No. 9.]

FROM ADVANCE, 3:30,

Received Aug. 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Despatch of 10:20 received. General Halleck is misinformed in regard to Reno's location. He is not at Kelly's Ford, nor can I hear of him. No one but four companies of Rhode Island cavalry is at Rappahannock Station and Bealeton. This was the last information I received. I have sent to Bealeton to get information, and shall start Sykes at daybreak for Rappahannock Station or its vicinity. The Sixth New York occupy Barnett's and are on opposite bank. I think they can hold and watch that point, with the addition of a Dutch battery; but if there is a battalion of infantry available without breaking a brigade, think it well to put it there to-morrow. Shall leave Griffin there. Reynolds is gone, and, like Reno, is beyond reach. *This portion of my corps would have been one day further forward had I had any information of Pope's forces or the enemy.*

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

[No. 10.]

ADVANCE, August 25, 1862.

TO GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE:

My aid has just returned from Bealeton. He says Birney is there with two regiments, one at Rappahannock Station. Pope's headquarters are at Warrenton; Kearney at Warrenton Junction. King went to Warrenton to-day. Hooker was to go. Reno is at Sulphur Springs. Reynolds is at Warrenton. Banks and Sigel are at Sulphur Springs fighting to-day. A deserter came over to-day arriving at Rappahannock Station. Said enemy moving his forces to our right. Those left down this way are their regiments which have been cut up in the battles. At Brandreth's station are five hundred wagons guarded by a small force of infantry and squadron of cavalry. At Rappahannock station the river is fordable for all arms. Are my arrangements satisfactory?

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General.*

[No. 11.]

FALMOUTH, Aug. 25,

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER:

Until Sumner's troops arrive it would be well to hold the fords with an ample force. You are now in connection with Pope, and, no doubt, can get what cavalry you want. When you can dispense with the three companies of Indiana cavalry, please send them back. We will send up the forty wagons with provisions for Morell and Griffin; have sent down to Aquia for wagon load of hospital stores; will send them with supply train if they arrive. The wagons and ambulances will be sent out as they arrive with the direction you request. All quiet here. Your despatches all received, and your



disposition of troops is all right. You state that Reno is expected to pass to your left. To what point is he to go?

A. E. BURNSIDE,  
*Major-General*

[No. 12.]

ADVANCE, BARNETT'S FORD,  
8 A. M., August 26, 1862.

All quiet at and on the Rappahannock during the night. At Kelly's Ford the impression exists that two brigades of infantry with one regiment of cavalry are opposite Rappahannock Station. A squadron was seen last evening opposite Kelly's. A company from Bealeton to-day says Kearney is there with his whole division. I expect Sykes to halt about four miles short of Bealeton, at water, and until I can find a proper camp. Water is to be had only by going within range from opposite shore. I shall go through Rappahannock Station and Bealeton to Sykes, where my camp will be. Please have the telegraph run up that way by troops. Barnett's and Kelly's Fords will communicate with you by telegraph to-night. Many men are sick, and, for want of medicines and ambulances, will suffer. I have directed trains to be sent for grain.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General*.

After sending the above despatch, I went to Rappahannock Station, and thence to Bealeton. The enemy had gone to our right. There was no need of staying on the Rappahannock, and at 11 a. m. I sent by General Kearney a letter to General Pope, putting myself under his command.

[No. 13.]

FROM BEALETON STATION,  
Received Aug. 26, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Have been to Rappahannock Station. I find it in possession of General Kearney, whom I will relieve to-morrow. No enemy in front; river fordable anywhere; Sykes is here. Morell, with two divisions, is at Kelly's, and Griffin at Barnett's; Reno is expected to pass my left.

F. J. PORTER.

[No. 14.]

FROM BEALETON, VIA WASHINGTON,  
Received Aug. 26, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Sykes is within three miles of this camp, and I will be up to-morrow to relieve Kearney. Reading your despatch of last night, I expected to find Banks and Reno here. I consider the fords below perfectly safe with much less forces, but for future movements I think they should remain. Sykes will get provisions and grain here. His wagons can come up with ammunition and medical supplies.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General*.

[No. 15.]

FROM ADVANCE, SIX MILES FROM BEALETON,  
Aug. 26, 1862.

TO GENERAL PARKE:

I despatched you from Bealeton, under the impression that Sykes was three miles off. I went to Barnett's. All is well at the first two. Griffin is at first; Morell, with two divisions, at the second. I have decided to post Sykes at Bealeton, and picket, with strength from infantry and artillery, Rappahannock Station, and patrol with cavalry. The Rappahannock is fordable everywhere; and if the enemy desired to cross, he could do so with a larger force than I have. Camp, for want of water, cannot be found nearer, except within gunshot. I have sent back cavalry as fast as I could, and ordered them from the divisions, and directed Morell to use those at the fords. This I had done before receiving your telegram. The one hundred and fifty cavalry will be a good thing. Send grain. Provisions can be brought to Bealeton from Warrenton. Please send up the wagons and ambulances, and have the drivers directed to pick up sick in a house about nine miles from Bealeton, on right hand side, and bring them here. The supply train must go to Barrett's and Kelly's Fords; ambulances, also, which belong to Morell's. Please have sent up to-morrow an operator and instrument, for Bealeton, to work the other lines; also the corps mail.

F. J. PORTER.

At 11 p. m., 26th, I received the following order from General Pope, given in reply to my report for duty. This I despatched at once to General Burnside.

The speed with which General Pope's orders were generally delivered begin to be illustrated in this case. It was more than four hours going twelve miles.

[No. 16.]

FROM ADVANCE, 11:45 P. M., Aug. 26th,  
Received August 27, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Have just received orders from General Pope to move Sykes to-morrow to within two miles of Warrenton, and to call up Morell to same point, leaving the fords guarded by cavalry. He says the troops in rear should be brought up as rapidly as possible, leaving only a small rear guard at Rappahannock Station, and that he cannot see how a general engagement can be put off more than a day or two. I shall move up as ordered, but the want of grain and the necessity of receiving a supply of subsistence will cause some delay. Please hasten back the wagon sent down, and inform McClellan that I may know I am doing right. Banks is at Fayetteville; McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Reno on his right; Cox joins to-morrow, Sturgis next day, and Franklin is expected. So says General Pope.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION,

August 26, 1862, 7 o'clock p. m.

GENERAL:

Please move forward with Sykes's division to-morrow morning through Fayetteville, to a point two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, and take position where you can easily move to the front, with your right resting on the railroad. Call up Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving only small cavalry forces to watch the fords. If there are any troops below, coming up, they should come up rapidly, leaving only a small rear-guard at Rappahannock Station. You will find General Banks at Fayetteville. I append below the position of our forces, as also those of the enemy. I do not see how a general engagement can be postponed more than a day or two.

McDowell, with his own corps, Sigel's, and three brigades of Reynolds' men, being about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warrenton; Reno joins him on his right and rear, with eight thousand men, at an early hour to-morrow; Cox, with seven thousand men, will move forward to join him in the afternoon of to-morrow; Banks, with six thousand men is at Fayetteville; Sturgis, about eight thousand strong, will move forward by day after to-morrow; Franklin, I hope, with his corps, will, by day after to-morrow night, occupy the point where the Manassas Gap railroad intersects the turnpike from Warrenton to Washington city; Heintzleman's corps will be held in reserve here at Warrenton Junction until it is ascertained that the enemy has begun to cross Hedgeman's river. You will understand how necessary it is for our troops to be in position as soon as possible. The enemy's line extend from a point a little east of Warrenton Sulphur Springs around to a point a few miles north of the turnpike from Sperryville to Warrenton, with his front presented to the east, and his trains thrown around well behind him in the direction of Little Washington and Sperryville. Make your men cook three days' rations and keep at least two days' cooked rations constantly on hand. Hurry up Morell as rapidly as possible, as also the troops coming up in his rear. The enemy has a strong column still further to his left towards Manassas Gap railroad, in the direction of Salem.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER,  
*Commanding 5th Army Corps.*

[No. 16a.]

HQ'RS 5TH ARMY CORPS,  
6 miles from Beadton, Aug 26—11 a. m.

Major-Gen'l JOHN POPE,  
*Com'd'g Army of Virginia, Warrenton Junction:*

GENERAL: Your dispatch of 7 p. m. is at hand, and your instructions will be obeyed as rapidly as possible. My forces have been disposed of under instructions from the

General-in-Chief, and owing to the fact that their wagons have been sent to Falmouth for provisions (that on hand being expended), they may not move as rapidly as you may wish, but they will be there in time for effective service.

No troops are in my rear, that I know of. Sumner is to land at Aquia, but I know nothing of him. I shall leave at the ford the cavalry force which has been guarding them.

I have no cavalry.

I am, general, very respectfully, your ob'd't servant,

F. J. PORTER,  
*Maj. Gen'l Com'd'g.*

I will thank you to direct grain for 800 animals for 3 days to be sent to Bealeton early in the morning. I am out entirely, and there is none to be had in this country. I have very few wagons.

F. J. P.

None to carry subsistence or ammunition, and I have only 40 rounds of the latter. The wagons have not come up, and we have been hastened forward to occupy positions, and depend on the small transportation which General Burnside could provide. I have no ambulances, and no medical supplies. I mention these facts in the hope you may provide deficiencies.

F. J. P.

[No. 17.]

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,  
AUGUST 27th, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL MORELL, COMMANDING DIVISION:

General, The commanding general directs that you hurry up with your command, pass through Bealeton and Fayetteville, and join the commanding-general in the vicinity of Warrenton. Smead will be directed to join and report to you with his battery.

When your command passes through Bealeton and Fayetteville have your ranks well closed up, so that a good impression may be made by the appearance of our troops. Permit no straggling.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRED. T. LOCKE, A. A. G.

P. S.—After getting to Bealeton send all your men belonging to the cavalry back to their commands. If Griffin cannot get all the way up to-day let him stop at Bealeton.

Try and keep three days' cooked rations always in possession of your men.

General, lose no time in getting up. You will find me near Warrenton, and if you send forward an officer to me will have you located. Do all you can to get up provisions, and put as much bread in haversacks as possible—three days. We go right to the railroad, and with your cattle will manage to get all that is wanted. Hurry up Griffin; don't wait for him. Hope you are improving.

F. J. PORTER.

While on the march in execution of the above I received the following order. Jackson and Stewart, at 8 P. M., 26th, had struck General Pope's rear and occupied all his communications with Washington. This order was five hours by daylight reaching me, then only five miles from General Pope:

[No. 18.]

(From advance.—Received August 27th, 1862.)

BEALETON, 9 A. M., August 27th, 1862.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I am ordered to move direct to Warrenton Junction, and to push up the command at Barnett, &c. The enemy have struck with their cavalry the railroad near Manassas. I expect to be out of reach of you, and you must keep back trains, &c. If you can push up ambulances I want them much. Your animals will have to rely on grassing; there is no grain.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION, August 27th, 1862, 4 o'clock A. M.

GENERAL:

Your note of 11 P. M. yesterday is received. Major-General Pope directs me to say that under the circumstances stated by you in relation to your command he desires

you to march *direct to this place* as rapidly as possible. The troops behind you at Barnett's Ford will be directed by you to march at once direct to this place, or Weaver-ville, without going to Rappahannock Station. Forage is hard to get, and you must graze your animals as far as you can do so. The enemy's cavalry has intercepted *our railway communication near Manassas*, and he seems to be advancing with a heavy force along the Manassas Gap Railroad. We will probably move to attack him to-morrow in the neighborhood of Gainesville, which may *bring our line further back towards Washington*. Of this I will endeavor to notify you in time. You should get here as early in the day to-morrow as possible, in order to render assistance should it be needed.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RUGGLES,

*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

MAJOR-GENERAL F. J. PORTER,  
*Commanding Fifth Army Corps.*

After a very hot and hard march running into night, my command reached Warrenton Junction, via Bealeton, and until a late hour was engaged getting food, of which they had had none that day, and which was very scarce with General Pope's army.

[No. 19.]

WARRENTON, 27th, P. M.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford. Can you have it hauled to Fredericksburg and stored? His wagons were all sent to you for grain and ammunition. I have sent back to you every man of the First and Sixth New York Cavalry, except what has been sent to Gainesville. I will get them to you after a while. Everything here is at sixes and sevens, and I find I am to take care of myself in every respect. *Our line of communication has taken care of itself, in compliance with orders.* The army has not three days' provisions. The enemy captured all Pope's and other clothing; and from McDowell the same, including liquors. No guards accompanying the trains, and small ones guard bridges. The wagons are rolling on, and I shall be here to-morrow. Good night!

F. J. PORTER,

*Major General.*

The despatch (20), enclosing the annexed order, was written with sufficiently full information of the movements of the enemy to form an idea of their destination. I also became, as will be seen, in some degree acquainted with the general policy of the campaign till the large reinforcements from the army of the Potomac should join us.

[No. 20.]

(From Warrenton Junction, August 27th, 1862—1 P. M.)

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE, Falmouth, Virginia:

I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as well as the present. Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty power was propelling them. I see no cause of alarm, though this may cause it. McDowell is moving to Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter got to Buckland bridge in time to put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is pursuing his route unmolested to the Shenandoah or Loudon County. The forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, Whiting's, Ewell's and Anderson's (late Huger's) divisions.

Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. They have much artillery and long wagon trains. The raid on the railroad was near Cedar Run, and made by a regiment of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The place was guarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavalry. They routed the guard, captured a train and many men, destroyed the bridge, and retired leisurely down the roads toward Manassas. It can easily be repaired. No troops are coming up except new troops, that I can hear of. Sturgis is here with two regiments; four were cut off by the raid. The positions of the troops are given in this order. No enemy in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized when Stuart's aide-de-camp was seized, directs Stuart to leave a squadron only to watch in front of the Hanover Junction, &c. Everything has moved up north. I found a vast difference between these



troops and ours, but I suppose they were new, as to-day they burned their clothes, &c., when there was not the least cause. I hear that they are much demoralized, and needed some good troops to give them heart, and, I think, head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run,\* and I presume will be there in a few days, if strategy don't use us up. The strategy is magnificent, and tactics in the inverse proportion. I would like some of my ambulances. I would like also to be ordered to return to Fredericksburg, to push toward Hanover, or, with a larger force, to push toward Orange Court House. I wish Sumner was at Washington, and up near the Monocacy, with good batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have a large amount of supplies provided for them, and I believe they have a contempt for the Army of Virginia. I wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our companions. I was informed to-day by the best authority that, in opposition to General Pope's views, this army was pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army that could take care of itself. Pope says he long since wanted to go behind the Occoquan. I am in great need of ambulances, and the officers need medicines, which, for want of transportation, were left behind. I hear many of the sick of my corps are in houses on the road—very sick, I think. There is no fear of an enemy crossing the Rappahannock. The cavalry are all in the advance of the rebel army. At Kelly's and Barnett's farms much property was left, in consequence of the wagons going down for grain, &c. If you can push up the grain to-night, please do so, direct to this place. There is no grain here or anywhere, and this army is wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says he never could get enough. Most of this is private, but if you can get me away, please do so. Make what use of this you choose, so it does good. Don't let the alarm here disturb you. If you had a good force you could go to Richmond. A force should at once be pushed on to Manassas to open the road. Our provisions are very short.

F. J. PORTER.

After telegraphing, this dispatch will be sent to General Burnside.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
WARRENTON JUNCTION, August 27th, 1862.

*General Orders No. —.* The following movement of troops will be made, viz:

Major-General McDowell, with his own and Sigel's corps, and the division of Brigadier-General Reynolds, will pursue the turnpike from Warrenton to Gainesville, if possible, to-night.

The army corps of General Heintzelman, with the detachment of the Ninth corps, under Major-General Reno, leading, will take the road from Catlett's Station to Greenwich, so as to reach there to-night or early in the morning. Major-General Reno will immediately communicate with Major-General McDowell, and his command, as well as that of Major-General Heintzelman, will support Major-General McDowell in any operations against the enemy.

Major-General Fitz John Porter will remain at Warrenton Junction till he is relieved by Major-General Banks, when he will immediately push forward with his corps in the direction of Greenwich and Gainesville, to assist the operations on the right wing.

Major-General Banks, as soon as he arrives at Warrenton Junction, will assume the charge of the trains, and cover their movement toward Manassas Junction. The train of his own corps, under escort of two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, will pursue the road, south of the railroad, which conducts into the rear of Manassas Junction. As soon as the trains have passed Warrenton Junction he will take post behind Cedar Run, covering the fords and bridges of that stream, and holding the position as long as possible. He will cause all the railroad trains to be loaded with the public and private stores now here, and run them back towards Manassas Junction as far as the railroad is practicable. Wherever a bridge is burned so as to impede the further passage of the railroad trains, he will assemble them all as near together as possible, and protect them with his command until the bridges are rebuilt. If the enemy is too strong before him before the bridges can be repaired, he will be careful to destroy entirely the train, locomotives and stores before he falls back in the direction of Manassas Junction. He is, however, to understand that he is to defend his position as long as possible, keeping himself in constant communication with Major-General Porter on his right. If any sick, now in hospital at Warrenton Junction, are not provided for and able to be transported, he will have them loaded into the wagon train of his own corps (even if this should necessitate the destruction of much baggage and regimental property), and carried to Manassas Junction. The very important duty devolved upon Major-General Banks, the major-general commanding the Army of Virginia feels assured he will discharge with intelligence, courage and fidelity.

The General Headquarters will be with the corps of General Heintzelman until further notice.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
Colonel and Chief of Staff.

\*General Pope.



The above order was superseded by the following, received at 9:50 P. M. It turned me again towards Alexandria.

In anticipation of an early march under the above order, I had sent two aids to examine the character, direction, &c., of the roads. They found the road to Catlett's Station where that to Greenwich branched, so crowded with wagons as to be almost impassable. The bearer of the order had found great difficulty in getting to me, having been three hours and twenty minutes going ten miles, part by daylight.

[No. 21.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
BRISTOL STATION, August 27, 1862, 6:30 P. M.

GENERAL: The Major General commanding directs that you start at one o'clock to-night, and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately; also send word to Banks to hurry forward at all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight.

I send an officer with this dispatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him to that effect.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

P. S. If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery, as a guard, till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately upon his doing so. If Banks is not at the Junction, instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of artillery with it.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

Major-General PORTER, Warrenton Junction.

The following dispatch (21 a) was never heard of by me till I found it in a pamphlet published by General Roberts. It was not sent to me. It was acknowledged as genuine by the Recorder before the Board.

[No. 21 a.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
Bristol Station, Aug. 28th 1862.—6.5 a. m.

Maj. Gen. F. J. PORTER,  
*Commanding 5th Corps.*

GENERAL: Major-General Pope directs me to say that General Hooker reports his ammunition exhausted. Gen. Pope desires, therefore, that you come forward with your command at once with all possible speed, and that you send back to hurry up your ammunition train.

I am, general, your obedient servant, very respectfully,

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Col. & Chief of Staff.*

I joined General Pope before 8 A. M., 27th. The head of my column was halted at Broad Run to close up the column, fearfully broken by unruly and crowding wagon trains. About 10 A. M. the corps took its place in line.

[No. 22.]

BRISTOL, 9:30 A. M., August 28, 1862.

My command will soon be up, and will at once go into position. Hooker drove Ewell some three miles, and Pope says McDowell intercepted Longstreet, so that with-

out a long detour he cannot join Ewell, Jackson and A. P. Hill, who are, or supposed to be, at Manassas. Ewell's train, he says, took the road to Gainesville, where McDowell is coming from. We shall be to-day as follows: I on right of railroad, Heintzelman on left, then Reno, then McDowell. He hopes to get Ewell, and push to Manassas to-day.

I hope all goes well near Washington. I think there need be no cause of fear for us. I feel as if on my own way now, and thus far have kept my command and trains well up. More supplies than I supposed on hand have been brought, but none to spare, and we must make connection soon. I hope for the best, and my lucky star is always up about my birthday, the 31st, and hope Me's is up also. You will hear of us soon by way of Alexandria.

Ever yours,

F. J. P.

General BURNSIDE, Falmouth.

At this time, with forty wagons of provisions from General Burnside on hand, I felt myself independent of General Pope's supply, but I was disappointed, as amid the confusion the wagons could not be found before the night of the 29th. The men were then supplied with a small allowance of hard tack, about all the food they had from breakfast that morning till the 31st at Centreville.

[No. 23.]

The following just received from Porter, four miles from Manassas, the 28th, 2 P. M.:

"All that talk about bagging Jackson, &c., was bosh. That enormous gap—Manassas—was left open and the enemy jumped through; and the story of McDowell having cut off Longstreet had no good foundation. The enemy have destroyed all our bridges, burnt trains, &c., and made this army rush back to look at its line of communication, and find us bare of subsistence. We are far from Alexandria, considering the means of transportation. Your supply train of forty wagons is here, but I can't find them. There is a report that Jackson is at Centreville, which you can believe or not. The enemy destroyed an immense amount of property at Manassas—cars and supplies. I expect the next thing will be a raid on our rear, by way of Warrenton Pike, by Longstreet, who was cut off.

"F. J. PORTER,  
"Major-General."

This is the latest news.

A. E. BURNSIDE,  
Major-General.

[No. 24.]

FALMOUTH, Virginia, 5½ P. M., 29.

GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,  
General-in-Chief:

The following message has just been received:

BRISTOE, 6 A. M., 29.

TO GENERAL BURNSIDE:

I shall be off in half an hour. the messenger who brought this says the enemy had been at Centreville, and pickets were found there last night.

Sigel had severe fight last night; took many prisoners; Banks is at Warrenton Junction; McDowell near Gainesville; Heintzelman and Reno at Centreville, where they marched yesterday, and Pope went to Centreville with the last two as a body guard, at the time not knowing where was the enemy, and when Sigel was fighting within eight miles of him and in sight. Comment is unnecessary.

The enormous trains are still rolling on, many animals not being watered for 50 hours; I shall be out of provisions to-morrow night; your train of forty wagons cannot be found.

I hope Mac's at work, and we will soon get ordered out of this. It would seem from proper statements of the enemy that he was wandering around loose; but I expect they know what they are doing, which is more than any one here or anywhere knows.

Just received the following order:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
NEAR BULL RUN, Aug. 29, 1862, 3 A. M.

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER:

General McDowell has anticipated the retreat of Jackson; Sigel is immediately on the right of McDowell.

Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early dawn; Major-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville at the first dawn of day with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe engagement is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Ch.*

A large body of the enemy reported opposite; I am preparing and will hold the place until the last; the only fear I have is a force coming from Manassas Junction.

A. E. BURNSIDE,  
*Major-General.*

A verbal message by Captain Piatt of Gen. Pope's staff of the same tenor as No. 25 found me about midway between Manassas Junction and Bull Run, going to Centreville under the preceding order.

That verbal order was:

General Pope orders you to march to Gainesville and take King with you.

An order (No. 25), by the hands of Gen. Gibbon, found me about 9.30 a. m., nearer Manassas Station, where I had returned to execute the above verbal order.

After passing Manassas Junction this despatch was sent:

*August 29, 1862—8.30 o'clock.*

General MORELL: General Porter desires you to keep closed up and see that the ammunition train, which is, I learn, at Manassas, is put in with our train.

Yours, respectfully,

GEO. SYKES.

It was endorsed as follows about 9 a. m.;

MANASSAS JUNCTION.

GENERAL: There is an ammunition train here belonging to King's division; nothing for us.

GEORGE W. MORELL,  
*Major-General.*

To Major-General PORTER.

and again endorsed about 9.30 a. m.:

GENERAL: We have sixteen wagons here with 396,000 rounds, caliber .58; 20,000 rounds .69. We are ordered to support General King. The head of the column is halted beyond the junction; General Porter will be here soon; he rode ahead to find General Pope; General Gibbon has just come with an order from Pope for us to march to Gainesville at once.

Yours,

F. T. LOCKE, *A. A. G.*

The ammunition was distributed as rapidly as possible, and about 10 a. m. the corps marched toward Gainesville, under the following order (No. 25):

[No. 25.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you upon Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warrenton turnpike. Be expeditious as we lose much.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER.

Since the close of the hearing the following fragment of a dispatch and its postscript of August 29th, from Gen. McDowell, at Manassas, to Gen. Pope, at Centreville, has been furnished to me. It was delivered to Gen. Pope after 2 p. m., near Groveton.

[No. 25.]

\* \* \* "till late. This morning I was told by Reynolds that King's div. was ordered to Manassas, and Ricketts' to Greenwich, and Sigel to Gainesville. Supposing these orders were from you, I left Reynolds on the left of Sigel, and came here to see you and get my two divisions. I find here that King came here on his own order, finding himself overmatched and *Ricketts the same*. King's div. is getting supplies of food and ammunition and will be ready to move soon. I have not heard from Ricketts this morning, but understand he is coming here. It was Gibbon's *brigade* that was engaged yesterday.

"Very respectfully,

"IRVIN McDOWELL, M. G."

"I have just seen your last order telling Porter to take *King*! Of course this is but temporary, and I have asked Porter to place King on his right, that I may have him when you say so.

"I. McDOWELL."

This order (No. 26) was written on the receipt by General Pope of a note from me requesting written orders and informing him of the position of McDowell, Ricketts, &c.:

[No. 26.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
CENTREVILLE, August 29, 1862.

You will please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull's Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so, on account of our supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements of McDowell's troops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton Pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' position, as I have not been able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as possible.

If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's Corps, or at this place.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

The following order (No. 26 *a*) is explanatory of General Pope's purposes in issuing the above order.

The order was delivered about noon August 29th to the generals addressed.

[26 *a*.]

HEADQ'R'S ARMY OF VA., Aug 29th 1862.

To Gens. Heintzelman, Reno & Sigel.

If you find yourselves heavily pressed by superior numbers of the enemy you will not push matters further.

Fitz John Porter and King's Division of McDowell's Corps are moving on Gainesville from Manassas Junction & will come in on your left. They have about twenty thousand men. The command must return to this place to-night or by morning on account of subsistence and forage.

JNO. POPE,  
*Maj. Gen. Comd.*

General McDowell joined me and assumed command of my forces, then on the road to Gainesville and about five miles from Manassas



Junction. They were deploying into line of battle—having the enemy in force immediately in front.

[No. 26 b.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY BRIGADE, 9.30 A. M.

"Seventeen regiments, one battery and five hundred cavalry passed through Gainesville three quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged at once. Please forward this."

JOHN BUFORD,  
Brigadier-General.

GENERAL RICKETTS.

General McDowell decided to separate from me and turn his troops up the Sudley Springs road towards Groveton.

Soon after 1 o'clock, I sent Colonel Locke, my Assistant Adjutant-General, to King's Division, with instructions for it not to go away—intending to use it in extending my march to the Warrenton Pike. I received the following verbal reply:

[No. 27.]

*From General McDowell to Porter on Manassas road, delivered by Colonel Locke, between 1 and 2 o'clock.*

Give my compliments to General Porter, and say to him that I am going to the right and will take King with me. I think he had better remain where he is; but if it is necessary to fall back, to do so upon my left.

The following was given early in the afternoon, and was followed by the despatches and endorsements from 28 to 39 inclusive, in the order now arranged, at various hours up to 6.35 P. M., 29th August:

[No. 30.]

GENERAL:

Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the woods on our right towards the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the road. If this be so, it will be *hot* here in the morning.

GEO. W. MORELL,  
Major-General.

Endorsed as follows:

Move the infantry and everything behind the crest, and conceal the guns. We must hold that place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them they do over us, and get your men out of sight.

F. J. PORTER.

[No. 31.]

GENERAL PORTER:

I can move everything out of sight except Hazlett's battery. Griffin is supporting it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. The other batteries and brigades are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean by everything?

GEO. W. MORELL,  
Major-General.

Endorsed as follows:

GENERAL MORELL:

I think you can move Hazlett's, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes with the others so as to deceive. I would get everything if possible in ambuscade. All goes well with the other troops.

F. J. P.

[No. 29.]

GENERALS McDOWELL and KING:

I found it impossible to communicate by crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in force on this road, and as they appear to have driven our forces back,



the fire of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messages have run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how affairs are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back?

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

General Heintzelman's diary recites the substance of this dispatch, and shows it was received by General Pope at forty-five minutes past five.

The following dispatch is but a duplicate of the foregoing. The duplicate was sent by another messenger,\*so that in case the one should not reach its destination the other would do so.

[NEW.]

Produced by General McDowell—Board Record, p. 810.

[29 a.]

General McDowell: The firing on my right has so far retired that, as I cannot advance, and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall withdraw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate, please do so. I have sent many messengers to you and General Sigel, and get nothing.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

An artillery duel is going on now—been skirmishing for a long time.

F. J. P.

In pursuance of the purpose expressed in these dispatches, I sent to Morell the following order:

[No. 28.]

August 29th, 1862.

GENERAL MORELL:

Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach a road up which King is moving, and he has got ahead of you, let him pass, but see if you cannot give help to Sigel. If you find him retiring, move back toward Manassas, and should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

Look to the points of the compass for Manassas.

But soon, finding he was mistaken as to the main army retiring, and before anything was done by Morell in execution of it, I sent him the following:

[No. 33.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is passing?

F. J. PORTER.

[No. 32.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Tell me what is passing, quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to him, and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 34.]

GENERAL MORELL:

The enemy must be in a much larger force than I can see, from the commands of the officers, I should judge a brigade. They are endeavoring to come in on our left, and have been advancing. Have also heard the noise on left as the movement of artillery. Their advance is quite close.

E. G. MARSHALL,  
*Colonel 13th N. Y.*

[No. 35.]

GENERAL PORTER:

Colonel Marshall reports a movement in front of his left. I think we had better retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the movement. Stay where you are to aid me if necessary.

MORELL.

[No. 36.]

GENERAL MORELL:

I have all within reach of you. I wish you to give the enemy a good shelling without wasting ammunition, and push at the same time a party over to see what is going on. We cannot retire while McDowell holds his own.

F. J. P.

Next follows in order the despatch from General Warren, who had read the above, to General Sykes:

No. 36 a.

5 h. 45 m. p. m., Aug. 29, '62.

GENERAL SYKES:

I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and support Morell. I faced about and did so. I soon met Griffin's brigade, withdrawing, by order of General Morell, who was not pushed out, but returning. I faced about and marched back 200 yards or so. I met then an orderly from General Porter to General Morell, saying he must push on and press the enemy; that all was going well for us, and he was returning. Griffin then faced about; and I am following him to support General Morell, as ordered. None of the batteries are closed up to me.

Respectfully,

G. K. WARREN.

This dispatch undoubtedly refers to one of the dispatches last to General Morell, the date 5.45 p. m., shows about the hour at which those dispatches were received and sent back.

[No. 37.]

August 29th.

GENERAL MORELL:

I wish you to push up two regiments supported by two others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attack the section of artillery opposed to you. The battle works well on our right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy a good shelling as our troops advance.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General Commanding.*

[No. 38.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Put your men in position to remain during the night, and have out your pickets. Put them so that they will be in position to resist anything. I am about a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well and we are getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a dozen men from the cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are passing up to Gainesville, pushing the enemy; Ricketts has gone, also King.

F. J. PORTER, *Maj.-Gen.*

After the time of these occurrences, I sent the following:

[No. 38 a.]

Newly produced by McDowell:

General McDowell or King: I have been wandering over the woods, and failed to get a communication to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force in front of me, and I wish to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have to retire for food and water, which I cannot get here. How goes the battle? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left.

F. J. PORTER,

*Major-General Volunteers.*

[No. 38 b.]

Newly produced by McDowell:

General McDowell,—Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about the woods for a time I withdrew him, and, while doing so, artillery opened upon us.

My scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe some have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not succeed, as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of scouts think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this messenger came. I have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs whether you retire or not. I cannot get water, and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men from infantry firing.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General Volunteers.*

Aug. 29, 6. P. M.

The two dispatches last set out are evidently duplicates of each other. They were sent by different messengers, and probably by different routes, so as to secure that one of them should reach the intended destination. It is quite evident that they intended to describe, in short, the movement of Morell over to the right, the inability to communicate the moving of the enemy on his right, and to ask for such information as would enable me to determine what I should do for the night, which was then approaching. It is a mistake to suppose that these dispatches intended to describe events occurring immediately before their date (6 P. M.). They run hurriedly over the events of the afternoon, so as to give an idea of the situation at that time.

These dispatches contain intrinsic evidence that they were written before I had received the 4.30 order. The language found in them could not have been used by me if I had already received the order to attack, as contained in the 4.30 order. In fact the following despatch shows that at that hour (Ricketts not having passed at sunset) I did not know General Pope was at Groveton.

[No. 38 c.]

Newly discovered (Board Record, p. 304):

GEN. MORRELL: Send down some energetic men to Gen. Pope at Centreville. Get hold of Colonel Beckwith and get some rations. Bring beef up to kill; we have nothing else; and get enough to last two or three days.

F. J. PORTER, *Major General.*

Ricketts has gone up, also King.

After this, and certainly after sunset, I received the following order:

[No. 39.]

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,  
August 29, 1862—4.30 p. m.

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER:

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds.

The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

Immediately on receipt of the above order I sent Colonel Locke with verbal orders to General Morell to attack with his whole force, and after acknowledging the receipt of the order went myself to Morell, and then the events occurred which are described by General Morell in his evidence and in the evidence of Colonel Locke.

[No. 40.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
In the Field Near Bull Run, August 29, 1862, 8:50 p. m.

GENERAL:

Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and

report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning.

JOHN POPE,  
*Major General Commanding.*

Major General F. J. PORTER.  
Received 3:30 A. M., Aug. 30.

Though the above order from General Pope was dispatched from and delivered at the same points as the 4.30 order, only five miles apart, six hours and a half were occupied in the delivery.

[No. 41.]

GENERAL MORELL:

Lose not a moment in withdrawing and coming down the road to me. The wagons\* which went up send down at once, and have the road cleared; and send me word when you have all in motion. Your command must follow Sykes's.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General Commanding.*

The following despatch (B. R. p. 717), written at the same time as No. 41, came to light for the first time in the evidence of Gen. Sturgis. If it had been brought forward before the court-martial in 1862, it certainly would have relieved me of all suspicion and of the charge that knowingly I permitted Piatt's brigade and Griffin's to wander to Centreville, and would have tended to destroy the impression of an evil *animus* on my part.

[No. 41 a.]

Gen. Sturgis: Please put your command in motion to follow Sykes as soon as he starts. If you know of any other troops who are to join me, I wish you to send them notice to follow you.

We march as soon as we can see.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major General.*

[No. 42.]

HEADQUARTERS, NEAR GROVETON,  
August 30th, 1862, 12 o'clock M.

Special order No.

The following forces will be immediately *thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy*, and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of *the pursuit*. Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton Turnpike, *followed* by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds.

The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Haymarket Road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman; the necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made.

The general headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton Turnpike.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

[No. 43.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 30th, 1862.

Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to *pursue the enemy*, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds; Heintzelman, with his corps, preceded by

\* Two wagons of "hard tack"—all that could be got hold of, of Burnside's 40 wagons—and the only provisions the men had from early 29th to about noon 31st.



Reynolds' division, will move on your right on the road from Sudley Springs to Haymarket. He is instructed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which it is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of Reynolds' division on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to report to you; push it well to the left as you advance.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c.*

[No. 44.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 30th, 1862.

GENERAL:

Major-General McDowell directs that you push on the movement suggested in your note to him to the left, and General Heintzelman, now here, will attend to the front and right. You have at your disposal, to reinforce you, King's division and Reynolds's.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZ JOHN PORTER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c.*

NOTE.—The enemy having shown indications of advancing by the right, Reynolds has been withdrawn from your column and put over on our left; it is still thought you will be strong enough to effect your purpose with King; if not, General Pope will send you Sigel.

[No. 45.]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD ARMY CORPS, ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
August 30th, 1862.

Major-General McDowell is now busy attending to our left; he directs me to inform you that you must use your discretion in reference to the employment of King's division in connection with the service you are to perform.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ED. SCHRIVER,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

MAJOR-GENERAL PORTER,  
*Commanding, &c., &c.*

[No. 46.]

GENERAL McDOWELL:

I fear for the result unless you push up Sigel. Our right is also attacked.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 47.]

(Received September 1, 8 A. M.)

CENTERVILLE, August 31, 1862.

DEAR GENERAL:

I send you copies of some orders under which I have moved lately. I advanced in pursuit of the enemy and struck the centre of his line, especially under the direction of General Lee, and was whipped, as was the whole army, badly; that is, it was overpowered. Two of Morell's brigades were in action, under Butterfield, and two of Sykes' (Buchanan and Chapman), and they did nobly. The latter lost by volunteers firing into them before passing through them. They were not sustained on the right, and had to retire. The Pennsylvania Reserves did beautifully; they show the advantage of being well led by Reynolds, Meade, Seymour and Jackson. A battery was lost and retaken by them, but again lost after gallant resistance. Warren has only one hundred and eighty-seven men left—not one missing—and only three commissioned officers. We were driven from the field, and here we are, after marching all



last night, strongly located in a position, which, if the enemy shells, will cause slaughter; but I do not believe he will attack, but get in our rear and compel us to attack him in a well-selected place. The men are without heart, but will fight when cornered. To-day General Pope asked the question of the Government if arrangements had been made to protect Washington in case this army met with a disaster. He said to us chiefs of corps present when the reply was received that he was glad the Government had decided the question for him, but we were to fight wherever the enemy was, meaning we were not to return to Alexandria, &c., as all forces were coming to us. I believe the decision was a general disappointment except to him. However, we obey, and do what Halleck thinks is best. Pope says there are political considerations which control, not the safety of the army. But our men will not fight with heart when they know, if wounded (as we cannot retain the field against present odds), they are to be left to the care of the enemy.

Pope sent in a flag to-day to get our wounded. I have many officers in their hands, some of the most valuable from every State. Our wagons are gone, and our artillery and cavalry will not soon be movable. The latter is broken down, and, as Pope says, he has no *cavalry*, though he has *regiments*. We have taken very few prisoners—some 400. In return we have left all our killed, and the most of our wounded, in their hands. The enemy got one battery of six pieces yesterday. I believe they belong to Reynolds. The enemy took, at Manassas, one battery, and left one piece (iron) spiked and useless. It was left on the ground when we abandoned Manassas. I hear it is claimed we captured it.

We are bivouacking; and, as I have had no dinner or supper to-day, and no chance of any to-morrow, I will bid you good-bye, in the hope of seeing you (without being whipped), and that you have plenty to eat. If we return, I hope the forces will be directed to take different roads to the forts, and they will be well manned and protected by us. I do not wish to see the army back, if it can be helped; but I fear it may be kept here, at the will of the enemy, to cripple it so that when it does get back it will be so crippled that it cannot defend the forts against the powerful force of the enemy, who will hold it here while they cross into Maryland. I may be in error as to their purpose. Lee is here. Jackson is not now here. Cadmus Wilcox commands Hill's division, directly in front; and the enemy are massing to turn us. I expect to hear hourly of our rear being cut, and our supplies and trains (scarcely guarded) at Fairfax Station being destroyed, as we are required to stay here and fight. I am glad Couch is coming up on the road. Hope we will have the fight before he gets here, as so much will be saved for another day. I understand the Secretary of the Interior sent out some men to take care of our wounded, and they were much surprised to find that they were in the hands of the enemy. They returned with a different impression from what they came. Good-night. The bearer will tell you much.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

General McCLELLAN.

[No. 48.]

CENTREVILLE, VIRGINIA, August 31.

GENERAL McCLELLAN, *near Alexandria:*

Bayard reports the enemy forming in on the Chantilly road, and my pickets that they are coming down the Little River turnpike. Twelve brass guns were seen, and infantry and cavalry. I can see the dust and flags; columns evidently moving directly north, evidently towards Leesburg. If you can, I hope you will protect the ford into Maryland, and guard the railroad to Baltimore. I think we will have a fight before night. The enemy are between us and Fairfax Court-House, and shelled our trains last night. We will fight, or they will avoid us and strike our rear first. We have been held on thirty-six hours too long, and we are bound to work our way to Alexandria. I only regret that we have not been distributed to forts, and to the fords over the Potomac into Maryland. God speed your operations, and enable you and others in authority to save our country.

Yours,

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General.*

After a conference with general officers at Centreville, lasting till dark, General Pope gave verbal orders to fall back to Fairfax C. H. After arrival there on the 2d I received the following order. The enemy had struck our rear, and the fight provided for therein had taken place while we were at Centreville:

[No. 49.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,  
FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, September 1, 1862.

General Order No. —.

The army corps of Heintzelman, Sigel, Sumner, Porter and Reno, as soon after daylight as possible, will begin to draw slowly to their right in the direction of Fairfax Court House until they come closely in contact with each other. Major-General Reno will follow as closely as possible the line of the old railroad now occupied by him; the others along the pike. He will notify those in his rear of his exact position and every step of his movements, and will ask support if he needs it. They will not be more than half a mile in rear of him. If any severe engagement should occur at any point of the line the army corps commanders on the right and left will immediately send forward a staff officer to report to the general commanding the troops of the attack, and to notify him that they are ready to support him if he needs it. For the present the general headquarters will be established at Fairfax Court House.

By command of Major-General Pope.

GEO. D. RUGGLES,  
*Colonel and Chief of Staff.*

I received the following despatch at Fairfax C. H. about 9:50 A. M., September 2d.

[No. 50.]

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
September 1, 1862—5:30 P. M.

I ask of you for my sake, that of the country and of the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to all my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me.

I am in charge of the defenses of Washington; I am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become necessary.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*Major-General PORTER,  
Centreville, Commanding 5th Corps.

I asked of General Pope, but was refused the sending of this reply:

[No. 51.]

FAIRFAX COURT HOUSE, September 2d, 1862—10 A. M.

You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed and wounded and enfeebled troops attest our devotion to duty.

F. J. PORTER,  
*Major-General Commanding.*General GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
Washington City.

General McClellan said as the cause of sending his dispatch:

[No. 52.]

I sent the despatch in accordance with the request of the President of the United States, who sent for me on that day, and told me that he had understood that there was an unkind feeling on the part of the army of the Potomac towards General Pope, and requested me to use my personal influence to correct it by telegraphing either to General Porter or to any other of my friends there. I told him I did not consider it necessary, but was perfectly willing to do it. I had no doubt, then, in my own mind but that the army of the Potomac, and all connected with it, would do their duty without there being any necessity for action on my part.

He sent, as thus shown, the telegram to quiet the apprehensions of the President, and not to remove any apprehensions of his own.

[No. 53.]

HEADQUARTERS FIELD OF BATTLE,  
NEAR GROVETON, VIRGINIA, 5 A. M., August 30, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief, United States Army.*

We fought a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until after dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted yet to push matters, though I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as General Fitz John Porter comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still in our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than eight thousand (8,000) men, killed and wounded; but from appearances of the field, the enemy lost not less than two to one. We stood strictly on the defensive, and every assault was made by ourselves. The battle was fought on the identical battle-field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of the men.

The news just reaches me from the front that the enemy is retiring towards the mountains. I go forward at once to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent. Our troops behaved splendidly. \* \* \*

JOHN POPE,  
*Major-General.*

[No. 54.]

CENTREVILLE, August 30, 1862—9:45 P. M.

We have had a terrific battle again to-day. The enemy largely reinforced assaulted our position early to-day. We held our ground firmly until 6 P. M., when the enemy massing very heavy forces on our left, forced back that wing about half a mile. At dark we held that position. Under all the circumstances, both horses and men having been two days without food, and the enemy greatly outnumbering us, I thought it best to draw back to this place at dark. The movement has been made in perfect order and without loss. The troops are in good heart, and marched off the field without the least hurry or confusion. Their conduct was very fine. The battle was most furious for hours without cessation, and the losses on both sides very heavy. The enemy is badly crippled and we shall do well enough. Do not be uneasy. We will hold our own here. The labors and hardships of this army for two or three weeks have been beyond description. We have delayed the enemy as long as possible without losing the army. We have damaged him heavily, and I think the army entitled to the gratitude of the country. Be easy; everything will go well.

JNO. POPE.

Major-General HALLECK, *General-in-Chief.*

P. S.—We have lost nothing, neither guns nor wagons.

The following despatch caused the President to ask General McClellan to send me, or some other of his friends, despatch 50:

[No. 55.]

CENTREVILLE, September 1, 8:50 P. M.

All was quiet yesterday, and so far this morning. My men are resting, they need it much. Forage for our horses is being brought up. Our cavalry is completely broken down, so that there are not five horses to a company that can raise a trot. The consequence is that I am forced to keep considerable infantry along the roads in my rear to make them secure, and even then it is difficult to keep the enemy's cavalry off the roads. I shall attack again to-morrow if I can; the next day certainly. I think it my duty to call your attention to the unsoldierly and dangerous conduct of many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula. Every word, and act, and intention is discouraging, and calculated to break down the spirits of the men and produce disaster. One commander of a corps who was ordered to march from Manassas Junction to join me near Groveton, although he was only five miles distant, failed to get up at all—worse still, fell back to Manassas without a fight, and in plain hearing, at less than three miles distance, of a furious battle which raged all day. It was only in consequence of peremptory orders that he joined me the next day. One of his brigades, the brigadier-general of which professed to be looking for his division, absolutely remained all day at Centreville in plain view of the battle, and made no attempt to join. What renders the whole matter worse,



these are both officers of the regular army, who do not hold back from ignorance or fear. Their constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is that the Army of the Potomac will not fight; that they are demoralized by withdrawal from the Peninsula, etc. When such example is set by officers of high rank, the influence is very bad amongst those in subordinate stations. You have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes of commander-in-chief and others. These men are mere tools or parasites, but their example is producing, and must necessarily produce, very disastrous results. You should know these things, as you alone can stop it. Its source is beyond my reach, though its effects are very perceptible and very dangerous. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away. My advice to you—I give it with freedom as I know you will not misunderstand it—is that, in view of any satisfactory results, you draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to organize and re-arrange it. You may avoid great disaster by doing so. I do not consider the matter except in a purely military light, and it is bad enough and grave enough to make some action very necessary. When there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men.

Please hurry forward cavalry horses to me under strong escort. I need them badly—worse than I can tell you.

JNO. POPE,  
*Major-General.*

Major-General HALLECK,  
*General-in-Chief.*

#### CENTREVILLE TO ANTIETAM, AND TO WARRENTON, VA.

The 5th Corps, also Sumner's, Sigel's, Banks', Franklin's and Reno's Corps were held at or near Centreville till the night of September 1st. It was reported early on the 31st to General Pope that the enemy, avoiding our strong position, was moving to our right and rear towards Maryland and Washington. Yet, despite the loss of time, General Pope held to this useless position, not, as he asserted, from his own free will, but by reason of orders from Washington, "a political in opposition to a military necessity controlling."

Near 3 P. M., September 1st, General Pope came to me and candidly stating his enforced position, asked my opinion and suggestions. As we then held a worthless position (the enemy not daring to strike us, and as we were in no condition to go after him), I urged an immediate withdrawal from Centreville for the protection of Washington and Maryland, towards which for two days in plain sight the enemy had been moving. I said that I believed it was wrong to have stopped at Centreville so long. Every reason required it to be abandoned, and our troops were dispirited and without food. He would be held responsible for the safety of the Capital and the proper use of the army. Our condition could not be understood at Washington, and no orders from distant authority should compel him to submit to and maintain a manifestly wrong course from every proper point of view. I said I had had no talk with others, but I suggested that he should confer with those general officers present, whose opinion he had a right to have, and which opinion he should respect. At my solicitation, we sought General Franklin, at whose tent were called Generals W. F. Smith, Newton, Hancock, Slocum, Bartlett, and others, all of whom gave about the same advice I had given, and General Pope then issued verbal orders withdrawing the troops to Fairfax Court House.

Just at this time, General Kelton, aid to General-in-Chief Halleck, entered the tent, and was informed of the orders and the reasons for them. He expressed surprise at receiving an unfavorable report of the situation, and said, from official reports received in Washington, he expected to find General Pope with a very large force, in good condition,

cheerful after great successes, though rumors had been for some time in circulation stating the contrary, which he now found to be the truth. He had come prepared, if the rumors were correct, to direct General Pope to do what he had just done.

While this conference was being held, the enemy, in large force and unknown to us, had struck our right and rear, inflicting heavy losses.

My command that night withdrew towards Fairfax Court House, whence it by order the next day marched *via* Chain Bridge to subsequently occupy the almost vacated defenses of Washington City from Fort Corcoran to Hunting Creek, the security of which was confided entirely to me.

My arrangements in this direction rendered the line secure, and so quieted the alarms of the Secretary of War and General Halleck as to induce them to send a large part of my command, now numbering some 25,000 men, to the Army of the Potomac, then moving against General Lee at Frederick.

This force, as the regiments arrived, I had organized into divisions and brigades, and had so placed them that large bodies could be used quickly at any point on the defenses, or selected for active operations in the field.

Near midnight on the 12th September, I received orders to rejoin the Army of the Potomac. Early on the 13th, while passing through Washington with Morell's division, about 6,000 strong, all I had any right to take, the remainder of my corps, Sykes' having preceded me, I was offered, by General Halleck, under direction of the Secretary of War, an additional division from the southern defenses of Washington. At my request, General Humphreys was assigned to command this division.

General Humphreys hastened to join me. Detained in the vicinity of Frederick City at the earnest request of the Secretary of War and General Halleck, to allay fears that the enemy might evade us and capture Washington, General Humphreys, much to his regret and mortification, to mine and to that of his command, as affecting the result and honor of the day, was prevented from arriving in time to take part in the battle of Antietam.

I mention these facts to counteract the effect of a report to which one of General Halleck's dispatches gave circulation, that I left Washington City with at least 20,000 men. General Halleck knew that Humphreys' division had been retained in the vicinity of Washington with his approval, and that its commander had in vain endeavored to provide it with serviceable arms, equipments, and transportation.

My official report of these events in the War Department shows the condition of my command at the time and the service to which it was put. I will, however, repeat, in this connection, that my command was as early as any on the field at Antietam, and consisted of Morell and Sykes' divisions, about 9,000 strong. Of these, all except some 2,000 were detached at critical moments by my orders or General McClellan's to the assistance of others, or were in action in my front at the time, when it has been asserted my corps (erroneously said to have been idle) could have decided the fate of the day.

In regard to a report freely circulated that I refused assistance to General Burnside during that battle, I repeat that General Burnside officially denied that he had applied to me for aid, and I am assured that no application reached General McClellan before darkness had closed the contest between the weary combatants. Of my own free will that day I sent Warren's brigade to secure Burnside's right flank, and posted batteries to aid in clearing his front as he advanced to the attack.



My report of the services of the corps at the battle of Antietam, and of the engagement at the Sharpsburg crossing of the Potomac is in the War Department.

Up to November 12th, 1862, I remained in command of the corps, getting it in a condition not excelled by any other command for the effective service soon to be required of it. On that day I was relieved at Warrenton, Va., on the eve of an attack designed by General McClellan upon the right wing of the Confederate army, then widely separated from its left.













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